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**FORMATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE
VISION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE STATE AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE
ON OVERCOMING THE CONSEQUENCES
OF THE OCCUPATION AND CHALLENGES
IN THE REINTEGRATING THE AUTONOMOUS
REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY OF
SEVASTOPOL IN THE INFORMATION,
EDUCATION, SCIENTIFIC, CULTURAL
AND RELIGIOUS FIELDS**

KYIV 2023

This publication is made possible by the generous support of the American people through the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the framework of the Human Rights in Action Program implemented by the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union.

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ISSUED:

Non-governmental organization "Crimean Center of Business and Cultural Cooperation "Ukrainian House" as part of the implementation of the project "Formation of a comprehensive vision and recommendations to the state authorities of Ukraine regarding overcoming the consequences of the occupation and challenges in the process of reintegration of the TOT of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol in the 4- in their spheres: informational, educational-scientific, cultural, religious."

The photos on the cover are by Anatoly Kovalskyi and Yuriy Smelyanskyi

Cover design by Andrii Prybyehy

Page 152

Circulation: 200 copies

Publisher: "ArtEk Publishing House" LLC

Address: 04050, Ukraine, Kyiv, str. Yuriy Ilyenka, bldg. 63

Tel. (+380 97) 552 15 05

ArtEk
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CONTENTS

- 5** INTRODUCTION TO THE REPORT FORMATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE VISION AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATE AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE ON OVERCOMING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCUPATION AND CHALLENGES IN THE REINTEGRATING THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL IN THE INFORMATION, EDUCATION, SCIENTIFIC, CULTURAL AND RELIGIOUS FIELDS (Andriy Shchekun, Yuriy Smielianskyi)
- 10** FORMATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE VISION AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE STATE AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE TO OVERCOME THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCUPATION AND CHALLENGES IN THE PROCESS OF REINTEGRATION OF THE TOT OF THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL IN THE EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC SPHERE (Valentyna Potapova, Yuriy Smielianskyi)
- 37** RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATE AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE ON OVERCOMING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCUPATION AND CHALLENGES IN REINTEGRATING THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL AFTER THEIR LIBERATION IN THE EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC FIELDS
- 46** FORMATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE VISION AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATE AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE ON OVERCOMING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCUPATION AND CHALLENGES IN THE REINTEGRATING THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL IN A RELIGIOUS DIRECTION (Andrii Ivanets, Oleksandr Sagan, Andrii Smirnov, Ruslan Khalikov)
- 63** RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATE AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE ON OVERCOMING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCUPATION AND CHALLENGES IN REINTEGRATING THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL AFTER THEIR LIBERATION, AND ON DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELEVANT PRACTICAL IN THE RELIGIOUS FIELD
- 73** FORMATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE VISION AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATE AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE ON OVERCOMING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCUPATION AND CHALLENGES IN THE REINTEGRATING THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL IN THE INFORMATION POLICY (Gayana Yuksel, Andrii Shchekun)
- 97** RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATE AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE ON OVERCOMING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCUPATION AND CHALLENGES IN REINTEGRATING THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL AFTER THEIR LIBERATION IN INFORMATION POLICY
- 110** FORMATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE VISION AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATE AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE ON OVERCOMING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCUPATION AND CHALLENGES IN THE REINTEGRATING THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL IN THE CULTURAL POLICY (Evelina Kravchenko, Andrii Lutsyk, Serhii Mokrenyuk, Daryna Pidgorna; invited experts: Tetiana Vodotyka, Volodymyr Gurich)
- 148** RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATE AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE REGARDING OVERCOMING THE CONSEQUENCES OF OCCUPATION AND CHALLENGES IN THE PROCESS OF REINTEGRATION OF THE TOT OF THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL ON THE USE OF TERMS RELATED TO COLLABORATIONISM (Andrii Shchekun, Yuriy Smelyanski)



The presented project of experts "Humanitarian politics" of the Expert Network of the Crimean Platform is a fairly thorough and meaningful work, in which clear professional recommendations have been developed for the state authorities of Ukraine. The expert work has a thorough study, which reflects the socio-political situation in Crimea before and after the occupation, taking into account the current Russian-Ukrainian war, which has been ongoing since 2014. What is important to note is that these expert studies should have a political decision regarding further legislative implementation at the state level on reintegration of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

On behalf of the team of our public organization, I am grateful to the experts of the "Humanitarian Policy" group of the Crimean Platform for their work and contribution to the liberation of Crimea. We would like to thank our donors USAID and Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union (UHHRU) for their assistance and support in the implementation of this necessary and extremely important project.

Serhii Kovalskyi,
head of the "Crimean Center for Business
and Cultural Cooperation "Ukrainian House", NGO.

**INTRODUCTION TO THE REPORT
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EDUCATION, SCIENTIFIC, CULTURAL
AND RELIGIOUS FIELDS**

Andriy Shchekun, Yurii Smielianskyi

In 2021, from 29 July to 4 August, the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation together with the Razumkov Centre sociological service conducted a survey on the future of occupied Crimea. One of the results was that the vast majority of Ukrainians (61%) believed that the Crimean peninsula should be part of Ukraine in the future. At the same time, 44% believed that the return of the Crimean peninsula to Ukraine was impossible. This indicator of "belief in a return" fell by 11% compared to a similar survey conducted in 2016. That is, 11% more Ukrainian citizens no longer believe in the possibility of de-occupying the Crimean peninsula.

The reason for these changes was the government's policy of de-occupation and reintegration of Crimea. More precisely, the lack of a clear, transparent and consistent policy on this issue.

In June 2016, at the parliamentary hearings "Strategy of reintegration into Ukraine of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol: problematic issues, ways, methods and means", the Recommendations were approved, the

implementation of which was to lay the foundation for the domestic policy in relation to the occupied territory of the Crimean peninsula.

This document emphasised that "...the development of a state strategy for the reintegration of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol into Ukraine must be preceded by the definition of the procedure by which the process of returning of the de-occupied Crimean peninsula to the legal field of Ukraine will be carried out, which means the prior achievement of political and public consensus on a number of basic issues, in particular:

- in what form of autonomy the de-occupied Crimean peninsula will be reintegrated into Ukraine;
- whether it is advisable to obtain a new name for the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, de-occupied and reintegrated into Ukraine, and what will be the depth and content of the political and legal status of the autonomy;
- how powers will be distributed between local self-government bodies and local authorities in Crimea, including the Kurultay and the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, and the central government, especially in view of Ukraine's new

awareness of the weight and role of the Crimean Tatar factor on the Crimean peninsula;

- how the risks will be minimised to prevent the recurrence of events substantially similar to the Crimean tragedy of 2014, as well as what internal Crimean safeguards will guarantee to prevent any unfriendly external influence, including armed aggression."

It should be noted that unfortunately both the above-mentioned Recommendations and the rhetoric of discussing the entire spectrum of Crimean issues mainly consider only the rights and role of the Crimean Tatar people as an indigenous people of Ukraine. After all, two other indigenous peoples of Ukraine have formed on the territory of the Crimean peninsula: the Karaites and the Krymchaks. And these peoples, despite their small numbers, have the same rights as the Crimean Tatar people.

The authorities have not provided answers to any of the questions posed that would be positively received by Ukrainian society. There is no public dialogue on these issues between civil society, the expert community and the authorities.

At the same time, the Recommendations of the parliamentary hearings themselves have become a successful example of cooperation between civil society, the expert community and the authorities in the development of the state documents of strategic importance. In fact, the Recommendations have become a roadmap for the formation of Crimean Ukrainian policy. Despite the considerable delay, the authorities continue to refer to and implement the points of the Recommendations. Without such close horizontal ties as one of the features of a democratic society, it is impossible to develop and implement an effective Crimean reintegration policy.

Reintegration should be understood as the restoration or return to the legal, economic, ideological, cultural, administrative and other spheres of Ukraine. In other words, the elements of the reintegration policy for the Crimean peninsula, as well as for any other de-occupied territory of Ukraine, will include economic, social, humanitarian, and other policies.

Humanitarian policy should be viewed as a system of goals and means of achieving them by political and state institutions for managing and regulating the spiritual sphere of society. Humanitarian policy can be defined as a system of decisions aimed at creating conditions for the social and humanitarian development of society, social, intellectual and spiritual security of a person, fulfilment of his or her spiritual needs and enrichment of creative potential.

This includes cultural, ethnic, educational, scientific, informational and other types of policies aimed at the comprehensive development of a person as an individual, ensuring his or her constitutional rights and freedoms. In terms of reintegration, these tasks are complicated by the need to overcome the consequences of the occupation. First and foremost, in the minds of people, citizens of Ukraine, who have been forced to stay in occupation or emigration for a long time.

Humanitarian policy is based on the recognition of inalienable human rights, including the right to a decent life for everyone, regardless of national, racial, religious, age, gender, individual or social characteristics.

Accordingly, the goals of humanitarian policy may include consolidation of the titular nation, indigenous peoples of Ukraine and national minorities, all social groups permanently residing on the territory of the Crimean peninsula on the basis of humanism, comprehensive human development

and meeting their cultural, national, educational and religious needs. This is how the goal of humanitarian policy in a democratic state is formulated.

In a totalitarian society, on the contrary, humanitarian policy is aimed at atomising society, subjugating the individual to the dominant ideological doctrine (communist, fascist, national socialist, Zionist, fundamentalist, racist, etc.). This is exactly what is happening today in the occupied territory of Crimea.

The state humanitarian policy is a system and consistent activity of the state in relations with a person in particular and society as a whole, carried out through the state executive, legislative and judicial authorities with the involvement of the public and taking into account fundamental human rights, and aimed at achieving a high level of life, spiritual and intellectual development of the individual, both in his or her own interests and in the interests of the state as a whole.

The results of reintegration can be different: harmony, cooperation, unity or tension, confrontation, conflictuality. Everything will depend on the instruments of the established reintegration policy.

The ultimate goal of humanitarian policy, in particular in the process of implementing reintegration policy on the territory of the Crimean peninsula, should be to create conditions for the full-fledged cultural, national and social development of individuals, national and social groups and society as a whole on the basis of the realisation of human rights of all peoples and ethnic groups as part of a single multinational state.

In this regard, the humanitarian policy of the state in the process of reintegration of the de-occupied Crimean peninsula should be manifested

in the consistent implementation of measures aimed at supporting the humanitarian development of the Crimean regional society and overcoming the consequences of the occupation in accordance with the identified priorities and national interests:

- cultural policy should be aimed at creating conditions for the revival and comprehensive development of the spiritual potential of individuals – and society in the Ukrainian region the Crimean peninsula, ensuring access to the services of cultural institutions and establishments, and guaranteeing freedom of creativity;

- policy in the field of science, the priorities of which are to determine the needs of the state in the field of science; the contribution that the Crimean regional scientific space can bring to the unified Ukrainian scientific space; formation of intellectual potential in the Crimean regional society as an integral part of Ukrainian society; formation of a new Crimean regional system of national and scientific and technological policy and its organic entry into the Ukrainian and world scientific space; improvement of the status of science in society; strengthening the mutual interdependence of science and the economy;

- education policy, the main goal of which is to ensure the regeneration of the Crimean regional educational model, create conditions for access to education, create conditions for the comprehensive development of all branches of education as a basis for the socio-economic, spiritual, cultural and intellectual development of society, overcome the consequences of the occupiers' interference in the minds of the inhabitants of the Crimean peninsula, introduce foreign experience in the development of education, and enrich the educational space of Ukraine;

- religious policy, the main task of which is to ensure the rights and freedoms of thought and religion, religious activity, equality of religious organisations, combining the interests of the state, society and church in the process of shaping morality and spiritual development, creating conditions for a religious environment, providing protection against the negative influence of the Russian church and their religious propaganda on the minds of Crimean residents.

The NGO Crimean Centre for Business and Cultural Cooperation "Ukrainian House", with the involvement of experts from the Humanitarian Policy Working Group of the Crimean Platform Expert Network and the support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in the framework of the program "Human Rights in Action" administered by the Ukrainian Helsinki Human Rights Union, implemented the project "Formation of a comprehensive vision and recommendations for the state authorities of

Ukraine to overcome the consequences of the occupation and challenges in the process of reintegration of the TOT of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol in 4 spheres: information, educational and scientific, cultural, and religious".

The aim of the project was to create a basic document in 4 spheres (information, cultural, religious, educational and scientific) with recommendations for the formation and implementation of state policy, which are integral components of the development of the Concept of Humanitarian State Policy for the Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. The text offered for review is a report resulting from the implementation of this project. In our opinion, the proposed report should become an additional tool to assist the Ukrainian authorities in formulating an objective policy of reintegration of the Crimean peninsula in the issues under consideration.

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AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL
IN THE EDUCATIONAL
AND SCIENTIFIC SPHERE**

Valentyna Potapova, Yuriy Smielianskyi

Education is the social and spiritual basis of human life, a means of ensuring democratic freedoms, a backbone factor of national security, stability and development of society. Education performs a function, which is to ensure the processes of socialisation of the individual and his or her civic formation, and to pass on national and world cultural and historical experience to new generations.

However, using the tools of the education system, it is possible to educate haters, rapists, murderers, looters, and robbers. For such people, there will be no world culture. All other peoples will be perceived as inferior, of lower quality, and dependent. By choosing such educational tools, society embarks on the path of degradation and self-destruction. This is the vector chosen by the Russian Federation in implementing its educational colonisation policy in the occupied territory of the Crimean peninsula. These are the educational results that the Russian invaders have demonstrated and continue to demonstrate in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine.

Ukrainian society has become in dire need of people of a new formation – free, ambitious, highly educated, open to communication, flexible

to change, brave enough to take on challenges, passionate and ready to serve not only their own pocketbook interests. The need for such people in the process of Crimea's reintegration is even greater, taking into account all the challenges. Therefore, the school's task, in cooperation with parents and other public institutions, is to raise a new generation of young people to be just that. A well-known biblical truth says, "nor do they put new wine into old skins". It is therefore impossible to raise a person who will be able to find himself or herself, realise his or her potential, and become useful and successful in our modern society by using outdated approaches.

The challenges facing the education system today require qualitative changes. And it would be advisable to start reassessing priorities in the light of the targets related to the reintegration of Crimea. Today, a school is evaluated primarily by the level of knowledge of its graduates, but, as practice shows, in the era of technological progress, when information is available to everyone, knowledge alone is not enough to become a successful and happy person.

There is something more – the ability to communicate, to unite for the sake of an idea, to cooperate, to empathise, to work in a team, the

ability to listen and to take heed on, the ability to hear and the desire to be heard, the ability to live freely in society without violating the boundaries of other people's personal space, the ability and desire to be useful.

Therefore, the main task of a teacher and a school is to educate a Free Person. This is true, because freedom allows you to:

- to see
- to move forward;
- to live and act autonomously.

Historical background

For Ukraine, 2010 was the first year of partial recovery from the global crisis of 2007-2009. At the end of 2010, the population of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was 1,963,500 (excluding the city of Sevastopol). The population of Sevastopol was 380,800 people. The educational space of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was characterised by the following general indicators. A total of 63,700 employees were involved in the regional education system of the ARC in the academic year 2010/2011.

It is no secret that the language of communication on the Crimean peninsula was Russian, which affected the educational space of the ARC.

The structure of quantitative indicators of the regional education system in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea in the 2010/2011 academic year

Level of educational institution	Number of institutions	Number of students
Preschool educational institutions	607	51800
General educational institutions ¹	600	177500
Vocational educational and training institutions	30	14172
Higher educational institutions ²	32	55523
Total	1269	298995

¹ At the beginning of the 2010/2011 academic year, there were 609 general education schools. At the end of the school year, there were 600 of them.

² There is no statistical data on the number of structural units of higher educational institutions from other regions of Ukraine on the territory of the Crimean peninsula. However, it is known that 28,400 students were enrolled in these structural units on the territory of Crimea.

The structure of language use in the educational process in the 2010/2011 academic year

Level of educational institution	Language of education			
	Ukrainian	Russian	Crimean Tatar	English
Preschool educational institutions	1715	49546	539	-
General educational institutions	13609	149793	5399	217
Higher educational institutions	8515	47008	-	-
Total	23839	246347	5938	217

Description of the existing state of affairs

A "risk" and a "threat" are terms whose occurrence almost inevitably gives rise to problems, troubles and disasters. In assessing existing and potential risks and threats, we offer the following definitions:

A "threat" is a possible danger. A threat is a promise of harm, evil. That is, a potentially possible event, impact or action.

A "risk" is a combination of the probability and consequences of adverse events. Risk factors are events that can occur. In other words, risk is a danger.

From the point of view of classifying the risks and threats that may and/or will accompany the process of reintegration of the educational and scientific space in Crimea, it is permissible to define them as follows:

1. Risks and threats shaped by pre-war and pre-occupation historical memory. For example, corruption and plunder, universities and their branches acting as "shops selling diplomas", necessity to pay for "free education", etc.

2. Risks and threats arising from the results of the occupation.

3. Risks and threats arising from the policy of the Ukrainian authorities on the Crimean issue. In our case, the reintegration of the educational and scientific space of Crimea.

4. Risks and threats resulting from the implementation of the reintegration policy. For example, the consequences of "manual control"; the "executor effect", etc.

The situation in Crimea at the beginning of the occupation in February 2014 can be summarised as follows: "All citizens living in Crimea can be approximately equally divided into 3 social groups: pro-Ukrainian, pro-Russian and those who look

at the world through the prism of the 'fridge theory'.³ The latter is neither good nor bad, there are a majority of them all over the world, but the reference system in which they live in different countries is different. In Crimea, all citizens were fully satisfied with "Ukrainian legal liberalism, in which the rigidity of laws was compensated by the non-binding nature of their implementation". However, they were not satisfied with the "quality of government" and "quality of life". These were the "hooks" that the occupiers used to catch the minds of citizens in Crimea.

What is the result of the occupation? "Ukrainian legal liberalism has been lost. The quality of government and the quality of life have not changed and have even become worse, as a reflection of the Russian state reality." And the residents of Crimea, citizens of Ukraine, understand this. Each in their own way. After all, each person has their own analyser of life, an analyser of reality, constantly working in their head.

The results of the work of these individual analysers throughout the entire period of occupation worked in the interests of Ukraine. But after the de-occupation and in the process of implementing the reintegration policy, these individual analysers will not stop working. However, they will be assessing Ukrainian policy in Crimea and the Crimean Ukrainian reality. They will assess it while in transitional states of mind and consciousness. These individual states will have a huge impact on the formation of the state of the collective consciousness:

1. Negative perception.
2. Critical perception.

3. Expectational perception.
4. Euphoric perception.

For illustration. Being in the euphoria of the possibility of returning home – the euphoric perception of the reality – Crimean political emigrants realise their dream of returning home. Let's say it happens in mid-August. And suddenly it turns out that children and grandchildren will not go to educational institutions (kindergarten, school, university, vocational training) in September. The reason is trivial: they are not ready for a number of reasons (organisational, economic, personnel, information, methodological). At the same time, the authorities cannot specify the exact date of the start of the school year and other educational processes.

Although the military-civilian administration is intended to perform the functions of local self-government, it is not, in fact, a local government. The question is: how quickly will the enthusiastic perception turn into the negative perception? This is a rhetorical question.

And there are many such components of the case-study example "reintegration of Crimea", the approach that has become trendy as training method nowadays.

And now let's return to the problems themselves. The main problems that can generate risks and threats with the transition to a state of socio-political instability are lies, uncertainty, disorientation, disorganisation, indifference, arrogance, fallacy, etc.

³ The essence of the "fridge theory" is that a person is completely apolitical and perceives the events that take place solely from the perspective of his or her own consumption capabilities. In other words, depending on the degree to which their own fridge is full.

Risks and threats arising from pre-war historical memory

For the education sector, this is primarily educational corruption. For pre-schools, it is a shortage of places, which creates corruption. For secondary schools, it is tutoring as a business. For universities, it is the sale of diplomas as a system of organising the educational process linked to the number of students. Especially for commercial students. For vocational education, it is "paid" free education. A vocational school in Yalta, training cooks: "Children, tomorrow in class we will learn to cook duck dishes, so everyone should bring 1 duck."

The authorities' rhetoric, for example, does not mention the reintegration of the pre-school segment of the Crimean educational space at all. The infrastructure that was lacking before the war. We mean places in pre-schools. How do the authorities see this situation in the Crimean reintegration policy? This is the uncertainty, the very thing that generates risks. What is the position on the personnel issue in this segment? Uncertainty. If Ukrainian citizens in Crimea who have been liberated from the occupation see that the issue will remain problematic for their families in the indefinite future, individual analysers will generate rejection. How quickly will this rejection be projected onto Ukraine as a whole? After all, we will have those who are euphoric, those who are waiting, and those who are rejecting it from the very beginning. Three social groups. And the occupiers beyond the Kerch Strait will not disappear.

Risks and threats arising from the results of the occupation

Among the processes aimed at the future reintegration of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, one of the most important is the reintegration of the education system and, as a result, the reintegration of children and youth.

Since 2014, an armed conflict has been going on in Ukraine, which has led to the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol and the territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions. For 9 years, the occupation administration, using educational institutions of formal and non-formal education, has been pursuing a deliberate policy of destroying national identity and militarising the minds of young people.

According to Russian statistics, as of 1 January 2023, in occupied Crimea the population aged 14-35 was 472,000, or 25% of the peninsula's population. And there were 191,700 children under the age of 18. In the first half of 2023, 7463 children were born on the peninsula.

About 80,000 children (in 2022 they were 79,843) receive preschool education in temporarily occupied Crimea in 418 preschool educational institutions. During the years of occupation, the number of preschools has been growing, with more than 50 institutions built and put into operation. As of 1 September 2023, 10 more preschools with 1480 places were opened. Thus, in 2023, there were 627 places in preschools per 1,000 children. There are also not enough places for children in the occupied city of Simferopol in 74 preschools (information is posted on the website of the so-called Department of Education, although according to Natalia

Matyukhina, Deputy Head of the Department – Head of the Department of General Education of the occupation administration of Simferopol, there are 64 preschools in Simferopol, while 1300 Crimean children are still waiting for the vacant places).

In total, 232,369 schoolchildren attended schools in temporarily occupied Crimea in the 2023-2024 academic year (233,000 schoolchildren in the 2022-2023 academic year). The number of children who moved from the so-called “new territories”, i.e. Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions, has also increased: in the 2023-2024 academic year, about 3,500 children were enrolled to the schools of temporarily occupied Crimea (last academic year there were 1994 children from the “new territories”).

All occupational media resources in temporarily occupied Crimea report that the 2023-2024 academic year began in 541 schools, and in previous years (2021-2022 and 2022-23 academic years) it was reported that the educational process on the occupied peninsula would begin in 545 general educational institutions. And this is taking into account the opening of new educational institutions. Moreover, on 1 September 2023, a new school was opened in the village of Tryochprudne, Simferopol district. And the so-called head of the republic, Sergey Aksyonov, stated that 12 schools had been built on the occupied peninsula since 2014.

At the same time, it is worth noting that the school system in temporarily occupied Crimea is unable to provide appropriate learning conditions and continues to teach in two shifts. In the 2023-2024 academic year, 20,600 schoolchildren in 98 schools will study in the second shift.

For example, in the temporarily occupied city of Simferopol, starting from 1 September, about

50,000 children will sit down at desks in 48 schools (in the 2022-2023 school year, there were 49,560 schoolchildren), and there will be about 5,000 first-graders (last year there were 5,900 first-graders). And again, there will be a second shift in the schools of occupied Simferopol.

As of 1 September 2023, 548 school buses will be operating to transport children to the place of study. In addition, according to the so-called Minister of Education Valentyna Lavryk, occupied Crimea will receive 28 more buses by the end of the year.

In the occupational Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of Crimea, Minister Valentyna Lavryka reported that 23,248 children will sit down at desks for the first time, while the page of the so-called head of the Republic of Crimea Sergey Aksyonov cites a figure of 21,941 first-graders. Moreover, the data is presented with a difference of one day. The figure of 23,248 children is still more likely, as there were 24,624 first-graders in the previous 2022-2023 school year. The difference in numbers by 1,345 children is significant, which is almost 45 classes or two schools.

The number of vocational educational organisations is difficult to determine because they belong to different departments. Thus, the website of the so-called Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the Republic of Crimea lists 52 institutions; the Minister of Education Valentyna Lavryk reports 42 institutions, and the so-called Head of Crimea Sergey Aksyonov speaks of 36 vocational educational institutions.

At the beginning of the current academic year, on 1 September, 68 schools opened their doors in occupied Sevastopol, i.e. 62 public schools and 5 or 6 private schools. The issues of provid-

ing proper conditions in occupied Sevastopol have not been resolved, the second shift has been introduced in 38 schools and the number of children attending schools in the second shift is growing, as in the previous academic year there were 37 schools with the second shift.

In the academic year 2023-2024, 6,105 schoolchildren were enrolled in the first grade for the first time, which is less than last year, when there were 6,220 first-graders, although the number of first-grade classes increased from 208 to 211.

In the academic year 2023-2024, 9,876 schoolchildren started studying at 10 vocational educational institutions (last year, 9,324 schoolchildren studied at this type of institutions).

In the 2022-2023 academic year, 6,484 employees were engaged in the educational process in preschool institutions of temporarily occupied Crimea (in the previous year – 6,368 employees). The number of teachers has also increased – in this academic year, 17,499 teachers work in the schools of the occupied peninsula (in the 2022-2023 academic year, there were 17,382 teachers). In the 2023-2024 academic year, 1,400 young specialists work in the schools of occupied Crimea. At the same time, despite the slight increase in the number of teachers in temporarily occupied Crimea, there is a shortage of teachers. Thus, in Simferopol, there is a shortage of primary school teachers, Russian language and Math teachers. The occupation authorities are trying to solve the issue of providing schools with teachers in various ways – in Simferopol and Yalta, young specialists are paid 5,000 rubles from the local budget; the Zemsky Teacher programme is being implemented (102 teachers have come to occupied Crimea in 3 years, each of whom was paid 1,000,000

rubles), teachers are provided with housing benefits and land plots, and more. And on 4 September 2023, the Crimean Republican Institute of Postgraduate

According to Russian statistics, the educational process in the 2023-2024 academic year in educational institutions in temporarily occupied Sevastopol is provided by 1,755 pedagogical employees of preschool education and 3,101 pedagogical employees of school education (in the previous year, there were 1,701 educators and 3,051 teachers, although according to the so-called Department of Education and Science of Sevastopol, 1,613 pedagogical employees worked in preschools and 3,378 in schools).

The education system in temporarily occupied Crimea is managed by the so-called Ministry of Education, Science and Youth of the ‘Republic of Crimea’ headed by Minister Lavryk Valentyna Vasylivna (was born in Khomenky village, Sharhorod district, Vinnytsia region, in 1995 graduated from the Frunze State University of Simferopol with a degree in Ukrainian language, qualification of philologist and teacher of Ukrainian language).

The education system in the temporarily occupied Sevastopol is managed through the Department of Education and Science of Sevastopol, which as of 1 September 2023 – 2024 was headed by the acting head of the Department, Maksym Yuriiovych Kryvonos.

In 2014, almost 60,000 students were enrolled in Crimea, of whom more than 15,000 transferred to educational institutions under Ukrainian control after the occupation of the peninsula. Approximately 14,000 students were enrolled in universities of the third and fourth accreditation levels in annexed Sevastopol.

In August 2014, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev ordered the establishment of the

Vernadsky Crimean Federal University (KFU) in Simferopol. In October 2014, he signed a decree on the establishment of another federal university, the Sevastopol State University (SSU). To create the KFU, it was decided to unite 7 universities and 7 research organisations of the peninsula, and to create the SSU – 7 Sevastopol universities. Most private institutions have closed down, and branches of Ukrainian higher educational institutions in Crimea did not announce freshmen admission in 2014. Both KFU and SSU universities were established in January 2015.

According to the KFU's internal audit, in 2015, 31,650 persons studied at the institution, including 19,739 full-time students. The number of students on a budgetary basis was 48.5% of the total. It should be noted that before the annexation, almost 18,000 students were enrolled in Vernadsky TSU alone. The 3 other major universities in Simferopol (Crimean State Medical university, National Academy of Nature Protection and Resort Construction, and Crimean Agrotechnological University) had approximately 15,000 students.

According to published information, in 2018-2019 academic year, 32,668 persons studied at the Vernadsky Crimean Federal University and 10,500 – at the Sevastopol State University. Every year, the number of students at the KFU is decreasing: in 2018-2019, the total number of students enrolled there decreased by 6% (1,878).


In addition to the merger of universities in occupied Crimea, there was also a process of reducing the number of higher educational institutions. While at the beginning of 2014 there were 94 higher educational institutions (including branches) in Crimea, in autumn 2014 there were only 10, and at the beginning of 2023 – only 8:

- Kerch State Maritime Technological University
- Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University
- Vernadsky Crimean Federal University
- Crimean University of Culture, Arts and Tourism
- University of Economics and Management
- Crimean Law Institute (branch) of the Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution "University of the Prosecutor's Office of the Russian Federation"
- Crimean branch of the Russian State University of Justice
- Crimean branch of the Federal State Budgetary Educational Institution "Krasnodar University of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Russian Federation"

It should also be taken into account that in addition to the "monster" KFU, other higher educational institutions perform a nominal function. For example, the Crimean University of Culture, Arts and Tourism had about 500 students in 2022.

The educational process in the occupied territories of Ukraine since 2014 has been changed to the standards of the occupied territories or Russian standards, and later fully subordinated to Russian standards. A big problem is that some Ukrainian children are educated only according to Russian standards, which makes it impossible for them to form a Ukrainian identity through education.

During the 9 years of occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the occupation authorities have formed a whole system of destroying the Ukrainian identity of children in the temporarily occupied territories. Experts of the Almenda Human Rights Centre, who have been studying Russia's



educational policy towards children in Crimea for 9 years, were able to structure it into a certain scheme, i.e. "The Russian system of destroying the identity of children in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine (TOT)". The components, or rather mechanisms, of this policy are militarisation, indoctrination, destruction of the Ukrainian educational component in education, and propaganda of the "culture" of war.

In order to understand the challenges facing the Ukrainian state, it is worthwhile to provide quantitative indicators of the educational sphere of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol in the dynamics and in comparison with the pre-occupation years.

According to the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, at the time of the occupation, 208,536 pupils received general secondary education in 586 general secondary educational institutions in Crimea, including 12,079 graduates.


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
After the occupation, there is no official data on the state of educational sphere in temporarily occupied Crimea and one can only rely on the data from the Ministry of Education of the "Republic of Crimea". In recent years, the educational statistics of annexed Crimea have become closed. It is either very difficult to find out quantitative indicators or the information is too contradictory. In addition, a significant difference in the statistics may arise from the special status of Sevastopol, which data have always been counted separately.

At the same time, it is impossible to calculate the number of Ukrainian citizens receiving education in the occupation, as over the years of occupation, Crimeans have been replaced by Russian citizens in various ways (up to 17% at the beginning of 2018). Also, the statistics do not take into account the significant increase in the military contingent and special services, most of whom

**NUMBER OF SECONDARY SCHOOLS
IN THE TOT OF THE AUTONOMOUS REPOUBLIC
OF CRIMEA
AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL
BY ACADEMIC YEAR**



**NUMBER OF CHILDREN ENROLLED IN SCHOOLS
IN THE TOT OF THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA
AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL
BY ACADEMIC YEAR**



“move” to the peninsula with their families. The following examples are illustrative: in Sevastopol, in the 2018 academic year, the number of first-grade pupils increased by 30% (from 3,800 to 4,500), which led to the introduction of two shifts.

The fact that the peninsula has been under the control of the occupation authorities for a long time has contributed to a threatening situation with regard to the learning outcomes in accordance with the requirements of the State Standard of General Secondary Education and educational documents in accordance with the levels of the National Qualifications Framework.

The Law of Ukraine “On Education” defines the following levels of education: primary education, which corresponds to the first level of the National Qualifications Framework (grades 1-4); basic secondary education, which corresponds to the second level of the National Qualifications Framework (grades 5-9); specialised secondary education, which corresponds to the third level of the National Qualifications Framework (grades 10-11).

Thus, almost 100 % of schoolchildren and graduates of previous years in Crimea will have to obtain relevant educational documents for the

An analysis of the contingent of schoolchildren in temporarily occupied Crimea in the context of levels of education and studying under Ukrainian educational programmes shows that only schoolchildren who graduated from the 10th grade in 2022/2023 studied according to the state educational standards of Ukraine, the rest studied exclusively under the programmes of the Russian Federation and have no certification according to the levels of education in Ukraine.

Grades	Роки											
	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	
1st												RF
2nd											RF	RF
3rd										RF	RF	RF
4th								RF	RF	RF	RF	
First level of the National Qualifications Framework (certificates of primary education)												
5th								RF	RF	RF	RF	RF
6th							RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF
7th						RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF
8th					RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF
9th			RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF
Second level of the National Qualifications Framework (certificates of basic secondary education)												
10th		RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF
11th	UKR	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF	RF
Third level of the National Qualifications Framework (certificates of complete general secondary education)												

three levels of education during integration. Unfortunately, since 2015, the issue of obtaining educational documents (certificates of basic secondary education and certificates of complete secondary education) has been replaced by the issue of admission to higher educational institutions in Ukraine. This system is aimed only at those children who have expressed a desire to continue their studies in Ukrainian higher educational institutions and does not address the issue of “nostrification” of educational documents of children from the temporarily occupied territory in any form.

In quantitative terms, without taking into account children who moved from the Russian Federation, this is approximately 200 thousand educational documents (certificates of basic secondary education and certificates of complete secondary education (data as of 2023)).

Problems caused by the occupation

These problems have already been created. These risks and threats already exist. First of all, it is the militarisation of the minds of young people and children. In general, of everyone who has gone through the occupational educational space. This militarisation of consciousness will manifest itself in an inadequate, initially negative perception of Ukraine as an enemy. The internal analyser can lead to another source of polarisation of society into pro-Russian and pro-Ukrainian as the basis of confrontation. The worst thing would be if the pro-Ukrainian side had no arguments other than “we have to be patient”. Thus.

The risk of a distorted perception of the events that took place between 2014 and until the de-occupation. This is, at the very least.

The risk of a distorted perception of history.

The risk of language rejection, and this is one of the most easily overcome risks if the right approach is applied. For example, the question: why learn Ukrainian? For a career and a social lift on the territory of Ukraine? Yes. It is a necessity. For the life in Crimea it is not necessary. **And we need to change this.** By the way, the measurements of social attitudes in Crimea and Sevastopol in 2011 illustrated this very clearly. These measurements were conducted by a Russian analytical centre, and they were very unpleasantly shocked by the results. This concerned the awareness of the need for knowledge of the Ukrainian language among the residents of the Crimean peninsula.

However, there are some reservations. For example. Constitutional trilingualism in pre-war Crimea. Do we really believe that all three languages had the same status in Crimea?

We are in the tenth year of occupation. During the entire period of occupation, the Ukrainian language was actually banned for use in the occupied territory. In Crimea, during this period, one could observe a picture of a group of Crimean residents swimming in the sea and communicating in Ukrainian and then stopping when someone else, someone unfamiliar approaches. It's dangerous, one can suffer for speaking Ukrainian.

It should be acknowledged that the language issue will have a special place in the future reintegration of the Crimean peninsula.

Despite the declarations of a multilingual educational environment in the occupied territories, in temporarily occupied Crimea, the languages of education in pre-school, primary and secondary education (up to grade 10) are Russian, Ukrainian

and Crimean Tatar; and in grades 10-11 only Russian language is used; the situation is similar in Sevastopol.

At the time of the attempted annexation in March 2014, **7.3% of Ukrainian schoolchildren (13,322) were taught in the state language**, and there were 7 Ukrainian-language schools in urban areas, but **no Ukrainian-language schools in rural areas**. Moreover, the Ukrainian was a compulsory language for study in all schools in the ARC and Sevastopol, resulting in 100% proficiency in the state language among children and youth.

After the occupation, the Russian Federation has almost destroyed the opportunities for teaching children in the Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar languages, despite the decisions of international organisations.

Thus, in the pre-war academic year 2013-2014, the Crimean regional educational space was characterised by the following indicators:

15 schools with the Crimean Tatar language of education (182 classes, 3,092 schoolchildren);

1 school with Crimean Tatar as the language of education and classes with Ukrainian as the language of education (40 classes, 809 schoolchildren);

20 schools with two languages of education: Crimean Tatar and Russian (68 classes, 679 schoolchildren);

27 schools with three languages of education: Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar and Russian (109 classes, 1,281 schoolchildren);

A total of 5,551 schoolchildren (3.1 % of the total) studied in the Crimean Tatar language;

12,707 schoolchildren studied the Crimean Tatar language as a subject, 28 studied it in-depth and 6,906 – as an optional subject.

And in the 2022/2023 academic year, 545 general education institutions with 230,300 students were operating in the part of the occupied Crimean peninsula called the ‘Republic of Crimea’ by the occupation authorities.

Education was provided in the three “state” languages of the “Republic of Crimea”: Russian, Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar.

There were 528 general education institutions with Russian as the language of education.

There were 16 general education institutions with the Crimean Tatar language of education (261 classes, 5,462 schoolchildren). In addition, 119 classes with the Crimean Tatar language of education (1905 schoolchildren) were opened on the basis of 21 general education institutions with Russian as the language of education.

One general education institution with Ukrainian as the language of education continued to operate (9 classes, 182 schoolchildren). In addition, a class with the Ukrainian as language of education was opened on the basis of the Simferopol Academic Gymnasium (15 schoolchildren).

Thus, 222,800 schoolchildren (96.7% of the total contingent) studied in Russian, 7,300 schoolchildren (3.2%) in Crimean Tatar, and 197 schoolchildren (0.1%) in Ukrainian.

In the 2022/2023 academic year, the teaching and study of 7 native languages of the peoples of the Russian Federation living in the ‘Republic of Crimea’ was organised in general education institutions of the ‘Republic of Crimea’:

- Armenian (134 schoolchildren),
- Bulgarian (49 schoolchildren),
- Greek (142 schoolchildren),
- Crimean Tatar (33,351 schoolchildren),
- German (117 schoolchildren),
- Russian (178454 schoolchildren),
- Ukrainian (3,486 schoolchildren).

In the 2022/2023 academic year, 78,600 children studied in 562 educational institutions of the 'Republic of Crimea' that implement preschool education programmes, of whom 72,600 (98.33%) were educated in Russian, 1,300 (1.63%) in Crimean Tatar, and 31 (0.04%) in Ukrainian.

Risks and threats posed by the Ukrainian authorities' policy on the Crimean issue

These include:

The risk of erroneous definition of strategic and intermediate goals of reintegration.

The risk of a wrong choice of the Crimean regional educational model.

The risk of polarisation of society.

According to Article 3 of the Constitution of Ukraine, everyone has the right to education. Complete general secondary education is compulsory. The state ensures that pre-school, complete general secondary, vocational and higher education in state and municipal educational institutions are available and free to citizens; it also ensures development of pre-school, complete general secondary, out-of-school, vocational, higher and postgraduate education, various forms of education; provision of state scholarships and benefits to schoolchildren and students.

According to Part 1 of Article 4-1 of the Law of Ukraine "On Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine", one of the goals of the state policy to ensure the state sovereignty of Ukraine in the temporarily occupied territory is to ensure the protection of the rights,

freedoms and legitimate interests of individuals and legal entities to the extent provided by law. And according to part 2 of Article 5 of the same law, the main areas of protection of the rights and freedoms of the civilian population in the temporarily occupied territories are the following:

- protection of fundamental political and civil, economic, social, cultural and other human rights and freedoms;

- ensuring access to educational and media institutions of Ukraine.

The above is implemented by ensuring:

- the right to receive pre-school, out-of-school, general secondary, vocational, professional, pre-tertiary vocational and higher education in any form of education defined by law;

- the right to continue their education and pass the state final examination in the relevant educational institutions in other regions of Ukraine if they have not completed the complete (basic) general secondary education;

- the right to receive higher, professional and vocational education on a competitive basis at the expense of the state budget, in particular on the terms of a state order, in accordance with the procedure and within the quotas determined by the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the "MES");

- the right to undergo certification for the recognition of qualifications, learning outcomes and periods of study in accordance with the procedure determined by the MES, except for persons who started higher education in the temporarily occupied territory after the date of the beginning of the temporary occupation of the relevant territory.

To ensure these rights, the Verkhovna Rada and the Government of Ukraine adopted and

approved **more than 75 different legal acts, most of which are reactive acts and to some extent do not correspond to the current situation (Annex).**

In our opinion, the main regulatory framework adopted by the MES is as follows:

- The Procedure for Admission to Higher, Pre-Tertiary Vocational and Vocational (Vocational and Technical) Educational Institutions for Persons Residing in the Territory of Ukraine Temporarily Occupied by the Russian Federation approved by the Order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine No. 271 of 01.03.2021 (as amended on 11.10.2022);

- Procedure for Admission to Acquire Higher Education in 2023, approved by Order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine No. 276 of 15.03.2023 (as amended on 05.07.2023);

- Procedure for Admission of Students for Pre-Tertiary Vocational Educational Institutions in 2023, approved by Order of the Ministry of Education and Science No. 277 of 15.03.2023 (as amended on 05.07.2023);

- Standard Rules for Admission to Vocational (Vocational and Technical) Educational Institutions of Ukraine, approved by Order of the Ministry of Education and Science No. 499 of 14.05.2013 (as amended on 03.08.2023);

- Order of the Ministry of Education and Science No. 563 of 15.05.2023 "On Approval of Methodological Recommendations on Certain Issues of Education in General Secondary Education Institutions under Martial Law in Ukraine";

- Order of the Ministry of Education and Science No. 8 of 12.01.2016 (as amended on 14.03.2023) "On Approval of the Regulation on Individual Form of Obtaining Complete General Secondary Education";


- Order of the Ministry of Education and Science No. 537 of 19.05.2016 "On Approval of the Procedure for Certification for Recognition of Qualifications, Learning Outcomes and Periods of Study in the Higher Education System Obtained in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine after 20 February 2014".

Some problematic issues can also be clarified by letters from MES.

However, the "ad hoc" approach to responding to challenges has led to the fact that not all regulations are correlated with each other, and changes to legislation occur late or after the situation has changed and the meaning of the changes has been lost.

For example, immediately after the occupation of part of the Ukrainian territory, more than 23,000 Ukrainian students were transferred to Ukrainian universities to continue their studies, and the 2014 admission campaign was almost identical to the pre-war one. The next admission campaign (2015) showed that every 10th applicant chose Ukrainian institutions. These figures were due to the fact that almost all applicants had certificates of basic secondary education, had basic knowledge of the Ukrainian language and the history of Ukraine, and only needed to complete higher secondary school (specialised grades 10-11) remotely. The untimely response to the challenges associated with distance education and state certification of education levels led to a sharp drop in the number of applicants (in 2015 there were 943 applicants, in 2016 – 153) and, as a result, the loss of the opportunity to integrate young people from the peninsula.

It should also be noted that Crimean youth still cannot enjoy equal educational rights to free general secondary education: it is still provided by ineffective means, i.e. distance learning



methods or through self-education (external form) when the state performs only a controlling function (in the form of state exams), without developing programmes to bridge educational gaps and appropriate curricula for online courses.

In 2016, in order to eliminate discrimination and create equal access to higher education, the MES created a special procedure for testing knowledge through the educational centres “Crimea-Ukraine” (the so-called “Quota-2” admission procedure introduced by the MES Order No. 271), and took a number of other measures to simplify university admission for Crimean youth. However, there are still a number of unresolved issues, including:

1. The Procedure approved by Order No. 271 of the Ministry of Education and Science indicates the possibility of providing quotas for applicants from the TOT to vocational, professional higher and higher education institutions, while the Procedure for Admission to Professional Higher Educational Institutions in 2023 does not establish a quota for applicants from the TOT, and the

Standard Rules for Admission to Vocational (Vocational and Technical) Educational Institutions of Ukraine also do not provide for this quota.

2. Despite the positive decision to allocate educational quotas for applicants from the occupied territory, the government did not pay attention to the problems of Crimeans transferring from educational institutions established by the occupation authorities. The educational system does not consider these persons as entering universities for the first time, and therefore they are deprived of the possibility to use this quota for free education.

3. The adopted Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as “CMU”) No. 1045 does not fully address the issue of social scholarships for all IDP students (both those studying at public expense and those paying tuition fees), which contradicts the Laws of Ukraine No. 1207-VII and No. 1556-VII.

4. The Law of Ukraine No. 1207-VII guarantees the right of persons from the temporarily occupied territories to receive education under the

state order, but the mechanism for implementing these guarantees has not yet been developed, and the use of budget places from the “Quota-2” has not been stipulated.

5. Children registered as internally displaced persons (IDPs) cannot fully benefit from the targeted state aid provided for by Law No. 425-VIII, as CMU Resolution No. 975 contradicts the provisions of the law and complicates its implementation.

In 2020, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as “VRU”) adopted the Law “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine on Improving Educational Activities in Higher Education”, thereby preserving the existing imperfect procedure for enrolling Crimeans in universities on the mainland of Ukraine.

Therefore, there is a need to study these norms and establish their compliance with each other, as there is still no clear educational policy of the state, which, accordingly, causes difficulties for education seekers.

If we analyse the regulatory framework in more detail in relation to the problems faced by education seekers from the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, we can note the following:

1. Problems of general secondary education

As a result of the armed aggression by the Russian Federation and its unlawful occupation of Ukrainian territories, the right to education in the temporarily occupied territories is becoming more difficult to exercise. Ukrainian children under occupation are subjected to pressure from the occupation authorities, who do not actually allow them to choose which state standards to study according to: that of Ukraine or the Russian

Federation. In addition, children and their parents may be persecuted and harassed for wanting to study in Ukrainian schools, and therefore choose to study under Ukrainian programmes in secret. As a result, there is a double burden on children due to Russia’s disregard for international norms. At the same time, Ukraine is taking steps to improve the situation of children in the TOT, including in matters related to education.

At the moment, distance and external forms of education are envisaged as some of the most successful for children from the TOT. However, there are still some nuances. In accordance with the Regulation “On Individual Form of Obtaining Complete General Secondary Education” approved by the Order of the Ministry of Education and Science No. 8, external form of education can be organised for persons who are in the uncontrolled territory or in settlements on the contact line and cannot attend classes at an educational institution or cannot pass the annual assessment.

A positive aspect is the possibility of remote enrolment, as well as the possibility to take annual assessments remotely. It is important to note that it is impossible to obtain an educational document without arriving in the territory controlled by Ukraine, which raises certain security issues, as the path may go through the combat zone, and it also involves additional financial costs. Among the difficulties is the lack of information about external form of education on the websites of the schools themselves or the irrelevance of the information published there.

The analysis of the MES website did not reveal, for example, an algorithm or explanations for enrolling the children from the TOT in the 1st grade. This lack of information may become an obstacle to the exercise of the right to education.

To summarise, there is a certain lack of up-to-date information on official information resources, which significantly complicates the process of applying for education for parents and children, and there are issues that need to be further addressed.

2. Problems of vocational education

In accordance with the Procedure for Admission to Higher, Pre-Tertiary Vocational and Vocational (Vocational and Technical) Educational Institutions for Persons Residing in the Territory of Ukraine Temporarily Occupied by the Russian Federation, approved by the Order of the MES No. 271 of 01.03.2021 (as amended on 11.10.2022), in order to obtain documents on basic secondary education or complete general secondary education necessary for obtaining higher, professional higher and vocational (vocational-technical) education, applicants should undergo an annual assessment and state final certification (except in cases of exemption from state final certification) for external education in authorised general secondary educational institutions. That is, the procedure is similar to the procedure for higher and professional higher educational institutions, but applicants to higher educational institutions can apply to them through educational centres, while applicants to vocational educational institutions cannot apply for admission through the educational centres “Crimea-Ukraine” and “Donbas-Ukraine”, and thus this possibility would simplify the procedure for persons from the TOT to some extent.

The aforementioned Procedure stipulates that it defines the peculiarities of obtaining documents on general secondary education and special conditions of admission to higher educational,

professional higher educational, vocational (vocational and technical) educational institutions by persons residing in the territory of Ukraine temporarily occupied by the Russian Federation, with the possibility of admission within the established quotas for admission to educational institutions of Ukraine. However, the same Procedure does not provide for quotas for applicants to vocational educational institutions and refers to the Standard Rules for Admission to Vocational (Vocational and Technical) Educational Institutions of Ukraine approved by the Order of the MES No. 499 of 14.05.2013 (as amended on 03.08.2023), which, in turn, also do not provide for any quotas for applicants from the TOT.

For example, the Procedure for Admission to Higher Education in 2023 establishes “Quota-2” for applicants from the TOT, which guarantees them a certain percentage of licenced places (the maximum number of students who can be enrolled in a given field of study). And it is advisable to introduce a similar quota for applicants to vocational educational institutions to guarantee applicants from the TOT the opportunity to study in Ukraine.

3. Problems of pre-tertiary vocational education

According to the relatively new Law of Ukraine “On Pre-Tertiary Vocational Education” of 06.06.2019 (as amended on 23.03.2023), a vocational college is a pre-tertiary vocational educational institution or a structural unit of a higher educational institution or other legal entity that carries out educational activities related to vocational higher education. This law stops the perception of a college as a higher educational

institution and defines it as a pre-tertiary vocational educational institution.

One of the petitions to our organisation was a collective petition regarding the fact that all licenced places in vocational colleges were already occupied during the admission campaign and, accordingly, the applicants from the TOT could not be enrolled in pre-tertiary vocational educational institutions.

Having analysed the Procedure for Admission to Higher Education in 2023, we understand that “Quota-2” is envisaged for applicants from the TOT to higher educational institutions, which guarantees them the opportunity to enter higher educational institutions. If you look for a similar quota for applicants from the TOT to pre-tertiary vocational educational institutions in the Procedure for admission to pre-tertiary vocational educational institutions in 2023, you will simply not find it. That is, the state does not guarantee a certain percentage of the licenced places that can be used by applicants from the TOT to vocational colleges, and due to factors beyond the applicants’ control, but caused by the occupation, they may simply not receive or not have time to obtain the desired place to study at pre-tertiary vocational educational institutions, which is what happened to the applicants who applied to the NGO “CCE Almenda”.

This problem coincides with the problem of vocational education in the context of the lack of admission privileges for persons from the TOT and, accordingly, its solution may be similar, i.e. the introduction of “Quota-2” for applicants from the TOT to vocational colleges, as well as the regulation of the use of the entire number of licenced places by pre-tertiary vocational educational institutions until the end of the admission campaign.

4. Problems of higher education

In 2023, 86 people from the TOT of the AR of Crimea and Sevastopol entered Ukrainian higher educational institutions, which is a low figure and indicates the existence of certain problems. The Procedure for Admission to Higher Education in 2023 consists of 125 pages with annexes. This amount of material, which is also loaded with specific terminology, makes it difficult to interpret correctly, which may cause misunderstanding by various specialists, higher educational institutions and applicants. This may become an obstacle to admission for applicants from the TOT.

Another nuance is that the Procedure for Admission to Higher, Pre-Tertiary Vocational and Vocational Education for Persons Residing in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine approved by the Order of the MES No. 271 defines only the dates when is the deadline for applying for the admission and entrance exams, but does not define the start time. Thus, educational institutions set the timeframes at their own discretion, and it is often difficult to obtain this information on their websites, which may result in the applicant missing the exams. This part requires additional regulation.

The letter of the MES No. 1/10142-23 of 11.07.23 “recommended that institutions of higher and pre-tertiary vocational education starting from 1 September 2023 move on to the educational process in the classroom format as much as possible, taking into account the availability and capacity of shelters”, which in fact makes it impossible for children from the TOT to study. This letter is only a recommendation and is not binding, but higher educational institutions took it as a basis and issued orders for compulsory full-time education, thus imperilling the possibility of

studying for people under occupation and those who left Ukraine due to the full-scale invasion.

These two categories of persons do not have a guaranteed opportunity to come to Ukraine and study here offline due to the security situation and financial difficulties. In accordance with Article 57-1 of the Law of Ukraine “On Education”, students, employees of educational institutions, educational institutions, research institutions, including those who, in the context of martial law, emergency situation or state of emergency in Ukraine or its separate localities declared in accordance with the established procedure (special period) were forced to change their place of residence (stay), leave their workplace, place of study, regardless of their place of residence (stay) for the duration of the special period, the organisation of the educational process in a distance form or in any other form that is the safest for its participants is guaranteed. In this case, higher educational institutions ignore this provision and restrict access to higher education for persons from the TOT, as failure to attend full-time offline educational process may result in expulsion.

5. The problem of transferring students from the TOT to state-funded education

The second most frequently addressed issue is the transfer of persons from the TOT to study at the expense of the state budget from studying at the expense of individuals or legal entities. The reason for this issue to be the second is at least a consequence of the lack of awareness by the persons from the TOT of their rights. This issue is really important, because under the occupation, it is not possible to pay large sums of money for education.

On 28 October 2022, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted Resolution No. 1224 “On

Approval of the Procedure for Transferring Certain Categories of Applicants for Pre-Tertiary Vocational Education and Higher Education to Study on State Order for Certain Categories of Applicants for Pre-Tertiary Vocational Educational and Higher Educational Institutions until 2021 inclusive, from studying at the expense of individuals and/or legal entities”, which approved the procedure according to which persons who resided or are currently residing in the TOT and were enrolled in higher or pre-tertiary vocational educational institutions until 2021 inclusive may be transferred to study at the expense of the state budget. As early as 2022, a number of NGOs raised the issue of the possibility of applying this provision in practice, but no changes to this procedure have been made to date.

In accordance with Resolution No. 1224, the fourth category of persons must provide the following documents for transfer to study at the expense of the state budget: an extract from the register of the territorial community confirming information about the person’s place of residence (stay) or information about the absence of such information as of 24 February 2022. If the extract from the register of the territorial community contains information about the absence of the specified information, a document confirming the right to transfer to state-funded education may be a document on education received during the relevant period of time in an educational institution located in the TOT or in the combat zone.

At the same time, Ukraine does not recognise any educational documents issued by the occupation authorities. Thus, for persons residing in the TOT of the AR of Crimea and enrolled in Ukrainian educational institutions until 2021 inclusive, transfer to state-funded education in accordance with this procedure is effectively blocked.

6. Recognition of qualifications, learning outcomes and periods of study in the higher education system obtained in the TOT

In 2016, the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine, by its Order No. 537, approved the procedure for certification for the recognition of qualifications, learning outcomes and periods of study in the higher education system obtained in the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine after 20 February 2014. However, this procedure was valid only for residents of the TOT of Crimea, and now, due to certain legislative changes, it can be applied only to persons who entered Crimean higher educational institutions before the beginning of its occupation.

Persons who, due to life circumstances, such as financial difficulties, the need to care for seriously ill relatives or other valid reasons, were forced to stay in the TOT and, accordingly, receive education according to the occupier’s state standard, are effectively left without higher, pre-tertiary vocational, vocational and technical education and, as a result, without the possibility of employment. To date, there is no legislative way to resolve this situation.

To solve this problem, on 08.08.2023, the Draft Law of Ukraine “On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Recognition of Learning Outcomes of Persons Residing in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine” No. 9591 was submitted to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, which proposes to provide the possibility of recognising the learning outcomes of persons in the TOT, for which, according to the draft law, the possibility of passing certification for the recognition of learning outcomes and ECTS credits will be provided.

In its Opinion, the Main Scientific and Expert Department agrees with the need for the

novelties, but recognises the need for their amendments and corrections. The same opinion is shared by the Committee on Education, Science and Innovation, which is stated in its Opinion. Thus, the draft law is currently awaiting its amendments and second reading.

Such amendments to the legislation are aimed at facilitating the reintegration of persons from the TOT and may indeed contribute to this in practice.

The third group risks and threats. Those arising from the policy of the Ukrainian authorities on the Crimean issue and related only to the reintegration of the educational and scientific space of Crimea.

Specifically, the threat of rejection of Ukraine because of a thirst for justice. Since the 90s, we have often heard young people say, “we are the lost generation”. And this has been true for every decade of independence. As a result of the occupation of Crimea, we will have a truly “lost generation” on the peninsula, and this is at least a “generation”. We wish there was not more than one.

The mechanism for obtaining Ukrainian educational documents. Certificates, diplomas, qualifications for working professions, driver’s licences (this is also a confirmation of working qualifications after studying and passing exams). For example. The norms of the draft law No. 9591 of 08.08.2023 adopted as a basis. Are these temporary regulations for the period of war? Some participants in the discussions argue that yes, the norms of the draft law are for the time of war. But life experience, given that the draft law does not say anything about this, raises a new question, i.e. who or what is the guarantor that these norms will not be valiantly applied in the policy of Crimean educational reintegration? There is no answer. Uncertainty.

What's in the bill. We recognise 75 credits. And 25 credits should be confirmed within 1 compulsory year of study. In the tenth year, graduates receive specialities and qualifications. At a minimum, the implementation of this decision will negatively affect half of the population of Crimea. Let us explain why with an example.

First of all. At whose expense will this process actually take place? At the expense of those who have to confirm their qualifications or speciality? In fact, this is a variant of economic sanctions for being forced to live in the occupied territory. What if you have no money to pay? Should you take out a loan? It is still possible to objectively justify the need for such additional training, provided that it is funded from the budget. And then include it in the amount of reparations, and it will be an objective requirement. Or, as a last resort, international assistance for this process.

At first glance, the draft law mentions that this process is to be financed from the budget. However, none of the accompanying documents to the draft law contains even an approximate calculation of the annual amount of expenditure on this process. There is no indication of an administrator or administrators of budgetary funds. The very situation with the revenue side of the state budget and its dependence on external financial assistance gives grounds to conclude that there will be no or insufficient funds for budgetary financing of the exchange of educational documents under the provisions of the draft law. There are no explanations. There is only uncertainty. And such economic sanctions will generate rejection of Ukraine.

The other side. The problem of time. Will a year be enough? 25 credits is almost a semester. An academic year is 60 ECTS credits. Following this logic, it will be enough. 25 credits are

about 5-6 disciplines. Here is an example from the group of disciplines that make up the Budget and Tax block for the training of economists in the field of finance:

Budgetary System – 4 credits on the 4th of bachelor's degree 2 semesters of study.

Tax System – 6.5 credits on the 4th of bachelor's degree 2 semesters of study. To start studying the Tax System, you need to study: Finance; Money and Credit; Macroeconomics; Microeconomics.

Local Finance – 5 credits, but it can only be studied after studying the Budget and Tax Systems.

These and other economic disciplines are inextricably linked to legislation. There is nothing to count there. Ukraine is a unitary state. Moskovia is a federal state. Even the state models are different.

In fact, a year is not enough. What are we going to do? Are we going to teach according to the classical scheme or are we going to develop adaptation programmes? Who prepares these programmes? How long should this process take? How many graduates will the Crimean regional labour market lose? Who will fill the gap? What level of socio-economic tension will we get as a result?

Risks and threats emerge as a result of decisions. But we have complete uncertainty. Or, in the extreme case we can try to solve all the problems by creating a Silicon Valley, developing tourism or growing narcotic cannabis. Or by the promise to return the pre-war educational model to Crimea. But part of this pre-war model was educational corruption. And what about the Russian-Ukrainian College in Yalta on Archivnaya Street and a branch of the European University there. A branch of Lomonosov Moscow State

University in Sevastopol and other educational institutions. Are we also returning them?

Risks and threats resulting from the implementation of the reintegration policy

There is an example about the consequences of "manual control" and the "executor effect". Some time ago, the Permanent Representative of the President in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, Ms Tasheva, wrote a post full of enthusiasm about another parliamentary "victory" in the Crimean issue, referring to the draft law on a new administrative-territorial division in Crimea. This is a purely practical example, which, in particular, relates to the organisation of the educational process and is generated by this draft law.

The newly created Kurmansky district. One of the extreme points of the district is the village of Der Emes. The shortest distance from the village to the district centre is 57.9 km. This is officially on the map. There are doubts that the shortest route will be laid. However, this distance will take about 120 minutes to cover with the vehicles that currently provide passenger traffic in the hinterland throughout Ukraine. At best, 90-100 minutes. One trip a day, and the bus is, as they say, "not breathing, not moving". And there is not enough space for everyone. Another option is 2 trips a day in the morning, but not every day.

Another aspect. We are talking about the Crimean territory, which in the old days of climatic conditions (and they are returning) was called the "Hungry Steppe". It is a semi-desert. In summer, it can be 45C and more in the shade. And it's a corridor for Kalmyk winds from east to west. What reaction do we expect from society?

The answer is "then it will be possible to adjust it, and it will be like that. Because we don't know the migration of the population, the number of people, their needs, and so on"? This is an example of thinking in the coordinates of manual control. We need to add educational colours. We can imagine the state and mood of educators who, in such logistical conditions, need to travel, sometimes urgently, "here and now", for example, to a methodological seminar in a district centre. There is no budget for business trips. And the bus is either only there or only back. You can spend the night wherever you want, but you have to be in class in the morning. And the moods of parents and schoolchildren during the period of preparation for school, medical examinations, etc.

In this situation, the "effect of the executor", a lower-level official, will inevitably and repeatedly arise. For this lower-level official the main task is to give a report on implementation and he doesn't care about the results saying, "I don't know, it just should be like this" in different scenarios. There will arise a risk of hostility to the government and the state as a whole as a result of additional problems, difficulties, costs, inconveniences, etc. There is also the "risk of staff shortages". Or rather, the "threat of staff shortage", and this threat already exists. Let's add to this the possibility of the "risk of an information gap" in the territory which is in the process of reintegration.

Speaking of financial resources. Today, when you get acquainted with the views of the authorities on the tactics of implementing the reintegration policy in Crimea, you notice that the administrators of budgetary funds are not at all mentioned in the action plans. This can be perceived as both unprofessionalism and a lack of understanding of the essence of the processes, and at the same time as preparation for "manual

corrupt control” of the reintegration processes. If, God forbid, this happens, we will get an increase in the effect of the “risk of historical memory”. Personal analysers will begin to work.

7. The language issue in the policy of educational reintegration

Unfortunately, not much attention is paid to the process of linguistic integration of people from the TOT. In the context of the Russian Federation’s strict language policy, as well as the long-term occupation, language ties can be lost.

Thus, many applications submitted by the persons from the TOT were about the existence of courses to learn or improve the knowledge of the Ukrainian language.

In 2021, the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories launched a pilot project, Free preparatory courses with scholarships for applicants from the TOT conducted on the basis of higher educational institutions. However, the Ministry’s website does not contain information on the success or overall implementation of such a project after 2021.

The website of the Commissioner for the Protection of the State Language has an interactive information map that allows to view the available offline Ukrainian language courses. However, information is not available for all regional centres. The website also contains online resources. The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine has created a National Platform for Learning Ukrainian Language, which can be used by people from the TOT.

Having analysed the educational and professional programmes of various specialisations of several Ukrainian higher educational institutions, it can be concluded that while the invariable component of these programmes may contain

a Ukrainian studies component (e.g., Ukrainian language for professional purposes), the variable component usually does not contain any disciplines with a Ukrainian studies component, and persons who lived in the TOT need it for linguistic reintegration and to fill in the knowledge gaps that were formed during the occupation.

Summing up the above, the problem of the lack of a unified state policy on reintegration courses for the persons from the TOT arises. Thus, it is advisable to create a unified programme that would facilitate the study and improvement of the Ukrainian language by the persons from the TOT, as well as address other educational problems arising during the prolonged occupation.

Teaching should definitely be conducted in Ukrainian. However, for children who have been indoctrinated, and this has been reflected in their consciousness and subconscious, all what is Ukrainian might seem bad and hostile. As a result, we can get “the risk of a drop in the level of assimilation of material and educational information”. Or “the risk of continued access to Russian educational sources via the Internet, which will cement the militarised consciousness of children”. Or, more precisely, both options.

How to minimise the risk? An employee of the Crimean education system should be prepared to clearly and distinctly explain the material and educational information in Crimean Tatar and Russian and in no case offer additional paid courses instead of explanations.

Without such an understanding, it is at least naive to expect a positive outcome of reintegration. At one of the roundtables discussing the reintegration of the educational space, our honourable colleagues gave an example of the work of Ukrainian gymnasiums in pre-war Crimea. The

example was something like: “We started teaching in Ukrainian, and the children caught up and overcame personal difficulties. Everything went well”. Yes, it really did. Does this mean that there is no need to be afraid of implementing the provisions of the law on education in the process of educational reintegration and overcoming the militarised consciousness of Crimean children and youth?

This example is from the pre-war reality, i.e. from the situation when Crimea is Ukraine in fact. When there is no fact that the occupiers have been militarising the consciousness of society, and especially children and young people, 24 hours a day for 10 years or more (we do not know how long the occupation will last). They form an image of Ukraine as an enemy. And these are completely different conditions for the perception of the language of education. This is to say that the language issue should be taken into account in the category of risks and threats when deciding on a reintegration policy model.

The language issue may become an additional factor in the formation of the threat of “lost generation thinking”, which is very serious. This is already a threat of hostility with all its negative consequences.

Another issue that is little discussed is **methodological support in the context of providing educational literature**. In this regard, we should focus on the History subject as an example. The problem is all-Ukrainian and has existed since independence – we are afraid of our history. More precisely, we are afraid to tell the truth about our history. For the reason that the truth is not unambiguous and sometimes not very beautiful. This is one side of the issue. The other, which is purely Crimean, is that about 500 years of Crimean history were stolen from us.

And without an understanding of the historical past, it is impossible to properly form the correct positioning of one’s small homeland (region, city, village) in the coordinates of one’s state.

And is impossible to define one’s small homeland (region, city, village) correctly in the state coordinates without an understanding of the historical past. Without a proper understanding of the historical past of Crimea, it is impossible to educate and transform the militarised consciousness of Crimean youth into the consciousness of a “responsible citizen of Ukraine”. A search of websites offering educational and methodological literature led to the publication “Essays on the History of Crimea in the Twentieth Century: 1939-1990”. This is additional literature. Perhaps there is more.

However, according to the logic and context of Ukraine’s budgetary relations model, it is the Council of Ministers of the ARC who should order the production of such literature, or rather the Ministry of Education of the ARC, which does not exist at the moment. The military-civilian administration of Crimea could act, if it had such powers and had been created, but it also does not exist. It should be borne in mind that the execution of such an order will take at best about a year.

That is, we have a “risk of a lack of historical knowledge about Crimea”. By the way, this risk is already manifesting itself in the decision-making process on the formation of a reintegration policy in Crimea. Among Ukrainian government officials. Only officials are in no hurry to admit to the lack of such knowledge and understanding. After all, according to the tradition that has developed since Soviet times, or rather earlier times, if a person becomes a layer between the edge of the executive desk and the official chair, he or she

automatically acquires the necessary knowledge and skills. However, this is not the case.

Додаємо сюди «ризик відсутності розпорядника бюджетних коштів». Ризик, який на свій вплив може просто поставити хрест на всій реінтеграції.

Let's add to this the "risk of not having an administrator of budgetary funds". A risk that, if it has its way, can simply put an end to the whole reintegration process.

Unfortunately, in our education system, there is a problem with a clear definition of values or value guidelines. And without these guidelines, it is problematic to educate a "responsible citizen" and a "patriot". Even more so, it is difficult to reintegrate the carrier of a consciousness militarised by the occupiers. In this context, the reintegration of the educational space of Crimea faces a "risk of lack of values". Such a risk creates disorientation of consciousness which is complicated by the presence of the militarised consciousness. Bad consequences.

What are the possible consequences? Rejection; social tension, socio-political and socio-economic confrontation; elections not in favour of Ukraine; riot; uprising; civil war; new occupation. The more risks are minimised, i.e. their occurrence is prevented, the higher is the likelihood of a positive outcome of the reintegration process in Crimea.

About science. There is not a single word in the rhetoric and already adopted documents about the reintegration of the scientific space of Crimea. What we already have and what we can see.

The risk of losing scientific potential. In whole or in part.

The risk of losing the archives of scientific institutions.

The risk of losing the continuity of scientific research.

The risk of losing scientific personnel.

The risk of losing research areas.

The risk of lack of financial resources for the restoration of scientific infrastructure.

Any decision, action, i.e. policy, can become a tool for generating threats and risks if a person, group, community perceives such a policy as unfair; restricting rights; dignity; worsening the quality of life, its prospects; social status, etc. For example, some people understand the change of consciousness as the formation of a free person, while the authorities understand it as the formation of admirers of the authorities.

It should be added that there are various tools to ensure security, including national security:

- Tools of coercion. Army, police, counterintelligence, prosecutors, courts, etc. This tool has a certain level of effectiveness in the short term. Perhaps in the medium term. In case of public approval of the use of coercive instruments. That is, the perception of them as fair.

- A tool of "acceptance", i.e., changing the model of consciousness, the model of thinking, the system of values. Effective in the long term. More difficult to apply. Thus, education is one of the tools for changing consciousness. That is, from the set of "acceptance" tools.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATE AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE ON OVERCOMING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCUPATION AND CHALLENGES IN REINTEGRATING THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL AFTER THEIR LIBERATION IN THE EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC FIELDS

The reintegration of the educational space of the Crimean peninsula is complicated by the fact that, in addition to fulfilling standard educational tasks, i.e. raising a patriot, a responsible citizen, a Free Man, the Crimean regional educational system must simultaneously restore its functionality and overcome the consequences of the occupation and militarisation of the minds of the residents of the Crimean peninsula.

Therefore, when developing reintegration strategies, we recommend be guided by the principle of the best interests of the child taking into account the provisions of international agreements on the rights of the child. And when formulating a policy for the reintegration of the educational sphere of the temporarily occupied territories, the following steps should be taken:

Problems to be solved and measures to be implemented while the Crimean peninsula is under temporary Russian occupation:

1. Recommend to the President of Ukraine, in order to ensure that the main tasks of the Advisory

Council are fulfilled, to make changes to the personal composition of the Advisory Council on De-occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, involving in its work at least two Crimean experts from among the members of the Expert Council at the Mission of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol under the following conditions:

- recommendation from the Expert Council at the Mission of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and Sevastopol:
- at least 10 years of practical experience in the humanities in the educational and scientific field in Crimea

2. Recommend to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine:

2.1. Accelerate the consideration and adoption of the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on Recognition of Educational Results of Persons Residing in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine".

2.2. Recognize that the strategic task in terms of ensuring national security in the long term is to

minimize the opportunities for collaborators to act in favor of the aggressor on the territory of Ukraine as a whole and in the de-occupied territories of Ukraine, respectively. Given the importance of the issue, it is recommended to return to and implement the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On Recommendations of the Parliamentary Hearings on the topic: "Strategy of Reintegration into Ukraine of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol: Problematic Issues, Ways, Methods and Means", in particular the one prescribed in paragraph 2.1, subparagraph 3, i.e. to adopt the law "On Collaborationism and Purification of Power (Lustration) in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol".

2.3. Prepare and hold parliamentary hearings on the development of a policy for the reintegration of the Crimean peninsula with the broad participation of representatives of the Crimean expert community and NGOs dealing with Crimean issues.

2.4. To the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Education, Science and Innovation – to prepare and hold committee hearings on the reintegration of the Crimean regional educational and scientific space.

3. To the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine:

3.1. Amend the structure of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine and create a separate unit, the Directorate of Educational and Scientific Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine.

3.2. Establish a state interagency commission on the reintegration of children and youth from the TOT under the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

3.3. Amend the CMU Resolution No. 796 "Some Issues of Awarding and Paying Social Scholarships to Students (Cadets) of Pre-Tertiary Vocational and Higher Educational Institutions" and CMU Resolution No. 1047 "On the Amount of Scholarships in State and Municipal Educational and Scientific Institutions" to increase social scholarships for students from the TOT, taking into account the subsistence level and the real needs of such persons.

3.4. Amend the CMU Resolution No. 673 "On Approval of the Procedure for Concessional Loans for Vocational (professional and technical), Pre-Tertiary Vocational and Higher Education" to improve the mechanism for providing concessional loans to internally displaced persons for vocational, pre-tertiary vocational and higher education.

4. Create a public council on the integration of children and youth from the TOT under the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories.

5. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine should ensure the implementation of the signed Memorandum of Cooperation and support of the Crimean Platform Expert Network.

6. To the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine:

6.1. Analyse the state standard of the Russian Federation and the educational programmes used to educate children during the occupation to identify the most dangerous narratives that changed the worldview and contributed to the indoctrination of young people.

To initiate the creation under the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine of a State Interagency Commission on the Integration of Children and Youth from the TOT to comprehensively study the issues related to the reintegration of children and youth from the TOT and find ways to address the identified problems.

6.2. Develop, approve, and publish selection algorithms and training programs for the personnel reserve for the educational space of the Crimean peninsula. To start training the personnel reserve. In order to solve the problem of staff shortages in the context of the post-war demographic crisis, to introduce an intermediate position of assistant teacher, preschool teacher in educational institutions of the Crimean peninsula.

6.3. Establish a structural unit of the Ministry of Education and Science (Directorate of Education for the Occupied Territories) with expert groups formed to perform tasks in specific areas of reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories to perform tasks related to ensuring the formation of state policy to guarantee access to Ukrainian education for persons from the TOT, coordinating and monitoring its implementation, analyzing and evaluating the impact of its implementation.

6.4. Create separate online educational institutions whose activities will be aimed at providing education taking into account the special educational needs of children from the occupied territories, namely: development of working initial plans to take into account the fact of studying under educational programs in the TOT, school work at a time convenient for the TOT residents, individual educational trajectories, individual and

group online classes with a tutor (mentor). To include the position of tutor in the Unified State Classifier of Professions of Ukraine.

Given the need to amend the Order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine No. 271 "On Approval of the Procedure for Admission to Higher, Pre-Tertiary Vocational and Vocational (Vocational and Technical) Education of Persons Residing in the Territory of Ukraine Temporarily Occupied by the Russian Federation" in order to establish clear timeframes for conducting entrance exams, to allow submission of original documents to the admission committee of an educational institution after the end of the occupation of the settlement in which the place of residence is registered/declared, because the existing procedure creates security risks.

6.5. Develop and implement a separate mechanism for confirming learning outcomes and periods of study for general secondary education received in the temporarily occupied territory for continuing education, including abroad.

To unify the procedure for obtaining documents on basic secondary education or complete general secondary education (passing the annual assessment and state final certification) by introducing appropriate amendments to the Regulation "On Individual Form of Completing General Secondary Education" and the Procedure for Admission to Higher, Pre-Tertiary Vocational and Vocational (Vocational and Technical) Educational Institutions for Persons Residing in the Territory of Ukraine Temporarily Occupied by the Russian Federation.

6.6. Develop, approve and publish an algorithm of actions for the exchange of educational documents obtained during the occupation of

Crimea. In this regard, additionally develop and implement the possibility of confirming educational qualifications obtained in the TOT regardless of the date of admission to a higher educational institution by improving the certification procedure under the Order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine No. 537 in accordance with the Convention on the Recognition of Qualifications in Higher Education in the European Region (Section VII), ratified by the relevant Law of Ukraine of 03. 12. 1999, No. 1273-XIV, and the recommendations of this Convention, as well as the implementation of the norms of the Order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine No. 504 of 05.05.2015. Namely:

- for the procedure of recognition, persons should provide educational documents available to them, such as: copies of documents on education or periods of study, student card, academic record, record book, course descriptions, documents on informal and non-formal education or other documents that can confirm the fact of study and/or obtaining qualifications; as well as available documents on work experience, such as: certificate of work experience, employment contract, employment record book, certificates from workplaces or other documents that can testify to the relevant qualifications.

Amend the Regulation "On Individual Form of Completing General Secondary Education" to provide an opportunity to obtain a document on basic secondary education or complete general secondary education without leaving the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine while studying on an external form, as the current procedure creates security risks.

6.7. Build an educational subsystem that will provide opportunities for students from the TOT

to continue their studies in higher educational institutions located in the territory controlled by Ukraine in a distance form, as the possibility of leaving such territories is blocked by the occupation forces and/or poses a threat to the life, health and freedom of citizens. It is logical to form this educational subsystem based on the example of the educational subsystem that is currently used for Ukrainian children living in other countries (EU, USA etc.).

6.8. Introduce an external form of study for all interested students of Ukrainian higher educational institutions who live in the TOT of Ukraine.

Develop methodological recommendations for pre-tertiary vocational and higher educational institutions to create opportunities for students from the TOT to continue their education in educational institutions located in the government-controlled territory of Ukraine in the form of distance learning, external studies, as the possibility of leaving the temporarily occupied territories is blocked by the occupation forces and/or poses a threat to the life, health and freedom of citizens.

Take into account the interests of persons residing in the TOT when developing and approving the Procedure for admission to higher educational institutions in 2024 and, in accordance with the Order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine No. 271 "On Approval of the Procedure for Admission to Higher, Pre-Tertiary Vocational and Vocational (Vocational and Technical) Educational Institutions for Persons Residing in the Territory of Ukraine Temporarily Occupied by the Russian Federation", to take into account the interests of persons residing in the TOT and approve the "Quota-2" for applicants from the TOT.

Amend the Standard Rules for Admission to Vocational (Vocational and Technical) Educational Institutions of Ukraine to take into account the interests of persons from the TOT and in accordance with the Order of the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine No. 271 "On Approval of the Procedure for Admission to Higher, Pre-Tertiary Vocational and Vocational (Vocational and Technical) Educational Institutions for Persons Residing in the Territory of Ukraine Temporarily Occupied by the Russian Federation" to provide "Quota-2" to the applicants from the TOT.

6.9. Create and maintain a unified information platform (web portal) for young people from the TOT, which will include information on admission, educational services, available preparatory or subject-specific courses, etc.

6.10. Timely prepare and conduct systematic information campaigns about existing educational services provided to Ukrainian citizens from the TOT, taking into account the challenges associated with disseminating information to the occupied territories (timely launch of information campaigns, involvement of marketers in information campaigns to find and use the most effective ways to disseminate information).

6.11. Conduct in cooperation with the expert community an audit and study of the existing legislative and regulatory framework in terms of forming a clear educational policy, starting with the documents adopted in 2014.

6.12. Bring the activities of the Educational Centres in line with the challenges posed by the full-scale invasion, in particular, to audit the activities of the Educational Centres "Crimea-Ukraine" regarding the 2023 admission campaign, to organise training for representatives of vocational,

pre-tertiary vocational and higher educational institutions on the upcoming admission campaign for children from the TOT, to provide methodological recommendations on the specifics of the admission campaign for applicants from the TOT in wartime. To conduct an audit of the activities of such educational centres for the entire period of their operation.

6.13. In order to ensure the safety of children and young people during the period of active hostilities in the de-occupation of Ukrainian territories, to develop a relevant programme and begin its implementation, using the capabilities of relevant international organisations and, above all, the format of the Crimean Platform.

Problems whose solution is delayed until after de-occupation, but the goals, principles and algorithms for their solution should be developed and published in advance

7. To the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine:

7.1. Develop and prepare for implementation an educational concept and action plan for the reintegration of the TOT residents, which will define the specifics of involving such citizens in Ukrainian education at different levels and in different forms using formal and non-formal education tools; special value-based programmes, taking into account the challenges of children's prolonged exposure to Russian narratives.

7.2. Develop adaptations of educational programmes for the temporarily occupied territories through the development of "compensatory working curricula" for pre-school education; primary, secondary and high schools; and higher

educational institutions in accordance with the State Educational Standard of Ukraine.

Develop a programme of "soft Ukrainisation", which envisages replacing Russian as the language of everyday communication with Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar through trilingual communication and education at all levels of the regional educational system in Crimea, starting with pre-school educational institutions.

7.3. Prepare programmes for enhanced study of the Ukrainian component (Ukrainian language, History of Ukraine, Geography, Legal studies, Human and World studies, etc.).

7.4. Launch a project to prepare educational books (on History, Literature, Geography, Biology) to teach about the region of residence, the homeland of Crimean residents. Effective reintegration of Crimea is impossible without understanding and comprehending the literary and historical context of the development and life of this Ukrainian territory.

Develop an information and educational manual "Crimea. The History of the Land" (tentative title) with historical and local lore content to raise awareness and knowledge of Crimeans and beyond, as well as to counteract information myths and Russian propaganda, narratives implemented by the occupation authorities in the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. To entrust the development of the manual to the Ukrainian Institute of National Memory.

7.5. Create a new regional educational model for the Crimean peninsula with strategic goals – to educate "patriots of Ukraine" and "responsible citizens".

7.6. Develop and publish criteria for assessing the results of the reintegration of the educational

space in de-occupied Crimea, including criteria for defining the concepts of "patriotism" and "responsible citizen". We suggest using the following wording:

"Patriotism" means love and respect for one's way of life, acceptance of the need to protect it.

A "patriot" is a person who loves, respects and is ready to consciously defend his or her way of life, which is prevalent in the state and ensures a decent standard of living. A patriot is a responsible citizen.

A "responsible citizen" is a person who belongs to the permanent population and has a sufficient scope of rights, duties and opportunities provided by the Constitution, who has the ability to exercise these rights, perform duties, give a full account of his or her actions, take responsibility for his or her own or the government's mistakes or poor performance, and be ready to correct them.

7.7. Formulate a clear and unambiguous position in the Ministry of Education and Science regarding Crimean collaborators in the field of education and science. To make a decision on the development and implementation of mechanisms for depriving collaborators of academic ranks and honorary titles.

7.8. We propose the following interpretation of the concept of "educational collaborationism" – "voluntary occupation of leadership positions in educational institutions in the occupied territories of Ukraine, other territories of the Russian Federation; destruction/participation in the destruction of Ukrainian books, educational materials, visual aids; organisation, conduct, participation in educational activities aimed at militarising the minds of students, persuading them to support the occupying state, approving the war against Ukraine,

and readiness to participate in the war against Ukraine on the side of the aggressor state;

public statements in support of the occupation of the territory of Ukraine; agitation, explanatory work in favour of the occupying state, including appeals, agitation for enlistment in the armed forces, other units of the aggressor state; public approval of the war against Ukraine; calls for the destruction of Ukraine and its citizens”.

7.9. We propose the following interpretation of the concept of “scientific collaborationism” – “voluntary transfer of results of scientific research and scientific developments; participation in Russian scientific projects; in scientific projects funded or co-funded by the Russian side; participation in scientific and/or scientific-practical conferences, symposia, round tables, other events to discuss or exchange scientific achievements, technological developments, etc. held on the territory of the aggressor state, in the occupied territories of Ukraine, video conferences, etc., including those funded or co-funded by the Russian side; publication of scientific articles and other materials based on the results of scientific research in Russian editions or funded in whole or in part by the Russian side.

Voluntary occupation of leadership positions in scientific institutions in the occupied territory of Ukraine; public statements supporting the occupation of the territory of Ukraine; campaigning, explanatory work in favour of the occupying state, including calls, agitation for enlistment in the armed forces, other units of the aggressor state; public approval of the war against Ukraine; calls for the destruction of Ukraine and its citizens”.

7.10. Start training personnel for the Crimean regional educational system who are fluent in Ukrainian, Crimean Tatar, English and Russian for

all levels of the educational process (pre-school education, secondary education, higher education). Such training should be entrusted to universities with relevant competencies in Crimean issues.

The most logical thing would be to create a base for such training at the Crimean Republican Institute of Postgraduate Pedagogical Education after its evacuation from the occupied territory of the Crimean peninsula and to staff with new personnel who have not tarnished themselves by cooperation with the occupiers.

Ensure the introduction and spread of Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar as languages of everyday communication at all levels of the regional educational model of the Crimean peninsula, starting with pre-school educational institutions.

7.11. Train personnel to conduct courses on mastering the Ukrainian language for the adult population of the Crimean peninsula

7.12. Introduce the necessary legislative and regulatory changes on lustration and the formation of a regional educational model in the Crimean regional educational system.

7.13. Develop, approve and publish curricula for the transitional period, which should not and cannot exceed three years. Taking into account the existing Crimean peculiarities. For the first three years of the reintegration process of the de-occupied territory of Crimea, taking into account that from 2027 high-schoolers will choose their subjects in accordance with the norms of the current legislation and regulations.

7.14. Formulate an approximate quantitative structure of the subsystem of preschool education, compulsory general secondary education, vocational education (for working professions), and higher education for the Crimean peninsula,

taking into account the diversity of forms of ownership in the educational space of the region to be reintegrated.

7.15. Identify and discuss in the expert and civil society community the list of higher educational institutions that will be revived in Crimea immediately after de-occupation. As well as a list of specialities and areas of study and training.

7.16. Identify and discuss in the expert and civil society community the list of scientific institutions that will be revived in Crimea immediately after de-occupation. As well as a list of research areas.

8. Implementing any reintegration policy task is impossible without resource support. This includes education and science. In this regard, and taking into account all the difficulties and problems of budgetary financing of the long-term reintegration process, we recommend creating a Fund for the Reintegration of Crimea and involving the member states of the International Crimean Platform in its formation. The President of Ukraine, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, and the Crimean Platform Expert Network should raise this issue at the next IV Summit of the International Crimean Platform.

**FORMATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE
VISION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE STATE AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE
ON OVERCOMING THE CONSEQUENCES
OF THE OCCUPATION AND CHALLENGES
IN THE REINTEGRATING THE AUTONOMOUS
REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA
AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL
IN A RELIGIOUS DIRECTION**

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1. Historical background.

**The Situation in Church-State Relations
(before 2014)**

As of January 1, 1991, there were 86 religious organizations in Crimea. However, the peninsula did not avoid the consequences of the collapse of the USSR and the dramatic change in attitude towards religion in society. Here, the process of religious revival was accompanied by the rapid growth of religious communities, a network of religious institutions, the formation of a stratum of clergy, the expansion of interaction with religious centers abroad, etc.

Therefore, at the beginning of 1997, there were 665 religious communities in the ARC (Orthodox: 39.0%, Islamic: 33.0%, Protestant: 22.0%, Roman Catholic: 1.6%, communities of Eastern religions: 1.5%, others: 2.9%). Their share in the all-Ukrainian massif amounted to 3.3%.

The growth rate of new religious organizations in Crimea until 2014 was almost one hundred units per year. At the beginning of 2004, the total number of religious organizations reached 1,329 (4.3% of the total number of religious institutions in Ukraine). And 10 years later, at the beginning

of 2014, in Crimea (without the city of Sevastopol) there were 2,083 religious organizations of various types (50 confessions and denominations), which constituted 5.6% of their total number in Ukraine. Of these, 1409 operated with the status of a legal entity, and another 674 religious communities enjoyed the right to religious activity without state registration. A total of 137 religious organizations were located in the city of Sevastopol. That is, in the end, we can talk about 2,220 religious organizations in Crimea and in the city of Sevastopol operating in early 2014.

Orthodoxy, Islam, and Protestantism dominated among the religions, (42.7%, 29%, and 20%, respectively). These numbers do not take into account communities without the status of legal entities. If we counted these communities, Islam would emerge as a leader on the peninsula. After all, 575 communities of the Religious Administration of Muslims of Crimea (RAMC) and about 30 communities of evangelical Christians operated without registration. The situation was somewhat different in Sevastopol, where the most common were Orthodoxy (53.3%); Protestantism (27%), and Islam (5.8%).

In the Orthodox environment, the UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate had almost monopolistic

influence. The Crimean Eparchy of the UOC-MP united 519 communities and their share (38.5%) among the religious institutions of the region remained stable for many years.

The network of the UOC-KP and the UAOC was represented by the activities of 50 and 10 religious organizations, respectively (in the UAOC, almost all communities were not registered and did not have permanent priests). In 1992-2014, these institutions did not receive any permission to build churches on the territory of the autonomous republic. At the same time, during the same period the UOC-MP obtained 50 permits. The appearance of churches of the UOC-KP with a complete boycott by the local administration (which can be considered as an example of religious discrimination) took place with public and state assistance: on the territory of military units, other territories of national jurisdiction, as well as those territories that were privately owned, when the owners, of their own free will, transferred them to be used by the religious community. Thus, by 2014, the UOC-KP had a total of 12 churches and adapted premises for public liturgies and the UAOC did not have a single premise (services were held there in apartments). The local dioceses of the UOC-MP had 415 places of worship.

Representatives of the UOC-MP in every possible way blocked the participation of clerics of the UOC-KP and UAOC in the activities of local self-government and regional government bodies. There were even attempts to prevent the clergy of these churches from participating in celebrations dedicated to public holidays. The same can be said about the representation of the UOC-KP and the UAOC in the state or municipal media of the peninsula: mentions of these churches were mainly aimed to criticize or discredit them.

As for the situation in the Islamic environment, at the time of the illegal occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol by Russian troops, 1015 Muslim religious organizations were registered or rather re-registered on the territory of the peninsula. This represented approximately 46% of the total pre-war number of religious organizations in the region (2220 religious organizations, including the city of Sevastopol).

The largest and oldest association was the Religious Administration of Muslims of Crimea (hereinafter referred to as the RAMC; since 2014 it has been cooperating with the occupying power), and since December 1999 has been headed by Emirali Ablayev. In addition, directly, in December 2010, an alternative Spiritual Center of Muslims of Crimea (SCMC) began to operate in Crimea, which experts associate with the Religious Administration of Muslims of Ukraine (RAMU), headed by Ahmed Tamim. The head of the SCMC was Ridvan Veliev, close to A. Tamim. Active competition began between the RAMC and the SCMC, which sometimes even turned into a physical confrontation.

After the occupation of the peninsula, the relations between the RAMC and the SCMC reached the highest point of escalation. In particular, in September 2014, the leadership of the RAMC accused the Tavrian Muftiate, which arose on the basis of the SCMC, of raiding the Juma Jami mosque in Yevpatoria. Actually, the creation of the Tavrian Muftiate became known only on August 22, 2014. Therefore, many experts then suggested that the main purpose of creating this structure was to create a counterweight to the RAMC.

Accordingly, if the mufti of the RAMC E. Ablayev had refused to cooperate with the

Russian authorities, the religious organizations under his control would gradually in one way or another be transferred to the management of the Tavrian muftiate headed by Ruslan Saitvaliev. However, since the RAMC eventually cooperated, the Tavrian Muftiate remained a small administration, although it was not defeated, like it happened, for example, with Muslim organizations close to the RAMU in the occupied Donbas.

In addition to the two most active competing religious administrations, other numerous Muslim organizations also operated on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. In particular, Hizb ut-Tahrir. Still, on February 14, 2003, this organization was banned on the territory of the Russian Federation by the relevant decision of the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation as "extremist" and "terrorist". Instead, before the occupation of Crimea its communities freely operated in Ukraine. Actually, it was the belonging (real or framed-up) to Hizb ut-Tahrir that became the reason for the persecution of the vast majority of Crimean Tatar activists during the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea.

In addition to Hizb ut-Tahrir, on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, there were jamaats of Salafis, Sufis, Shiites, followers of Said Nursi, Fethullah Gulen and Suleiman Hilmi Tunahan. After the occupation of the peninsula, the vast majority of their supporters also suffered repressions from the Russian authorities. In particular, followers of the latter three jamaats get really imprisoned for belonging to their religious denominations. Instead, in the Ukrainian legal field, they have been acting and continue to act quite freely, even though some of them have temporary conflicts with the Turkish authorities.

The religious component was also noticeably traced in the activities of Crimean Tatar

self-government bodies and political organizations. In particular, the pro-Ukrainian Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people and the pro-Russian organization "Milliy Firqa". The latter openly supported the Russian authorities after the occupation, and its head Vasvi Abduraimov repeatedly publicly stated that only within the Russian legal field the Crimean Tatars would be able to exercise their national rights.

Instead, the Mejlis did not support the occupation, its leaders were imprisoned or ousted from the peninsula. In 2016, the Russian authorities declared the Mejlis an "extremist organization, which was done first by the "Supreme Court of Crimea", and later by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation. On April 19, 2017, at the request of Ukraine, the International Court of Justice ordered the Russian Federation to resume the work of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, but the occupying power, contrary to international law, has not yet complied with this order.

Prior to the occupation of Crimea, the Islamic Cultural Center "All-Ukrainian Association of NGO's 'Alraid'" operated in Simferopol. With his support, several mosques were built, and a number of humanitarian projects were carried out. However, the Russian authorities expectedly curtailed the activities of this Center.

The peculiarities of interconfessional relations in the Crimea include the functioning since 1992 of the Interconfessional Council of the Crimea "Peace is a Gift of God", created on the initiative of the Simferopol and Crimean Diocese of the UOC-MP. It consisted of representatives of the Simferopol and Crimean Diocese of the UOC-MP; the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea; the Armenian Apostolic Church; the community of progressive Judaism of Crimea; the Roman Catholic Church; the German Evangelical

Lutheran Church; Evangelical Christian Baptists; the Adventist Church of the 7th day; the Spiritual Administration of the religious communities of the Karaites of Ukraine.

Lazar Shvets, Metropolitan of Simferopol and Crimea of the UOC-MP, and Emirali Ablaev, the head of the Spiritual Administration of Muslims of Crimea were co-chairmen of the Council. The Secretary was a proxy of the Metropolitan, the secretary of the Simferopol and Crimean Diocese of the UOC-MP.

The fact that this council was actually controlled by a pro-Russian metropolitan leveled the constructive nature of its activities. Pro-Ukrainian churches and religious organizations were not given a chance (and most often, did not have a desire) to become members of this council.

The issues of state-church relations in Crimea were attended directly by (the state body of Ukraine for religious affairs) the Republican Committee of the ARC for Religious Affairs (after the dissolution of the Republican Committee for Nationalities and Religions of the Ministry of Culture of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea). It should be noted that the Republican Committee for Nationalities and Religions was a more logical state body than the Committee of the ARC for Religious Affairs, since some of the religious trends are actually inseparable from the ethnic component, and are ethno-confessional entities (for example, Karaites or Krymchaks).

In addition to these religious organizations, several communities of the Ukrainian Diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church operated in some cities of Crimea. In particular, in Yalta, Feodosia, and Evpatoria there are traditional Armenian Christian monuments, khachkars. It is also impossible to ignore the activities of the Jewish communities in Crimea, as it is in the Crimea and

the northern Black Sea coast where this national and religious trend appeared in the territory of modern Ukraine. Before the occupation, Judaism was professed by 1% of the population of the peninsula.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The central executive body implementing the state policy in the field of religion in Ukraine and its integral part in Crimea (the Republican Committee for Nationalities and Religions) did not have the means and opportunities to significantly influence the sphere of state-church relations in the peninsula. Given the pro-Russian sentiments of the residents and the attempts of political leaders to play up to these sentiments, the UOC-MP dominated here with its leading ideological platform of the "Russian world".

2. Pro-Ukrainian Christian churches (UOC of Kyivan Patriarchate, UAOC, UGCC, Ukrainian Pentecostal Church, etc.), as well as individual Islamic or Jewish religious organizations (RAMC "Ummah", Progressive Hebrews), were considered "non-traditional" even before the occupation of Crimea. They often did not get state support even in matters of information policy, assistance in obtaining real estate, etc. Therefore, the development of these churches and religious organizations depended mainly on the initiative and perseverance of the clergy and their ability to resist pro-Russian narratives.

3. The dominant cells of the UOC-MP were the advocates of the chauvinistic ideas of the Russian Federation ("triune Russia", "holy Russia", etc.). However, this did not cause rejection or objection either in the authorities or in the representatives of the special services. Such a reaction stimulated the head of the diocese of the UOC-MP to impose on the authorities models of attitude

towards certain churches and religious trends, as well as to create and lead interconfessional councils, to impose pro-Russian ideology on the population, and to corrupt smaller religious trends.

4. The efforts of the Security Service of Ukraine in Crimea and other law enforcement agencies were mainly focused on the "struggle" against "extremist Muslim organizations" or "right-wing radical Ukrainian-nationalist" trends. First of all, this meant supporters of Hizb ut-Tahrir or believers of other Jamaats (Salafis, Sufis, Shiites, etc.), or mythical "Banderites fed by the UOC-KP or the UAOC (OCU) or the UGCC".

2. Religious sphere and state-church relations in Crimea since the beginning of the occupation (2014–2023)

Russian armed aggression has significantly affected the observance of the rights of religious organizations and believers in the temporarily occupied territories, in particular in Crimea. The latter actually turned into a space of religious unfreedom. After all, in the regions under their control, Russian invaders resorted to introducing the ersatz model of state-confession relations inherent in the Russian Federation. And there the boundaries of religious freedom are determined by the degree of willingness of religious communities to cooperate with Putin's regime and/or publicly demonstrate their loyalty to it.

In the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories, the policy in the religious sphere is carried out according to the Russian scenario with oppression and destruction of religious freedoms. Consequently, freedom of conscience and freedom of religious activity are seriously limited. The scale and intensity of persecution on religious grounds, which were recorded by human rights

activists, indicate that, in accordance with the definition of international humanitarian law, crimes against humanity are taking place in the temporarily occupied territories. A significant number of religious communities, in particular the Crimean Eparchy of the OCU, communities of the UAOC, individual communities of the UGCC, and Protestant movements, have ceased to exist, and freedom of thought, conscience, and religion as a phenomenon are absent.

It can be argued that the occupation of Crimea by the troops of the Russian Federation has become a challenge to the entire modern system of human rights protection. After all, all spheres of human lives where there were any mentions of Ukrainian culture were persecuted. Russian legislation brought to the occupied territories the same intolerance of dissent and other denominations other than Moscow Orthodoxy, which has existed and still exists on the invaders' own territory. This policy did not only affect the pro-Ukrainian Orthodox churches and the UGCC, but also many other religious trends. The occupation authorities in Crimea, as well as on the territory of the Russian Federation proper, systematically violate the norms of international law.

According to Dmytro Lubinets, the Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights, the Russian occupation authorities in Crimea have opened more than 100 criminal cases related to religion as of August 2023. 17 of them were against representatives of the communities of Jehovah's Witnesses (this religion is persecuted in the territory of the Russian Federation) (<https://ua.korrespondent.net/ukraine/4616994-rf-prodovzhuie-represii-za-relihiinoui-oznakoui-v-krymu-ombudsmen>). Thus, the Russian authorities continue to ignore the UN General Assembly Resolution 74/168 of December 18,

2019, in which the international community calls on the Russian Federation to ensure freedom of religion or belief without any discrimination.

Since the beginning of Russia's military intervention in the Crimean peninsula, Ukrainian churches and religious communities have been targets for harassment of their activities. The Russian authorities have established a requirement for mandatory re-registration of religious organizations and objects of religious significance in Crimea, the coercion to transfer to Russian citizenship, control over the production and distribution of religious literature, special rules for missionary activities, etc.

The occupation of Crimea in 2014 had critical consequences for religious freedom and religious diversity. According to official data, before the occupation, at least 2,220 religious organizations were operating on the Crimean peninsula, which represented about 50 religious denominations. Instead, as of the end of 2020, the occupation authorities reported 907 religious organizations representing about 20 denominations. Thus, both the number of religious organizations and the number of denominations they represent decreased more than twofold.

2.1. The Situation of Orthodox Communities During the Occupation of Crimea

The Orthodox Church of Ukraine (until 2019, Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church)

In the Ukrainian territories occupied by the Russian Federation, the most biased attitude is towards the Orthodox Church of Ukraine (hereinafter referred to as the OCU; until 2019 there

were two churches, the UOC of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church). Local propagandists working on religious issues, despite the recognition and receipt of the Tomos, regard the OCU as a "schismatic pro-Western structure" that is allegedly associated with mythical "radical nationalist circles" and the "Kyiv junta". An additional argument for pressure is the steady position of the OCU, namely, the reluctance to be re-registered in accordance with the Russian occupation legislation.

Of all the recorded cases of persecution of religious organizations, 34% concerned associations, followers and clergy of the OCU (See the study "Religious occupation: oppression of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate in Crimea" / <https://www.helsinki.org.ua/articles/relihijna-okupatsiya-utysky-ukrajinskoji-pravoslavnoji-tserkvy-kyjivskoho-patriarhatu-v-krymu/>). The apogee of pressure on this Church was the forcible seizure of the Cathedral of Saints Volodymyr and Olga in Simferopol by Russian special services in May 2023. Metropolitan Clement of Crimea and Simferopol of the OCU called such a step an act of genocide since the temple remained the only core of Ukrainiandom on the Crimean peninsula during all the years of occupation.

The occupation policy of oppression and persecution of believers of the Crimean Eparchy of the OCU has resulted in a significant reduction of its institutional network. In particular, as already noted, as of the beginning of 2014, the Crimean Eparchy of the UOC-KP consisted of 46 parishes, 3 Orthodox brotherhoods and missions, and 1 monastery. There were 14 clergymen on the staff. At the same time, 26 communities had permanent premises for worship (most of them were private buildings provided by local entrepreneurs),

and the Crimean Eparchy had under its administration 6 land plots with a total area of 4 hectares. The UAOC had about 10 communities that did not have places of worship and several non-permanent priests.

Between 1992 and 2014, the UOC KP and the UAOC did not receive from local authorities a single permission to build their churches. The three churches of the UOC-KP erected at that time were located on the territory of military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. For comparison, during the same period, the UOC MP received 50 such permits for the construction of its churches. In Sevastopol alone, there were 47 religious buildings, including 4 new buildings.

During the first year of occupation, the activities of 39 out of 46 parishes of the UOC-KP and almost all communities of the UAOC were stopped. Parishes were also deprived of places of worship: they were either taken away by force (for example, in Sevastopol, Simferopol, in the village of Perevalne, etc.) or confiscated in favor of the UOC MP on the grounds that the owners of buildings used for worship left the territory of Crimea (cases in Saky, Krasnoperekopsk, Kerch, etc., <https://www.helsinki.org.ua/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/KBP-Relyhyoznaya-okkupatsyya.pdf>)

At the beginning of 2022, the diocese of the OCU had 7 parishes and 4 clergymen. As of October 2023, only 3 or 4 communities of the OCU remained formally active in Crimea, and their activities are actually paralyzed. Therefore, such a significant decrease in pro-Ukrainian Orthodox communities eloquently testifies to how disastrous the consequences of terror and discrimination by the occupying pro-Kremlin administration turned out to be for the OCU.

It should be noted that the Crimean Eparchy of the OCU is the only religious organization that

has neglected the need for re-registration, as required by the occupation authorities of the Russian Federation. As a result, this church is in the "gray zone", that is, in fact, "does not exist" for the occupation authorities of Crimea, and therefore is deprived of even the opportunity to hold worship services. On the other hand, this position of the clergy and believers of the OCU in Crimea has become one of the symbols of non-violent resistance to the occupation.

UOC of the Moscow Patriarchate, Since June 2022 Russian Orthodox Church

A completely different, opposite situation is observed with regard to the activities of the UOC-MP on the territory of Crimea. It should be noted that since the beginning of the 90s of the 20th century, there has been one diocese here, the Simferopol-Crimean. It was headed by Lazar Shvets, an authoritative Metropolitan, permanent member of the Synod of the UOC-MP (since 2012). In 2008, seven districts in the northern part of the Crimean Peninsula were separated from this diocese and a new Dzhankoi diocese was created. In December 2012, two districts were separated in the east of the peninsula and the Feodosia-Kerch diocese was created. Before the occupation, the UOC-MP in Crimea had 535 religious organizations, including 6 monasteries and one theological educational institution.

In 2014, the dioceses of the UOC-MP in Crimea did not only begin to cooperate with the occupation regime but often actively contributed to its establishment. In particular, when the Russian operation to occupy the peninsula began, some Crimean Orthodox churches provided shelter to agents of the Russian special services, who often arrived under the guise of "pilgrims". Actually, the special operation itself to seize

Crimea was carried out under the guise of "pilgrimage activities" conducted by saboteurs. For example, I. Strelkov-Girkin (https://zn.ua/UKRAINE/rukovoditel-terroristov-girkin-vel-razveddeyatelnost-pod-patronatom-russkoy-pravoslavnoy-cerkvi-145305_.html).

After the occupation of Crimea by Russia, the Simferopol and Crimean Eparchy of the UOC-MP received at its disposal two churches seized from the UOC of the Kyiv Patriarchate, located on the territories of military units of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in Sevastopol and the Simferopol district. In all three dioceses of the UOC-MP, departments were created to cooperate with the occupying law enforcement and military structures. In addition, the clergy of the dioceses participate in the education of Crimean children and youth in the spirit of "citizens of the Russian fatherland", including the involvement of the military aspect. There are also numerous cases of consecration of weapons by Orthodox clerics of the UOC-MP, up to the blessing and consecration of Russian long- and medium-range anti-aircraft missile systems, etc. For example, on January 14, 2017, the Metropolitan Platon of Feodosia and Kerch consecrated the S-400 Triumph system deployed in Feodosia.

Since 2022, it has become increasingly difficult for the dioceses of the UOC-MP in Crimea to be torn apart doing the "canonical split" between the Kyiv Metropolis, to which they belonged "de jure", and the Moscow Patriarchate that administered them "de facto". Subsequently, at the level of information messages from these centers, there was a certain change not only in rhetoric but also in the behavioral model. In particular, if earlier the electronic resources of dioceses and deaneries were simply replete with declarations of allegiance to the Russian authorities and their

regional puppets and evidence of cooperation with the occupying power and military contingent, then in the first months after the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation into Ukraine, the attention of the church media was mainly focused on social or at most educational projects.

However, cooperation with the occupiers was not stopped. After February 24, 2022, the Crimean structures of the UOC-MP continued their active work to spread the "Russian world" and "patriotic education" of local children and youth in the spirit of this ideology. In the new political context, the cooperation with the occupation military contingent and "law enforcement agencies" also strengthened.

Around March 2022, the Simferopol Eparchy of the UOC-MP began the practice of sending so-called "humanitarian convoys" to the newly occupied territories of Ukraine. These convoys were blessed by Metropolitan Lazar. Their formation and delivery was the task of the head of the diocese's military department, Archpriest Dimitry Krotkov, who had been dealing with such issues since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war in 2014.

The clergy of the Crimean Orthodox dioceses regularly gather "charitable aid" for Russian servicemen participating in the war against Ukraine. In particular, they send humanitarian goods to hospitals and military units of the Russian occupiers. Clerics also carry out individual "patriotic" work with the military. Thus, on June 28, 2022, Kalinik Chernyshov, the Vicar Bishop of Bakhchisarai, with the blessing of the head of the Crimean Metropolis, Metropolitan Lazar, visited subsidiary No. 2 of the Military Hospital of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation in Simferopol.

There, he thanked the wounded Russian servicemen for their "feats" and assured them that

the ROC "every day offers fervent prayers for peace to reign and for the soldiers fighting for their homeland." At the same time, epy Bishop Kalinik presented the wounded Russian soldiers with icons of St. Luke of Crimea and "prayer books of an Orthodox soldier." There are enough irrefutable facts that the clerics of the Crimean Metropolis participate in the spread of Russian propaganda, contributed to the mobilization of recruits to the Russian army, and massively blessed conscripts for the war against Ukraine.

Against the background of this work, it was not particularly surprising that at the Council of the UOC-MP in Feofania (27.05.2022), Metropolitan Lazar of Simferopol and Crimea expressed his categorical disagreement even with the purely declarative "break" with the Moscow religious center, which was proclaimed in words. Immediately after the Council, the Crimean hierarchs appealed to the Moscow Synod asking for direct subordination to the Moscow Patriarch.

The response from Moscow was almost "instantaneous", given the nature of the issue and its complexity (the need for at least formal consultations with the Synod in Ukraine, its endorsement, etc.). Already on June 7, 2022, in response to the appeal of the clergy of Crimea, the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church, by its unilateral decision, created the Crimean Metropolis on the peninsula and accepted the Feodosia, Simferopol, and Dzhankoi dioceses of the UOC-MP into direct canonical and administrative subordination to the Patriarch of Moscow and the Synod. Metropolitan Lazar Shvets was appointed to head this metropolis.

The withdrawal of the Crimean dioceses from the jurisdiction of Metropolitan Onuphrii's UOC-MP was carried out, according to the arguments of the Moscow center, based on "the need to

maintain an effective canonical and administrative connection with the central church authority [in Moscow]. As well as for the favorable course of church life" in these dioceses, and taking into account the "practical impossibility" of their regular connection with the Kyiv Metropolis of the UOC-MP due to the full-scale war of the Russian Federation against Ukraine. There have never been any protests or even assessments of this open church raiding from the leadership of the UOC-MP.

What is especially interesting is that for almost nine months after his de facto official withdrawal from the UOC-MP, Metropolitan Lazar Shvets remained a permanent member of the Synod of the UOC-MP. Thus, we can talk about the direct interference of the Moscow Patriarch Kirillin in the management of this "supposedly independent" UOC-MP. This intervention was mediated by the Patriarch's direct subordinate, Metropolitan Lazar Shvets.

Only given the sharp criticism from the public, the reflection of the mentioned fact in the relevant Examination of the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience (SEPFC) and the dissemination of this information in the world, on March 20, 2023, the Synod of the UOC-MP removed Metropolitan Lazar from its permanent members. However, it was not because he (according to their logic of interpreting the decisions of the Synod (Council) of the UOC-MP on 27.05.2022) passed to another church, but "due to the inability to participate in the meetings of the Holy Synod" of the UOC-MP. It should be noted that having used this hierarch as much as possible, the Moscow Patriarchate by the decision of the Synod of the Russian Orthodox Church of October 11, 2023 "thanked" Metropolitan Lazar by sending him into retirement.

In addition, for active collaborationist activities, Metropolitan Lazar was included in the sanctions list of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine (24.01.2023). By the Decree of the President of Ukraine, Metropolitan Lazar Shvets was deprived of Ukrainian citizenship. His assets in Ukraine were blocked, it became impossible to withdraw capital outside Ukraine, he was deprived of state awards of Ukraine, etc.

The new head of the diocese appointed by Moscow is the Metropolitan of Pskov and Porkhiv Tikhon Shevkunov, who was relieved of the administration of the Pskov Metropolis. Metropolitan Tikhon is considered one of the most influential hierarchs in the ROC and is called "Putin's confessor." This appointment testifies to the new vision that the Kremlin leadership, primarily secular, has of the role of the Crimean Metropolis in anti-Ukrainian propaganda and in the formation of the spiritual space in the Crimea, the organization of propaganda and rehabilitation work among the wounded Russian military. Given the close ties of Metropolitan Tikhon with the government and the business establishment of the Russian Federation, his activities can strengthen the position of the occupying power in Crimea as a whole.

2.2. Situation of Islam

Immediately after the occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea by Russian troops, work began with the leaders of Muslim organizations in order to integrate them into the Russian religious and legal field. Already on March 2, 2014, the Mufti of the Republic of Tatarstan Kamil Samigullin visited Crimea. Later, on March 27-29 of the same year, a large delegation of the Council of Muftis of Russia, headed by its leader, Ravil Gainutdinov, visited Crimea.

There were also visits by other religious figures who persuaded the Crimean Tatars and representatives of the Religious Administration of Muslims of Crimea (RAMC) that under Russian rule, the situation would develop better than under Ukrainian rule. That there will be no new deportations, and that the Russian Federation will promote the development of the Crimean Tatar language and culture, and that Russian Tatars are always ready to support the Crimean Tatars. Since these visits did not lead to the desired result, the Russian authorities began to threaten the RAMC that they would cooperate with the SCMC (later the Tavrian Muftiate). In the end, all these measures helped to "convince" the leadership of the RAMC to cooperate with the occupation administration. In particular, in 2022, the "Mufti of the Muslims of Crimea" E. Ablaiev declared his support for Russian aggression in Ukraine and the mobilization of Crimeans into the army of the aggressor state. In the same year, he called Kherson "a Russian city." In 2023 Ablaiev was served a notice of suspicion under Part 3 of Art. 436-2 (justification, recognition as legitimate, denial of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, glorification of its participants) and Part 6 of Art. 111-1 (collaborative activity).

Crimean jamaats – Hizb ut-Tahrir, Nurcular, Süleymanlılar – were repressed. It is curious that, unlike the first two trends, the congregation of Süleymanlılar was not banned in the Russian Federation at that time. The Russian authorities explained a significant part of the cases against the Crimean Tatars by their alleged involvement in Hizb ut-Tahrir.

As of mid-2023, Russian authorities imprisoned more than 180 Crimean Tatars. This includes the illegal deportation of prisoners from the occupied peninsula to the territory of the

Russian Federation, which violates Articles 49 and 76 of the IV Geneva Convention.

In January-September 2023 alone, at least 25 prisoners from Crimea were deported to the Russian Federation. Since the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people was recognized as an extremist organization, this was used as the basis for intensifying repressions against it and its members. The organization "Milliy Firqa", which initially supported the occupation, later became disillusioned with the policy of the Russian authorities. This is evidenced by the interview of the party leader and relevant materials on the official website.

In particular, in an article dedicated to the anniversary of the genocide of the Crimean Tatar people (May 18, 2023), the editors of the Milli Firqa website wrote: "... In the Russia of democratic choice, all of the above wonderful resolutions, laws, and decrees regarding the Crimean Tatar people live only on paper. The process of restoring the rights of the people, which began in 1989-1991, was stopped during the years of Ukrainian jurisdiction and continues to be suspended under Russian jurisdiction. The principles of Lenin's national policy and the legal personality of peoples are not recognized and ignored" (<https://mysmart.click/gwc4g>).

2.3. The Condition of Other Religious Organizations. Change in legal rules of operation

Not only congregations of the OCU and some Islamic movements were subjected to oppression. After all, except for the UOC-MP, virtually all other denominations, especially the Ukrainian-centric ones, were persecuted, their property was partially confiscated, and they were subjected to

the processes of "ousting" "unreliable" clerics from the peninsula. This is especially true of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC), Protestant movements, primarily Jehovah's Witnesses, as well as representatives of the modern religious movements.

Human rights organizations have repeatedly written about these facts in their reports. In particular, the U.S. Department of State's 2020 Report on International Religious Freedom states that "Russian authorities in occupied Crimea continued to persecute and intimidate minority religious congregations, including Muslim Crimean Tatars, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Orthodox Church of Ukraine (OCU) members and clergy." As of October 2021, 69 residents of Crimea remained behind bars due to their involvement in the Muslim political organization Hizb ut-Tahrir, which is not banned in many countries, including Ukraine. "Representatives of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and other denominations are also subjected to oppression. Many religious communities have essentially been pushed out of the occupied peninsula through the introduction of new registration requirements." (<https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-crimea/3244343-okupanti-prodovzuut-religijni-utiski-u-krimu-derzdep.html>). According to the European Association of Jehovah's Witnesses, as of October 2023, 27 believers of this denomination have already been prosecuted in Crimea. Of these, 12 people were sentenced to 6 or more years in prison for their religious beliefs, and two received suspended sentences.

It should be noted that religious organizations in Crimea were required to re-register under Russian law. Although the deadline for registration was postponed several times, by the beginning of 2016, about 400 religious organizations had

been re-registered. Others have ceased to exist (as, for example, all 22 communities of Jehovah's Witnesses) or withdrew from the Russian legal field (OCU).

Failure to comply with the requirement for re-registration threatens religious organizations with depriving them of the right to conduct their activities (celebrate contracts, open bank accounts, etc.) on the territory of the Russian Federation and their liquidation. The re-registration procedure itself provided for the fulfillment of one of the following requirements:

- joining the centralized religious organization of the relevant religious orientation existing in Russia;

- passing the state religious expert examination in accordance with the procedure established by the Order of the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation No. 53 "On the State Religious expert examination".

In addition, according to Article 6 of the Law of the Russian Federation "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Associations", in order to perform worship services, other religious rites and ceremonies, clergy must either be citizens of the Russian Federation or "legally stay in Russia" (Crimea is considered part of the territory of Russia under the legislation of the Russian Federation). This means that the refusal to obtain a Russian passport would make the stay of OCU priests in Crimea dependent on the permits of the Russian authorities. This, in turn, became one of the indirect methods of ousting Ukraine-centric churches and clerics out of the territory of the peninsula.

Since the occupation administration has not published official information about religious organizations in Crimea in recent years, we can rely on data from various public institutions.

Therefore, we are talking about 700+ to 900+ religious organizations that were registered in Crimea by the end of 2021.

Thus, the website of the Great Russian Encyclopedia, citing the Ministry of Justice of the Russian Federation, reports on 806 religious organizations registered in Crimea as of December 2021 (of which 250 are Muslim). (<https://bigenc.ru/c/krym-312b1b>) The website of the US Commission on International Religious Freedom reports more than 900 religious organizations registered in Crimea as of September 2022, but does not specify how many of them are Muslim (<https://www.uscirf.gov/publications/russias-religious-freedom-violations-ukraine>). In any case, this is considerably less than the 1,015 Muslims and the total of over 2,200 religious organizations that existed in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol as of January 2014.

With the beginning of Russia's large-scale invasion, repressions against religious organizations have intensified. According to the Commissioner for Human Rights of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Dmytro Lubinets, in August 2023, mass searches began in the homes of representatives of Jehovah's Witnesses in four cities of the temporarily occupied Crimea, Armiansk, Simferopol, Saky, and Dzhankoi. Searches are also carried out within the framework of dozens of criminal cases opened under "religious" articles (https://www.ombudsman.gov.ua/news_details/ombudsman-rosiya-prodovzhuye-represiyi-za-religijnoyu-oznakoyu-v-ukrayinskomu-krimu).

One of the forms of the so-called. of the "civilized" struggle of the Russian occupiers against disloyal or undesirable religious organizations in Crimea is their economic oppression. In 2021 alone, the "magistrate courts" of Crimea

considered more than 31 administrative proceedings under Art. 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation (Violation of legislation on freedom of conscience, freedom of religion, and religious associations) in relation to various religious organizations and their members. In particular, Muslims, Protestants, Baptists, followers of Judaism, and the OCU.

Most often, believers were persecuted for conducting religious ceremonies outside religious premises, or in premises not registered under the legislation of the Russian Federation as places of worship. Within the framework of these proceedings, in 2021, resolutions were adopted to levy fines totaling more than 373 thousand rubles. In total, during the period of occupation, the Crimean Human Rights Group recorded 132 proceedings, and fines have amounted to at least 1.8 million rubles (<https://crimeahrg.org/uk/relijijni-organizaczi%D1%97-v-krimu-oshtrafo-vani-na-majzhe-dva-miljona-rubliv/>).

No less "popular" in the occupied Crimea are administrative proceedings under Art. 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation for "Illegal missionary activity". In particular, in 2021, proceedings were opened against Pentecostal Churches. In particular, regarding the churches "Good News", and "New Life", as well as the leader of the "Christians of the Evangelical Faith of the city of Yalta" Edgar Babayan.

The Russians also interpret the service of OCU clerics in premises that are not registered as religious buildings under Russian law as "illegal missionary activity", although they have been functioning churches or monasteries for many years. In particular, in August 2021, in the premises of the Monastery of St. Demetrius of Thessalonica of the OCU, Archimandrite Damian

(Pavel Skokov) was fined 15 thousand rubles. rubles for the service held in the monastery. Since the OCU is not registered at the state bodies of the Russian Federation, in fact, each of their services can be interpreted as a violation of Article 5.26 of the Code of Administrative Offenses of the Russian Federation. And thus, due to financial pressure, it makes such services impossible.

An example of a kind of scoffing pressure on the believers of the OCU in Crimea is the resolutions on the demolition of churches by the parish members themselves. In particular, in 2019, the illegitimate "city court" of Yevpatoria decided to demolish the Temple in the Name of the Most Pure Image of the Mother of God "Unburnt Bush" of the OCU, arguing that its construction was illegal. The dismantling of the temple and the disposal of the municipal land must be carried out by members of the community. For failure to comply with the demolition order, the occupation authorities impose fines and use threats of imprisonment (<https://krymsos.com/okupaczijna-vlada-krymu-vymagaye-znesty-hram-pczu-v-yevpatoriyi-do-24-bereznya/>).

Another problem for Crimean believers was the Russian policy towards foreigners. The Federal Migration Service of Russia has not extended the validity of residence permits for foreign citizens who worked in Crimean religious communities. For example, the Roman Catholic parish in Simferopol was left without a rector, Fr. Peter Rosokhatsky, a Polish citizen who had worked in Crimea for 5 years. A similar problem was faced by Greek Catholics, who complained of the forced rotation of priests due to restrictions on staying on the peninsula for a period of no more than three months. Subsequently, the Migration Service of the Russian Federation allowed registered religious communities to invite foreign

citizens to work, but in compliance with numerous requirements. (https://risu.ua/donbas-i-krim-novi-vikliki-dlya-religiynoji-svobodipidsumki-roku_n72186).

2.4. International Legislation Protecting Human Rights in the Field of Freedom of Conscience in Crimea

After the occupation of Crimea, Russia began to illegally spread Russian legislation in the field of religion in this territory. At the same time, international organizations and missions have repeatedly recorded human rights violations and discrimination against religious communities. In particular, the OSCE mission in its 2014 report on human rights in Ukraine drew attention to the fact that after the occupation, "local religious leaders, including priests of the UOC of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church" were forced to leave Crimea. Priests and members of their families are under real threat of physical violence.

The U.S. Department of State's 2015 report on religious freedoms on the planet states that the occupation authorities have de facto imposed the laws of the Russian Federation on the territory of Crimea and subjected religious minorities, including the UOC of the Kyiv Patriarchate, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, and the Crimean Tatars, to persecution, intimidation, and detention.

This list of specific facts of violations of freedom of conscience can be continued. And not only Ukrainian or even Russian, but also international humanitarian law, which provides for a number of obligations of the occupying power regarding "spiritual personnel", is violated. In particular, it protects persons performing religious functions.

Accordingly, ministers of any particular religion and places of worship are under the protection of international law.

Article 27 of the Fourth Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War guarantees the right to respect for religious beliefs and practices, and their manners and customs.

Article 58 of the Fourth Geneva Convention also provides that "The Occupying Power shall permit ministers of religion to give spiritual assistance to the members of their religious communities."

Article 53 of the Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 provides for the protection of cultural property and places of worship.

Article 15 of that Protocol provides for the protection of civilian religious personnel.

Consequently, clergy and persons performing spiritual functions in the occupied Crimean peninsula shall enjoy the protection of international humanitarian law.

However, the actions of the Russian Federation directed against almost all religious organizations, and above all the OCU, aimed at seizing churches, depriving persons who perform spiritual functions and their parishioners, of the ability to perform religious rites and other ceremonies of spiritual content, directly violate these norms of international humanitarian law.

International human rights standards have also been violated on the peninsula. In particular, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in Article 18 proclaims:

1. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either

individually or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching.

2. No one shall be subject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice.

3. Freedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.

This article corresponds to a similar norm in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In particular, the UN Human Rights Committee, in its general comments on article 18 of the Covenant, explains: "The freedom to manifest religion or belief may be exercised "either individually or in community with others and in public or private".

"The freedom to manifest religion or belief in worship, observance, practice, and teaching encompasses a broad range of acts. The concept of worship extends to ritual and ceremonial acts giving direct expression to belief, as well as various practices integral to such acts, including the building of places of worship, and the use of ritual formulae and objects...

The Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (UN General Assembly, 25.11.1981) in Article 6 establishes a list of freedoms that are components of the right to freedom of thought, conscience, religion, and belief:

(a) To worship or assemble in connection with a religion or belief, and to establish and maintain places for these purposes;

(e) To teach a religion or belief in places suitable for these purposes;

(h) To observe days of rest and to celebrate holidays and ceremonies in accordance with the precepts of one's religion or belief etc.

Thus, international law protects the right of churches in Crimea to profess religion, perform religious rites, and be protected against discrimination on any grounds.

In accordance with Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the Convention, ECHR): "Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or belief and freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice, and observance." Under the protection of the same Article 9 of the ECHR, there is also the right to perform religious rites without the intervention of the government.

CONCLUSIONS:

1. The occupation led to gross and systematic violations of the right to freedom of conscience and a sharp deterioration in the situation of religious freedom in Crimea. The attempt to build state-church relations in this occupied territory according to the model existing in the Russian Federation itself has led to a sharp (more than two-fold) decrease in the number of not only religious communities but also denominations and religious trends that functioned on the peninsula before its occupation.

2. The greatest oppression in the nine years of occupation was suffered by the Ukrainian-centric Orthodox churches – the UOC of the Kyiv Patriarchate and the UAOC, which since 2019 have been functioning as one structure, the Orthodox Church of Ukraine. This is the only religious or-

ganization that has not re-registered under the norms of Russian law. During the years of occupation, the church was actually destroyed. Its property was taken away, and several parishes exist more nominally than practically because holding a worship service without such re-registration is considered a violation of the law and is punishable by significant fines.

3. In addition to the OCU, almost all churches and religious organizations suffer oppression, except for those who took the path of serving the occupiers. The most active on the path of collaboration, as it was expected to be, is the Crimean Metropolis of the Moscow Patriarchate (before 2022 it was three dioceses of the UOC-MP). In addition, this path was supported by the RAMC, some old-believer, Protestant and Judaist trends.

4. The situation in Islamic communities and religious administrations operating in Crimea remains tense during all the years of occupation. Russian law enforcement agencies are afraid of the protest potential of the Crimean Tatars.

Therefore, the latter are subjected to significant repressions, both religious and political.

5. The situation in the Protestant communities in Crimea also remains difficult. Some of them, such as Jehovah's Witnesses, are prosecuted simply because they belong to this religious organization. However, even passing the re-registration procedure does not protect many religious organizations from prosecution, confiscation of property, etc.

6. The Russian occupation authorities outrage all basic international treaties, declarations, and other documents that regulate the protection of freedom of conscience in the world. Human rights violations, discrimination against religious communities, seizure of churches and church property, persecution of clergy, etc., have been recorded by international human rights organizations every year and in significant numbers. However, Ukraine, in our opinion, has not used these facts enough in its information work, both inside the country and outside it, to effectively fight the enemy.

**RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE STATE AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE
ON OVERCOMING THE CONSEQUENCES
OF THE OCCUPATION AND CHALLENGES
IN REINTEGRATING THE AUTONOMOUS
REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY
OF SEVASTOPOL AFTER THEIR LIBERATION,
AND ON DEVELOPMENT OF THE RELEVANT
PRACTICAL IN THE RELIGIOUS FIELD**

In this chapter, we will use the concept of "Crimea" in the geographical sense, that is, to denote the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, since the reintegration processes in these administrative-territorial units will be of the same type.

1. RISKS AND THREATS OF REINTEGRATION MEASURES IN THE FIELD OF FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE IN CRIMEA

1.1. Radical attitudes are widespread in Ukrainian society regarding those clergymen of different churches and religious denominations who, since the beginning of the war (2014), are in the occupied territories and cooperate with the occupiers. However, we must understand that the ill-conceived total harsh pressure on all clergy of churches and religious organizations, primarily the Russian OC and the "RAM of Crimea and Sevastopol" (and they are actually all now cooperating with the occupiers), the prohibition (cessation of activities) of these organizations, etc., can lead to the formation of an underground (catacomb) environment that will be used by anti-Ukrainian forces to collect intelligence

information, as well as to spread false and anti-Ukrainian rumors, recruit agents to conduct sabotage, work with "agents of influence", etc.

Since the activities of religious organizations without legal registration are not prohibited in Ukraine (in accordance with the basic Law "On Freedom of Conscience and Religious Organizations"), the authorities will not be able to physically stop worship in all parishes, especially in Muslim ones, where the presence of the mullah at prayers is not a matter of principle. Selective closure of communities can be interpreted as "selective justice".

Attempts to control (prevent) worship services will not lead to a positive result. First, it takes a huge human resource of "controllers." Secondly, the prohibition of worship in communities, where, for example, priests or mullahs – collaborators have been removed from the leadership, and, therefore, in the opinion of believers, "collective responsibility" has been removed, will only provide argumentation for international human rights organizations in accusing Ukraine of violating the basic principles of freedom of conscience.

1.2. Simultaneous total removal and the subsequent conviction of all clerics who collaborated with the invaders (we are talking about hundreds

of cases) is physically impossible in a short time. But in addition to the problem of their physical detention, there is also a problem of double standards, the avoidance of which is possible only by condemning all those teachers, doctors, cultural workers, and other collaborators who cooperate with the Russian authorities. It means tens of thousands of cases.

1.3. The simultaneous dismissal of all clergy who will be subject to responsibility is also impossible due to the problem of replacing them for worship. Mass replacement of them by the leadership of churches and religious organizations located outside Crimea is practically impossible.

1.4. Russia and other countries of the world, primarily European and the United States, will closely monitor the processes in the field of freedom of conscience in Ukraine in the de-occupied territories. Any unjustified administrative or criminal prosecution will be used by human rights organizations to increase international pressure on Ukraine, depriving it of assistance (military, humanitarian, or political), etc. After all, religious freedom is one of the fundamental human rights, which is protected by all international treaties.

1.5. A certain risk for the objective (as far as possible) establishment of the degree of responsibility of certain persons for their cooperation with the enemy is that after the liberation of the occupied territories, it will be difficult to establish. Therefore, the recording of cases of collaboration activities by representatives of religious organizations in the occupied territories of Crimea, as well as war crimes committed by the armed forces and special services of the Russian Federation against the clergy that did not cooperate with the occupiers, is required in a constant manner and, in fact, from the beginning of the occupation and until the liberation of Ukrainian territories. With the

available evidence, it is possible to hold even trials and convictions in absentia of people whose guilt has been proven. This approach will greatly simplify the first steps of the Ukrainian authorities in the de-occupied territories. Partially similar work is already underway, but its scale should be increased significantly. For which it is necessary, in particular, to increase the staff of the Prosecutor's Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, to appoint an expert institution for cases related to Crimea, to simplify the procedure for investigating crimes committed in temporarily occupied territories. In the future, it is necessary to gradually fill up staff vacancies of law enforcement agencies of Crimea to the pre-war level. Given the limited financial capabilities of the Ukrainian State, it is also worthwhile to work to involve volunteer organizations and large grantors in the process of collecting and documenting information, who would allocate the necessary resources, primarily money.

1.6. After returning to Crimea Ukrainian institutions, there will be a problem with the existence of parallel religious institutions. In particular, those who left and re-registered on the Ukrainian-controlled territory, and those who remained under occupation. For example, it can be assumed that not all employees of Islamic institutions (registered by the occupation administrations as "RAM of Crimea and Sevastopol", "Central RAM Tavrian Muftiate" and other religious organizations) will be recognized as collaborators and lustrated or imprisoned. Accordingly, mechanisms will be needed to involve them in the work of parallel organizations that are currently in exile but will return to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. This will require a series of facilitated dialogues with the participation of representatives of both

communities who will want to continue cooperation after the liberation of the peninsula

1.7. Some risk may come from the activity of released "prisoners of conscience" convicted under the so-called "religious" articles. They will have high authority among the community of their supporters (first of all, they are supporters of Hizb ut-Tahrir, Jehovah's Witnesses, or other religious and national-religious trends). By default, these people will not be pro-Ukrainian, their position does not have to necessarily coincide with Ukrainian national interests, and the actions or measures proposed by them should be expected to represent risks of conflict-generating potential. In part, such a scenario has objective grounds, because these people have been out of the context of all-Ukrainian discourse for almost ten years.

1.8. The rehabilitation program for victims of repression in the field of freedom of conscience may not coincide with similar programs in the field of socio-political relations. Therefore, the participation (cooperation) and experience of those religious figures who have been repressed in the occupied territories will be needed.

1.9. Psychologists who will be involved in rehabilitation activities (psychological assistance to victims of religious repression or individual believers, if necessary) should be familiar with the specifics of the clients' religious activities and have basic knowledge of the religious organizations with whose representatives they work. To do this, they need to organize crash courses on religious studies, training sessions, etc.

1.10. To work in the field of state-church relations in the de-occupied territories, it will also be important to solve the problem of forming teams of civil servants who would know the local specifics of work in the field of freedom of conscience.

2. PROPOSALS FOR MINIMIZING RISKS AND THREATS

2.1. General considerations

Reintegration processes in the field of inter-religious and state-church relations require a graded approach to their solution. Therefore, some of the proposals provided may be universal for all religious organizations, while some others will apply only to specific churches and religious organizations.

2.1.1. Important for the reintegration processes in Crimea will be the adoption of the Law of Ukraine "On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine on the Activities of Religious Organizations in Ukraine" (No. 8371). After all, in Crimea, not only the Orthodox Metropolis of the Russian Orthodox Church but also some other denominations were re-subordinated to Russian centers (Old Believers, some Protestant denominations, etc.). The rupture of relations with their Russian leadership centers will be a fundamental decision in the matter of spiritual reintegration of the peninsula.

2.1.2. In cases of non-systemic work of the executive authorities or delays in the consideration of cases, the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine should be recommended to create a Temporary Investigation Commission (TIC) for political support of reintegration processes in Crimea and other liberated territories. Its purpose will be not only to investigate the facts of collaborative activities of representatives of religious organizations during the military aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine, but also to record the facts of war crimes committed by the armed forces of the Russian Federation against the clergy, and crimes in the field of freedom of conscience under martial law. The TIC should

make all these facts available in the information space of the world media, and create information support for the de-occupation and reintegration actions of the Ukrainian authorities in the liberated territories.

2.1.3. Prompt informing of international partners of Ukraine, representative security, and public human rights organizations, especially those specializing in the problems of freedom of conscience, should be a priority for all public authorities and Ukrainian public organizations. Any violations in the field of freedom of conscience and religion by the Russian Federation as an aggressor state in the temporarily occupied Ukrainian territories should be assessed in Ukraine and abroad.

2.1.4. The creation of the Office of the Commissioner for Freedom of Conscience under the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine can be an effective step towards addressing the issues of monitoring the observance of freedom of conscience in the Ukrainian territory, and first of all – in the temporarily occupied or de-occupied territories, as well as presenting the official position of the Government on specific (resonant) problems in the field of freedom of conscience in the international arena. It is worth noting that the US Department of State has the position of Ambassador-at-Large for Religious Freedom, and the President of the European Commission in 2016 created the Institute of the Special Representative for the Promotion of Freedom of Religion and Belief outside the European Union.

2.1.5. The fulfillment of these information tasks, as well as the establishment of an appropriate and prompt solution to current problems in the field of freedom of conscience, will require trained personnel. Therefore, state bodies, foremost the Ministry for the Reintegration of the

Temporarily Occupied Territories and the State Service of Ukraine for Ethnic Policy and Freedom of Conscience, urgently need to start work on creating a personnel reserve of civil servants, specialists in the field of state-church relations, to work in the de-occupied territories. Such training will involve certain financial expenses (training, clerkship, etc.), which must be included in the budget financing for the next year.

2.1.6. The general remarks should also include the need to organize the work of Ukrainian and international religious scholars and religious institutions, specialized public institutions on theoretical comprehension, and providing practical recommendations to the state bodies of Ukraine in their work on the normalization of state-church relations in the de-occupied Crimea. In particular, we are talking about conducting scientific, sociological, and information-analytical research, interviewing victims persecuted for religious beliefs, developing scientific and strategic approaches to work in the de-occupied territories of Ukraine, constantly correlating methods of work in accordance with new circumstances, etc.

2.1.7. Religious scholars together with interested state bodies and public institutions, should hold scientific and practical conferences, where they would listen to representatives of affected churches and religious organizations, psychologists, experts, and journalists dealing with the issues of Crimea. The materials of these conferences with an analysis of cases of violation of freedom of conscience in Crimea in 2014–2024, should also be published in English.

2.2. The basic model for the reintegration of Crimea in the religious sphere is the implementation of the following action points:

2.2.1. Return of churches and religious directions (organizations) of Crimea into the legal field of Ukraine. This means non-recognition of all registrations in Russian legal databases and re-registration of documents in accordance with the requirements of Ukrainian legislation.

2.2.2. An algorithm for registration or re-registration of religious organizations in the Ukrainian legal field should be prepared in advance and understood by all participants in the process.

2.2.3. Immediate return of all religious property confiscated by Russians or transferred to other churches and religious organizations. If such a return is not possible, an algorithm for determining the amounts of compensation should be developed (according to market prices at the time of return).

2.2.4. Deportation, through the appropriate procedure determined by law, of all clergymen and church leaders (religious journalists, novices of monasteries, etc.) who found themselves in Crimea illegally. First of all, this applies to those Russian citizens who have not committed criminal or administrative offenses here (for the latter they should be held accountable under the law).

2.2.5. Rehabilitation of all prisoners of conscience, facilitating their return (if desired) to their previous places of service.

2.2.6. Depoliticization of churches and religious organizations, which includes a whole range of steps:

- verification/examination of literature distributed by religious organizations through bookstores, parish libraries, recommendations of community rectors, etc.;

- analysis of articles and information in periodicals;

- analysis of sermons, messages, and appeals of clergy, especially in connection with religious holidays and political events;

- analysis of curricula in theological educational institutions, and Sunday schools regarding their compliance with Ukrainian standards in the educational process (interpretation of the history of Ukraine, the history of the development of a religious organization, etc.).

According to the results of these analyses, if the facts of violations of the relevant provisions of the existing regulatory framework are established, there must be a prompt response from the relevant state institutions and services.

2.2.7. Introduction of the Ukrainian language of teaching in theological educational institutions and, if possible, to services in the Ukrainian language. It should be borne in mind that most students, as well as teachers, do not know the Ukrainian language. Therefore, such a transition should have an adaptive component.

2.2.8. Creation of mechanisms for consultations and coordination of activities and initiatives of specialists in state-church issues in the newly created military-civil administrations with representatives of religious organizations. In our opinion, the creation of a new inter-faith council of Crimea could be such an effective mechanism. The previous Inteconfessional Council of Crimea "Peace is a God's Gift", which was created at the initiative of the Simferopol and Crimean Diocese of the UOC-MP, should be dissolved immediately, or it may wind up itself.

The new Interfaith Council should have its territorial offices in most areas of the peninsula. Inviting representatives of military-civilian administrations to meetings of such a council will

dismantle bureaucratic barriers and allow them to quickly solve problematic issues.

The Council may participate in the activities of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (Truth Establishment Commission) if it is created at the initiative of state bodies of Ukraine. This should be a structure whose purpose will be to identify historical events related to the violation of human rights during the temporary occupation of southern Ukraine. That is, on the one hand, the Commission should deal with detecting atrocities committed by representatives of the occupation authorities, military, and collaborators. On the other hand, there is a search for ways to depoliticize churches and religious organizations, removal of "hate speech", and establishment of peaceful coexistence of religious organizations.

2.2.9. The de-occupation of Crimea will take some time, during which probably the most public collaborators who worked in religious organizations (clergy, activists, etc.) may leave Crimea. The activities of these ideological assistants of the occupiers should receive an objective (judicial) assessment. Therefore, not only a list of collaborators will be needed, but also the registration and bringing to trial their criminal cases. Otherwise, they will present their escape as persecution on religious grounds. Conviction in absentia and putting it on the international wanted list will also be a guarantee of fair punishment for the crimes committed. Since this is a time-consuming case that requires certain specific knowledge, the law enforcement agencies of Ukraine, with the support of the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, should create a special investigative group that would specialize in identifying and investigating the facts of cooperation between representatives of religious organizations and the occupation authorities.

2.2.10. The introduction of teaching the subject "History of World Religions" in secondary education institutions and the normative course "Religious Studies" in higher education institutions will have a significant anti-propaganda potential for refuting the myths of Moscow propaganda and stopping the promotion of the "Russian world". Therefore, the Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine should consider the introduction of these disciplines in schools and institutions of higher education of Crimea.

2.3. Reintegration of Islamic communities

2.3.1. After the de-occupation of Crimea, several hundred Muslim religious organizations will return to the legal field of Ukraine, in particular, religious communities, madrasas (which are practically absent in the controlled territory of Ukraine), and religious media. Some of them were newly created, and therefore by definition were registered under Russian law. But most of them are re-registered from the Ukrainian legal field to the Russian one.

2.3.2. Considerable attention should be paid primarily to religious educational institutions. In particular, it is necessary to provide for their gradual transition to the Ukrainian language of instruction, possibly applying to the Russian language the approaches used to minority languages that represent the peoples of the EU today (according to the Law of Ukraine No. 3143-IX of June 10, 2023). In the case of Islamic educational institutions, in fact, the parallel preservation of the Crimean Tatar language, as well as the study of Arabic, Turkish, and other traditional languages of the Muslim faith, which have long been used in Crimea, will be mandatory.

2.3.4. From the first days of liberation, it will be necessary to create an effective mechanism for consultations of specialists on state-church issues in military-civil administrations with the participation of representatives from Islamic religious organizations of Crimea and to involve the latter in consultations at the all-Ukrainian level. In particular, to invite Muslim religious leaders and influential personalities to all-Ukrainian Muslim dialogue platforms – the Ukrainian Center for Fatwas and Research, the Congress of Muslims of Ukraine, etc. and also to involve the newly created interfaith council in the work.

2.3.5. The inclusion of the system of Islamic religious education in the all-Ukrainian legal field requires an audit of curricula, determining their compliance with Ukrainian legislation, inviting representatives of the Crimean Tatar people (in particular, internally displaced persons) as teachers, as well as secular Islamic scholars. Therefore, even before the time of de-occupation, it is necessary to create a personnel reserve of teachers for religious educational institutions who are ready to work in Crimea after its liberation.

2.3.6. When implementing the forceful scenario of the de-occupation of Crimea, the most public collaborators among Muslim religious figures will likely leave the Autonomous Republic of Crimea even before the arrival of Ukrainian troops. After the return of Ukrainian institutions, there will be a problem of the existence of parallel institutions (those that left and re-registered on the Ukrainian-controlled territory, and those that remained under occupation). It can be assumed that not all employees of Islamic institutions (registered by the occupation administrations as "RAM of Crimea and Sevastopol", "Central RAM Tavrian Muftiate" and other religious organizations) will be recognized as collaborators and

illustrated or imprisoned. Accordingly, mechanisms will be needed to involve them in the work of legal organizations that are currently in exile but will return to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. This will require a series of facilitated dialogues with the participation of representatives of both communities who will have a desire to continue cooperation after the liberation of the peninsula.

2.3.7. A specific area of work is cooperation with Muslim "prisoners of conscience" (convicted for their religious beliefs). They will objectively have a high authority in their communities (first of all, we mean Hizb ut-Tahrir). This work will require the understanding that the new moral authorities of religious organizations will not always have pro-Ukrainian attitudes, and their initiatives may have conflictogenic potential.

2.3.8. There will be a need to initiate a special rehabilitation program for victims of religious repression. In this process, the experience will be important of those Muslim religious figures who have been repressed in territories occupied for a shorter time. For example, Rustem Asanov, imam of the Crimean Tatar community in Shchaslyvtseve, and others.

2.3.9. Considering that the position of Mufti of the RAMC "Ummah" is currently occupied by the Crimean Tatar Murat Suleymanov and that at one time in a letter dated May 19, 2015, E. Ablav transferred the authority to represent the Crimean Duma in the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches and Religious Organizations (AUCCRO) to the previous Mufti S. Ismagilov, it is worth considering to launch the process of cooperation between these organizations after the de-occupation of Crimea. We are not talking about some kind of institutional merger, as it is equally important for them to coordinate their policies and strategic workstreams. This will raise the authority of the

ARC mufti Ayder Rustemov and unite Crimean Tatars throughout the country, blurring the basis for Crimean Tatar separatism in the future.

2.4. Reintegration of Orthodox Communities

The process of reintegration of the Orthodox communities of Crimea is expected to be more complex and conflictogenic than it will be, for example, in the largest religious community of the peninsula – the Religious Administration of Muslims of Crimea, or other religious organizations. After all, the vast majority of, for example, Islamic communities are Crimean Tatar in their ethnic composition. These people supported Ukraine, and a significant part of its activists are fighting against the Russian occupiers. Other communities, for the most part, have appropriate religious centers in the unoccupied territories, which will facilitate their reintegration.

In the case of Moscow Orthodoxy, the situation in Crimea will be perhaps the most difficult. The backbone of support for this church consists mainly of Russians or Russified Ukrainians. Since its transformation in the 1990s from an exarchate of the Moscow Patriarchate in Ukraine into a church without a defined canonical status, but formally "independent and self-governing", the UOC-MP has always had a pro-Russian position.

In Crimea, the structures of the UOC-MP were never concealed, and were even proud to be part of the Moscow Patriarchate. In the territory controlled by Ukraine, the situation was almost the opposite. In June 2022, the dioceses of the UOC-MP in Crimea were directly subordinated to the Moscow Patriarchate. Based on these data, it becomes clear why the Russian-Ukrainian war in the interpretation of Orthodox clergy of the Crimea (as well as throughout Ukraine) is

"fratricidal", sinful, that is, the one that should not be fought by Ukraine.

Therefore, the formation of a pro-Ukrainian position in the communities of the Crimean Orthodox Metropolis will take time and a clear plan of action. The components of this plan should include the following actions:

2.4.1. Introduction of a program for the return of all religious property that was in the Ukrainian state, communal property, or the property of religious communities, to the previous Ukrainian owners. The program should provide for a detailed examination of the condition of the property, determination of those responsible for damage (redevelopment, improper preservation, etc.) of the property, if such facts are established, and determination of the further fate of this property.

2.4.2. After the de-occupation of Crimea, the military-civil administrations and various Funds that will operate here should provide various assistance to the activities of the clergy. In particular, in the preparation and approval of documentation; legalization, and support of clerics sent to work on the peninsula; in performing cultural, teaching, and educational activities; psychological rehabilitation of those in need, etc.

2.4.3. Checking libraries, candle/bookstores, diocesan and metropolitan media, and educational institutions (as well as their curricula) to detect anti-Ukrainian narratives, literature, and articles that incite interreligious hatred or humiliate the dignity of believers of other churches or religious organizations.

2.4.4. On-site training of teachers of Orthodox educational institutions in the Ukrainian-speaking regions of Ukraine. The introduction of appropriate exchange programs for students of theological educational institutions.

Summing up our proposals, we note that the outlined vision of the actions of the Ukrainian authorities in the field of freedom of conscience after the de-occupation of Crimea requires some legitimization (its transformation into an official program of action). An important stage on this path could be annual parliamentary hearings, prepared and conducted by the Verkhovna Rada Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy in cooperation with the Office of the Verkhovna Rada Commissioner for Human Rights. The first hearings should be held even before the de-occupation of Crimea, and their topics could cover the situation of religious freedom in all territories of Ukraine that have been or are under occupation.

The results of the parliamentary hearings, in the form of a report indicating specific possible

actions of the Ukrainian authorities, should be sent to the US Department of State, the office of the Special Rapporteur on freedom of religion or belief outside the European Union, the UN, PACE, and OSCE.

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine should also play an important role in shaping public opinion outside Ukraine and countering massive Russian propaganda. In particular, at the meetings of international representative institutions, it is necessary to involve clergy and believers who are victims of persecution for their religious beliefs. These witnesses to the crimes of the Russian Federation should also tell the international community about the real situation of freedom of conscience in Ukraine.

**FORMATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE
VISION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE STATE AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE
ON OVERCOMING THE CONSEQUENCES
OF THE OCCUPATION AND CHALLENGES
IN THE REINTEGRATING THE AUTONOMOUS
REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY
OF SEVASTOPOL IN THE INFORMATION
POLICY**

Gayana Yuksel, Andrii Shchekun

For writing a report on the subject: “Formation of a Comprehensive Vision and Recommendations to the State Authorities of Ukraine on Overcoming the Consequences of Occupation and Challenges in the Process of Reintegration of the TOT of the AR of Crimea and Sevastopol in the Information Sphere” on September 19, 2023, the authors held a strategy session with the involvement of many media experts and representatives of state authorities that formulate and implement information policy. Topical issues were presented and discussed:

General state information policy of Ukraine after the de-occupation of Crimea

Interaction between the media sector and the military-civil administrations (the first period of de-occupation), and then the media sector and the authorities.

Proposals for amendments to the current legislation of Ukraine on the information sphere in the context of the de-occupation of Crimea (the Law of Ukraine “On Media”, current legislation on the media, etc.)

Forms and methods of work of the Crimean media and the information and media environment after de-occupation, including the matters

of restoration of infrastructure, provision of material and technical resources, formation of creative teams, staffing and lustration in the journalistic environment, etc.

Restoration and preservation of Ukrainian state identity, formation of a pro-Ukrainian worldview, popularization of Ukrainian culture and language.

Elimination of the propaganda consequences of the occupation in the media environment, countering propaganda after de-occupation.

Support and development of media and media resources of indigenous peoples of Ukraine.

All expert opinions and suggestions have been taken into account and set out in this Report.

When writing this Report, we used the materials of a scientific monograph by an expert of the Crimean Platform’s Humanitarian Policy Group, Associate Professor of Tauride National University named after V.I. Vernadskyi, PhD in Philology, Associate Professor H.Z. Yuksel “The Crimean Information and Media Paradigm in the Context of Occupation of the Peninsula (February 2014 – February 2022): Transformation of Media Area and Information Policy of Ukraine”: Monograph.

Kyiv: ArtEk Printing House LLC. 2023. 564 p. ISBN 978-617-8043-59-9.

1. HISTORICAL NOTE

The illegal occupation of Crimea in February – March 2014 was the result of Ukraine’s ill-conceived state policy regarding Crimea, the refusal to establish and restore the rights and freedoms of the indigenous peoples of Ukraine, in particular the Crimean Tatar people. This position of the state has been in place since the establishment and affirmation of Ukraine’s independence in 1991 and until the final phase of the occupation of the peninsula in 2014, namely until the carrying out of military operation to seize Ukrainian territories by the Ministry of Defense, the Federal Security Service, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Russian Federation using the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea and Russian special forces. On March 16, 2014, the local pro-Russian Crimean forces in power at the time of the seizure operation, together with Moscow’s curators, organized an illegal “Crimean referendum” on the peninsula’s accession to the Russian Federation, which has not been recognized by the international community.

In the context of destruction of the established international legal order, the forceful reformatting of the main principles of functioning society, which such an important region of unitary Ukraine as the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol has experienced, it is the media space, an active sphere of society’s life, that was one of the first to had been subjected to external influence, forced transformation and profound changes. The external challenges of 2014–2023 for Ukraine determined the development of Ukrainian Crimean media space in the

new conditions; dictated the need and laid the foundations for the formation of a new information policy of Ukraine; required the use of appropriate forms and methods of work on the temporarily occupied territory, responding to the current situation; organizing information resistance and struggle of Ukrainian society in conditions of absence of freedom and total control by the aggressor; search for various ways of information communication with the citizens of Ukraine on the peninsula

It is obvious that, in this process, a new stage in the development of events and the need to rethink and reformat the principles of state policy towards the TOT in Ukraine occurred as a result of the outright full-scale military invasion of the Russian Federation, which began on February 24, 2022. The rapid development of events, challenges to the security situation of the state, the emergence of new temporarily occupied territories after February 24, 2022, the active phase of hostilities in the context of full-scale aggression of Russia against Ukraine immediately required information counteraction to the threats to protection of the rights of residents of the temporarily occupied territories. In this context, there have certainly been changes with regard to Crimea. Prior to the full-scale invasion, the Ukrainian state and society still “considered” the diplomatic way of returning Crimea as a priority, but after February 24, 2022, Ukraine’s position is based on the principles of unconditional return of all occupied territories, including by military means.

Occupation of the peninsula in 2014 is a multiaspect, complex socio-political process that has affected all spheres of life of the region and affected its every resident. In our work, we focus on events and phenomena related to the mass media environment, area of mass information and

communication, and public relations. The information coverage is outlined in a chronological framework defined by two events: the beginning of the occupation of Crimea on February 20, 2014 and the beginning of the full-scale invasion of the Russian Federation in Ukraine on February 24, 2022.

Over this period, the occupation authorities of Crimea, with the support of the Russian leadership, carried out large-scale work, the main purpose of which was establishing of total control over the information space of Crimea, ousting independent media from the peninsula and preventing Ukrainian and international media and media organizations from directly monitoring the situation in the region.

The transformation of the Crimean information field was carried out with violation of international laws and regulations and with non-compliance with recognized acts, namely laws, treaties, memorandums, and codes of Ukraine. Among the fundamental international documents that enshrine the main ideas and principles of professional standards, define freedom of speech and expression of will as an important component of human rights, become necessary for the full functioning of the media space and its component – the media and communication, we would like to mention the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the European Convention on Human Rights, the Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Journalists, the Declaration of Principles of Professional Conduct for Journalists adopted at the Second World Congress of the International Federation of Journalists Bordeaux, April 25–28, 1954) as amended on the IFJ Eighteenth World Congress Helsingør, June 2–6, 1986). The general process of disseminating socially significant information in

the media and the legal framework for journalists' activities in Ukraine, which were established by the Constitution of Ukraine and regulated in domestic legislation by a number of regulations.

2. DESCRIPTION OF THE CURRENT STATE

The occupation of an integral part of the territory of the unitary state of Ukraine – the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol – by the Russian Federation in 2014 was a historic event of the early 21st century that led to a broad discussion and revision of the principles of functioning of the international security system. The illegal act of occupation of the peninsula conditionally “destroyed” the international status quo established in the mid-20th century, according to which civilized countries recognized the priority of political and diplomatic means over military and forceful ones for resolving problematic issues. For the international community, and especially for the Western World, the war against Ukraine, which began in 2014 and continues to this day, has become the beginning of rethinking of the principles of the security system and the problems of protecting states from external aggression.

When considering the general socio-political situation on the peninsula before and after the occupation in 2014, the significance of this event for Ukraine and the world, it is necessary to take into account the entire range of factors that influenced the specifics of events in the Crimean region and, above all, its importance due to its geographically favorable location from a geopolitical and a military points of view. Strategic advantages in the Azov-Black Sea basin, Eastern Europe and Middle East provided by control over

Crimea have turned the peninsula into a region of clashing of political interests of the Western World, Europe, Ukrainian state, and the Russian Federation.

Russia's aggressive policy towards the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, establishment of de facto control over Crimea by the Russian Federation led to the forced reformatting of the foundations of functioning of all spheres of life created over the years of Ukraine's independence.

In this process, it was the information and media area of the peninsula that was one of the first to suffer from forced transformation by the aggressor state. The forced reformatting was carried out using a wide range of different forms and methods of pressure on those who did not recognize the occupation, in particular the representatives of media sector: journalists, media technicians, activists, public figures, opinion leaders, bloggers, freelance authors, citizen journalists.

Protecting the information environment of Ukraine, which the information space of the occupied Crimea is part of, requires protecting the national identity of the Ukrainian people and the indigenous peoples of Ukraine, preserving their historical memory, contextualizing means of countering external challenges and threats, and preserving the mental values of the Ukrainian state. Such work, in turn, is possible only if communication with Ukrainian citizens in the TOT is strengthened and developed and the organizational work is carried out to protect and help them and address various social and legal issues. To achieve the goal of de-occupying the peninsula, it has always been important to consolidate efforts of representatives of the international community, Ukrainian state institutions, and civil

society, including national and international experts and organizations and public figures, whose work is related to the formation and protection of the information environment.

Implementation of tasks to achieve the goal should include the following activities:

- 1) approval of laws and regulations of the Ukrainian authorities that are corresponding to the situation and needs;
- 2) analysis and testing of civil society proposals on improvement of legislation concerning TOT;
- 3) protection of the interests of the Ukrainian state, development and advocacy of developments on relevant topics in the international arena;
- 4) continuous monitoring, collection and systematization of facts of violations of international and national law in all spheres of life in the TOT;
- 5) establishing of the information communication with Ukrainian citizens in the TOT through the media and social communication means;
- 6) providing public services, organizing legal, social, educational, informational and other assistance;
- 7) conducting various events to establish communication about the TOT of Crimea (awareness campaigns, symposiums, conferences, panel discussions, public discussions, etc.);
- 8) providing expert support to relevant international organizations and other institutions in formulating of the policy in the TOT.

The protection of Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty and reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories are among the top priorities for the development of the Ukrainian state. At the same time, the Ukrainian information space, which is undoubtedly an element of the global information space, plays one of the

important roles in the process of reintegration of Ukrainian territories, protection of the territorial integrity and interests of Ukraine in international politics and becomes an important factor and environment for the formation of the national Ukrainian identity. That is why the problem of strengthening of the Ukrainian state is connected with the formation of the state information policy, development of the information space and establishment of organizational and communication links with the residents of the TOT.

In the process of returning and reintegration of Ukrainian territories, the functioning of the components of the information space – media, social communications, communication channels, etc. – should be aimed at achieving the interests of Ukraine. Public response and attention of the media to the events in Crimea are important for Ukrainian citizens in the TOT, who are currently under pressure and repression, as they provide them with certain public protection and even a sort of immunity.

The information war carried out by the Russian Federation against Ukraine in 2014–2022, even before the full-scale invasion on February 24, 2022, caused not only profound changes in the violation of the territorial integrity of the state, but also exacerbated the issue of political, economic, socio-humanitarian and cultural changes. The problem of forced decontextualization of the Crimean information area as a result of the Russian Federation's expansion and forced reformatting of the information landscape has become urgent not only for Crimea, but also for the entire Ukrainian media space, and requires the formation of a new information security and protection policy.

In Crimea itself, the processes of negative information interference by the aggressor country

that took place in various segments of the humanitarian sphere of the peninsula have created new coercive value orientations, which may result in a change in the public outlook of Ukrainian citizens towards the TOT.

The consequences of the occupation are not only the complete militarization of the peninsula and its transformation into a military base, which the enemy, as was predicted, used in a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, but also a threat to Eastern Europe and the Middle East; replacement of the demographic composition of the peninsula's population by illegally creating conditions for the migration of citizens from the Russian mainland; violation of human and civil rights and freedoms, non-compliance with public and private economic rights; destruction of the environmental landscape of the region.

No less important consequences of the occupation are the constant interference of the institutions of the aggressor state in the spiritual, intellectual, informational and social spheres of Crimea. During the occupation of 2014–2022 and after the full-scale invasion, the Russian Federation conducted information propaganda to shape the pro-Russian, anti-Western and anti-democratic worldview of the Crimean residents. Ukrainian civic and ethno-national identity was replaced on the peninsula, the development of Crimean Tatar identity was restricted and prohibited, the consciousness of the population was militarized through imposing the so-called "Russian world" value system. The result of this work was the creation of an intellectual product in the scientific, educational, cultural, artistic, and information spheres, which not only cultivated the myth of "purely Russian Crimea", but also fully justified the occupation of the peninsula in 2014 as an alleged "return to home harbor", "establishment of

historical justice", "the need to protect the people of Crimea from Ukrainian nationalists" and so on.

The rapid introduction of Russian legislation and the process of Crimea's integration into the Russian information space are becoming the basis for the newest challenges for the Ukrainian state in the information sphere, including:

- 1) prohibition of activities and loss of the possibility for Ukrainian media and journalists to carry out full-fledged activities in Crimea;
- 2) blocking the broadcasting of Ukrainian media in Crimea;
- 3) pressure on journalists, opinion leaders, bloggers, free authors, media figures, citizen journalists, control of the activity of ordinary citizens in social networks.

The occupation authorities' policy of expanding the humanitarian environment is an attempt of cultural erasure, as well as the criminal destruction of historical memory and revision of history. The lack of a state information policy on matters of the de-occupation and reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, an adequate response and formation of countermeasures to the challenges of expansion leads to a change in the political, national and cultural identity.

In particular, the distortion of historical truth, changes in historical memory, national self-identity, national values, traditions, mentality, ethnic and national images. And vice versa, with the correct, balanced use of available state resources, legal tools, educational and awareness potential, development of a unified information and cultural space, it is possible to establish permanent communication with the residents of the TOT, establish a dialog and counteract propaganda. The de-occupation of Crimea as a general goal of Ukrainian

policy involves the implementation and conduct of a wide complex of measures in the state and the society.

Comprehensive integrated work, development of practical recommendations for sustainable and effective state policy require systematic, consistent and cooperative work of public authorities and civil society, synchronized process of data collection, processing, storage and dissemination; prosecution and punishment of criminals and traitors, use of existing international and Ukrainian legislative tools for legal protection of Ukrainian citizens.

It is important to record and report violations of the rights of Ukrainian citizens in the TOT that occurred as a result of various repressive actions, pressure on the population of the region carried out by the Russian occupational institutions and its adaptation to typical violations condemned by both Ukrainian and international law.

2.1. Policy of Ukrainian Authorities

Public Authorities of Ukraine for the TOT of Crimea

Starting in 2014, the Ukrainian state has been working to restore the operation of the Crimean public authorities in mainland Ukraine.

On July 17, 2014, the State Service of Ukraine for the AR of Crimea, the City of Sevastopol and Temporarily Displaced Persons was created. On April 20, 2016, this body was merged with the State Agency for the Restoration of Donbas to form the Ministry of the Temporarily Occupied Territories and Internally Displaced Persons, now the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine, which is designated as the main body in the system of central executive authorities that ensures the formation and

implementation of state policy in the temporarily occupied territories.

Activities of some public institutions of the AR of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol was restored on mainland Ukraine, in particular, the Mission of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea; the Main Directorate of the Security Service of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea; the Prosecutor's Office of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol; the Main Department of the National Police in the AR of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol; Regional Office of the State Property Fund in Kherson Region, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol; the Main Department of the SFS in Kherson Region, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol attached to Kherson Department of the SFS of Ukraine; the Department of Patrol Police in the AR of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, Representative of the Commissioner of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine for Human Rights of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

Since 2014, the head office of the representative body of the indigenous people of the peninsula, the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar people, has been operating in Kyiv, which in 2016, due to its principled political position in support of the territorial integrity of Ukraine and rejection of the occupation, was illegally recognized by the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation to be an extremist organization and cannot continue its full-fledged activities in Crimea.

Ukrainian Laws and Regulations on Information Policy in Regard to the TOT of Crimea

The protection of Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty and safe reintegration of its

temporarily occupied territories after the aggression of 2014 are among the top priorities for the development of the Ukrainian state. It is undeniable that in shaping the domestic and international policy of de-occupation of the temporarily occupied peninsula, it is information activity that unites representatives of government agencies, civil society and the media in Ukraine and the world.

General legal framework:

- Laws of Ukraine "On Information", "On Printed Mass Media (Press) in Ukraine", "On Television and Radio Broadcasting", "On State Secrets", "On Citizens' Appeals", "On Information Agencies", "On State Support of Mass Media and Social Protection of Journalists", "On the National Council of Ukraine on Matters of Television and Radio Broadcasting", "On the Procedure for Coverage of Activities of Public Authorities and Local Self-Government Bodies in Ukraine by Mass Media", "On the System of Public Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine"; "On the Media".
- Decrees of the President of Ukraine "On Measures to Ensure the Constitutional Rights of Citizens to Appeal", "On the Procedure for Official Promulgation of Laws and Regulations and Their Entry into Force", "On the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated June 17, 1997 "On Urgent Measures to Streamline the System of Implementation of the State Information Policy and Improve the State Regulation of Information Relations" (1997);
- Resolutions of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine "On State Registration of Printed Mass Media, Information Agencies and the Amount of Registration Fees", "On Approval of the Instruction on Record Keeping on Citizens' Applications in State and Local Government Bodies, Citizens' Associations, Enterprises, Institutions,

Organizations Regardless of the Form of Ownership in Mass Media";

- Resolution of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "Freedom of Speech in Ukraine: Status, Problems, Prospects", "On the Establishment of the Public Broadcasting Organization of Ukraine", "On Improving Public Management of the Information Sphere" etc.

The activities of the Ukrainian media in covering the matter and forming of an information policy on the temporarily occupied territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol are regulated in accordance with the effective laws and regulations of Ukraine and international laws and regulations that form the legal basis for creating a socio-political position of mass media in covering the occupation of Crimea and aggression against Ukraine. They include the Military Doctrine of Ukraine, the Doctrine of National Information Security, the Strategy of Information Reintegration of Crimea, the Strategy of Military Security of Ukraine, the Strategy of De-occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, the Crimean Tatar Language Development Concept.

In 2023, the action plan for the implementation of the Strategy of De-occupation and Reintegration of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea was updated. All in all, the plan includes 127 measures.

In 2023, a document entitled "The Report on the Implementation of the Order of the President of Ukraine to Develop the State's Priority Steps after De-occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol" was developed.

In the same year, the Strategy of Cognitive De-occupation" was presented at the Representative Office of the President of Ukraine in the AR of Crimea. The main goal of the strategy is to

provide practical recommendations to stakeholders, authorities and the expert community on the cognitive aspects of de-occupation by highlighting the expected risks and new opportunities for successful and sustainable reintegration of the Crimean population. In this document, cognitive de-occupation is defined as a set of strategic, operational and tactical measures to be planned and implemented by various actors to prepare, direct and evaluate long-term socio-political, socio-economic and socio-psychological processes of reformation of the actual consciousness, social values, worldview and civic behavior of many Crimean residents after the kinetic and/or diplomatic de-occupation of the peninsula, and, as a result, the full restoration of operation of the Ukrainian law and sovereignty in the territory of the peninsula.

It should also be noted that in 2022, Ukraine adopted the Law "On the Media", which focuses on the matters of functioning of the Ukrainian media environment.

Legal Basis that Regulates the Procedure of Work with the TOT of Crimea

Since 2014, a legal framework was created to regulate the procedure of work with the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. After the occupation of the ARC and the city of Sevastopol in 2014, the Ukrainian state has adopted a number of laws and regulations that have become the basis for legal relations in the TOT of the AR of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol for the time of temporary occupation.

The first and main laws regulating relations with the TOT of Crimea were the Law of Ukraine No. 1207-VII "On Ensuring the Rights and

Freedoms of Citizens and the Legal Regime in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine”, the Law of Ukraine No. 1706-VII “On Ensuring the Rights and Freedoms of Internally Displaced Persons”. The later adopted Law of Ukraine No. 1636-VII “On the Establishment of the Free Economic Zone “Crimea” and on the Peculiarities of Economic Activities in the Temporarily Occupied Territory of Ukraine” was heavily criticized by the public as lobbied by the business environment of the then Ukrainian leadership for conducting business with the TOT of Crimea, as the temporarily occupied territory could not be a free trade zone. Subsequently, the said Law was repealed by the Resolution of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine dated July 01, 2021.

In 2015, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, by its Resolution dated November 12 No. 792-VIII “On Recognition of the Genocide of the Crimean Tatar People,” guided by the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, honoring the memory of the victims of the deportation of the Crimean Tatar people in 1944, expressing support for the Crimean Tatar people, condemning the policy of the totalitarian regime to oppress the Crimean Tatar people, recognized this crime against humanity as an act of genocide.

The Strategy of Information Reintegration of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol adopted by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine on December 27, 2018 was aimed at ensuring the information reintegration of the temporarily occupied territory of Ukraine (the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol), creating information prerequisites for the restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and sovereignty, but, unfortunately, it has not been implemented.

The Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine dated December 29, 2016 No. 47/2017 provided for the clarification of the principles of formation and implementation of the state information policy, primarily to counteract the destructive information influence of the Russian Federation in the context of the hybrid war unleashed by it.

The Action Plan for the Implementation of Certain Principles of the State Domestic Policy on the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol was approved by the Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated March 28, 2018 No. 218–p. The document details the tasks of Ukraine’s state policy towards Crimea, defines the responsible authorities and the deadlines for fulfilling the tasks set. The Action Plan Order of 2018 became invalid, as an updated plan was subsequently approved by the Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine dated September 29, 2021 No. 1171–p. “On Approval of the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Strategy for De-occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol”.

Decree of the President of Ukraine “Matter of the Mission of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea” dated October 17, 2019 No. 758/2019 obliged the Mission to take measures to maintain and ensure political, social, informational, cultural and other relations with Ukrainian citizens in the TOT, as well as inform the public about the exercise by the President of Ukraine of the powers to ensure the observation of the constitutional rights and freedoms of Ukrainian citizens residing in the temporarily occupied territory or those who are internally

displaced persons and are in other regions of Ukraine.

The Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “On Amendments to Certain Acts of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine Regarding the Activities of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy” No. 231 dated March 23, 2020 established the functions of the newly created ministry, including the prospects and priority areas for the reintegration of the population living in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine in Donetsk and Luhansk Regions, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol into a single cultural and information space of Ukraine.

The Resolution of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine No. 212 dated March 11, 2020 “Some Matters of Optimization of the System of Central Executive Bodies” assigned the task of formulating and implementing a policy on the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine and the population living there to the Ministry of Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine. The ultimate goal is to reintegrate these territories into a single constitutional space of Ukraine.

After the occupation of Crimea, massive public events at the state and public levels dedicated to the Crimean events were initiated in Ukraine. For example, the Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 58/2020 dated February 26, 2020 declared February 26 the “Day of Crimean Resistance.”

In 2021, the Ukrainian state initiated a number of laws aimed at protecting Crimean residents. In 2021, Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, upon the proposal of the President of Ukraine, adopted the Law “On Indigenous Peoples” No. 5506 dated 07/01/2021, which enshrined in Ukrainian legislation the status of indigenous peoples, which are “an autochthonous ethnic community formed in the territory of Ukraine, are bearers of an original

language and culture, have traditional social, cultural or representative bodies, recognize themselves as indigenous people of Ukraine, constitute an ethnic minority within its population and do not have their own state formation outside Ukraine.”

According to the Law, the Crimean Tatars, Karaites and Krymchaks are recognized as indigenous peoples of Ukraine. The adoption of the Law is another step towards the de-occupation of the peninsula, as the occupation of Crimea is not just a physical seizure of territory, but an act of violation of the rights of the indigenous peoples of the region. For the first time in 30 years of independence, Ukraine has defined by law which peoples are indigenous and established state guarantees for the observance of their rights.

Equally important in terms of establishing information and communication links with the TOT of Crimea was the adoption of the Concept of Development and Popularization of the Crimean Tatar language in April 2021. With the de facto occupation of the peninsula and the region being under the control of the aggressor state, there were fewer and fewer tools for real communication and cooperation with the residents of the region. In this context, it is language that has become an important and effective tool for organizing such work, a kind of a bridge for communication and joint activities with the residents of Crimea

At its meeting on August 4, 2021, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the draft Law of Ukraine “On the Principles of State Policy for the Transitional Period”. The draft law enshrines the key concepts and principles of Ukraine’s policy regarding the TOT, in particular: 1) defined the basic principles (“red lines”) of de-occupation and reintegration; 2) unified approaches to the

temporarily occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions, as well as to the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol; 3) streamlined and modernized the existing specialized terminology and introduced the concepts that reveal its terms: transitional justice, convalidation, temporary occupation, occupation forces and occupation administrations of the Russian Federation, political, diplomatic and sanctions measures, contact line, sustainable peace, reintegration of the temporarily occupied (de-occupied) territories and their residents; 4) divided the regulation into conflict and post-conflict periods, which will allow determining a certain algorithm of state actions during the reintegration of the temporarily occupied (de-occupied) territories and the population living there, de-occupation of the temporarily occupied territories, including matters of demilitarization and disarmament, resolution of humanitarian problems, restoration of justice etc; 5) strengthened social ties with the temporarily occupied territories etc.

On December 28, 2021, the Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 685/2021 “On the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated October 15, 2021 “On the Information Security Strategy” approved the Strategy, which “defines current challenges and threats to the national security of Ukraine in the information sphere, strategic goals and objectives aimed at countering such threats; protection of the rights of individuals to information and personal data protection. At the same time, Article 72 of the Decree of the President of Ukraine dated February 25, 2017 No. 47 “On the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated December 29, 2016 “On the Doctrine of Information Security of Ukraine” lost its effect.

A separate important step in the matter of de-occupation of Crimea was the creation of the Crimean Platform as a tool for implementing the international component of the national Strategy for the De-occupation of Crimea. The Organization Committee was approved by the Decree of the President dated February 26, 2021.

However, the quintessence of the work on the TOT of Ukraine was the adoption of important documents on the Crimean Strategy at the state level in 2021, in particular, the Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 117/2021 “On the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated March 11, 2021 “On the Strategy for De-occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol” and the Decree of the President of Ukraine No. 121/2021 “On the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated March 11, 2021 “On the Strategy of Military Security of Ukraine”, which once again updated and established the norms of state policy on the integrity and return of territories.

Later, on September 29, 2021, The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine approved the Action Plan for the Implementation of the Strategy for De-occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, which provided for a set of actions aimed at de-occupation of the peninsula and was to become a conceptual document for the de facto return of the region to Ukraine. The Action Plan for the Implementation of the Strategy for De-occupation included 158 items: government programs, educational programs, legal and human rights programs, cultural and humanitarian connection programs, social work, and information policy measures.

The information factor was incorporated into almost all measures aimed at the occupied territory and, in order to succeed, Ukraine had to carry out powerful advocacy and public media work.

Crimean Media before the Occupation in 2014

In the early 1990s, the Crimean media environment witnessed a kind of “explosion” in the number of media outlets. The development of state television was underway, with the first Ukrainian editorial office opening, followed by Crimean Tatar and international ones. New television channels were launched, the first of which was Chornomorskaya Broadcasting Company. The print media develop and new editorial offices of the newspapers Krymsky Komsomolets, later renamed to Pivdennyi Kurier, Avdet (Povernennia), Krymska Svitlytsia, Krymsky Visnyk, and Per-vaya Krymskaya are created.

The openness of the society, on the one hand, made it possible for the information area in Crimea to develop rapidly and, on the other hand, created conditions for uncontrolled interference and various propaganda activities inside the peninsula.

It is quite natural that the functioning of the media sphere in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol was regulated by the official, unified Ukrainian legislation and the effective laws and regulations on the media. To open an all-Ukrainian electronic media outlet (radio, television, news agencies), permits were required from the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting (Kyiv), for Crimean print media – registration with the relevant departments of the Ministry of Justice of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (Simferopol).

The Republican Committee on Information (hereinafter referred to as Reskominform) was created and functioned within the structure of the Council of Ministers of the AR of Crimea.

State-owned, municipal, and private Ukrainian Crimean media outlets operated on the peninsula, as well as representative offices or correspondents of the international media (Radio Liberty, BBC, Agence France-Presse, Reuters, TRT and others).

In 2009, 86 TV and radio organizations operated in Crimea, including: 14 broadcast TV companies, 44 cable TV companies, and 1 broadcast-cable TV company. There was one state broadcasting company, Crimea State Broadcasting Company, 7 municipal and 78 private radio editorial offices in Crimea.

Number of media outlets on the eve of the occupation was 1319

On the eve of the occupation, in 2012, according to the Republican Committee on Information of the Council of Ministers of the ARC, 79 local broadcasting organizations were registered in Crimea, including 13 TV broadcasting stations, 14 FM radio stations, 39 cable television studios, 7 cable broadcasting companies, etc. In addition, there were 6 news agencies. Also, 1240 printed periodicals were registered in Crimea: 999 newspapers, 175 magazines, 30 newsletters, 33 collections, 2 calendars, 1 digest.

Language issue. Unfortunately, the number of Ukrainian-language and Crimean Tatar media outlets in Crimea was much smaller than the number of the Russian-language ones. Before the occupation of the language study in Crimea, 910 (69.1%) of the 1317 newspapers in the ARC that were included in the study were published exclusively in Russian. 212 newspapers (16.1%)

published their materials in Russian and Ukrainian (with the former predominating). 15 newspapers were published in Russian and Crimean Tatar (in various combinations); 11 newspapers were published in Russian and languages of small peoples/national minorities of Crimea (Greek, Armenian, etc.); 13 – in Russian and foreign languages (English, German, Arabic); 3 more – in various languages of national minorities/indigenous peoples (German with Russian, English, Crimean Tatar, Greek). In total, there were 42 newspapers with a significant share of the Russian language (3.2%). The total share of newspapers with Russian as the language of publication was 88.3%.

The following were published in Ukrainian: Slovo Sevastopolia, Dzvin Sevastopolia, Dumka, and Krymske Slovo. The media of the Ministry of Defense of Ukraine – the newspaper Flot Ukrayiny and the TV channel Bryz – were operating. Information in Ukrainian was provided by the website Ukrayinske Zhyttia Sevastopolia and the public and political news agency Media-Krym. The most famous Ukrainian-language newspaper in Crimea, Krymska Svitlytsia, was founded by Taras Shevchenko All-Ukrainian Society Prosvita and the Ministry of Culture of Ukraine in 1992. The Ukrainian-language newspaper included the Sport supplement and the youth supplement Budmo!, which were published with the assistance of the Republican Committee on Information of the Council of Ministers of the ARC.

The structure of Krym State Broadcasting Company included a Ukrainian editorial office that produced television programs in Ukrainian; the state radio broadcast the children's program Charivnyi Kuzhelik, the socio-political program Mlyn, and the cultural program Ridna Khata. The official publication of Verkhovna Rada of Crimea,

Krymskie Izvestija (Krymski Vidomosti), had a thematic supplement Dialog, which was also published in the state language, Ukrainian.

The national Crimean Tatar media operated on the peninsula, opening of which became possible after the Crimean Tatar people returned to their historical homeland from the places of deportation in the late 1980's (1944). At the beginning of 2010, 35 Crimean Tatar national newspapers and magazines were registered with the Reskominform founded by creative teams, public organizations, commercial entities, and individuals. In 2012, the following most influential socio-political Crimean Tatar newspapers and magazines were published regularly: Golos Kryma, Kjyrym, Poluostrov (Pivostriv), Yan'y Diunja (Novyi Svit), Avdet (Povernennia), magazines Jyldyz (Zirka), womens' magazines Nenkedzan, Arzy magazine. In Sudak, a supplement to the local municipal newspaper in the Crimean Tatar language, Suvdak Sesy (Holos Sudaka), was published. At various times, news information projects were created, including Alemy Medeniyet (Svit Kultury), Krym ta Krymski Tatary, Krymskotatarska Kukhnia and many others.

In 2005, the new information agency, Krymski Novyny, was opened, in 2006 – Radio Meydan, and in 2009 – the private Crimean Tatar TV channel ATR was launched.

It should be noted separately that there were quite powerful correspondents and structures of all-Ukrainian media in Crimea, such as the newspapers Den, Zerkalo Tyzhnia, Uriadovyi Kurier, Holos Ukrainy, Radio Svoboda, UKRINFORM, and UNIAN.

The following Crimean non-governmental institutions played an important role in the functioning and development of independent media in Crimea: Committee for Monitoring the Freedom

of Press in Crimea, Crimean organization "Independent Media Trade Union of Ukraine", Information Press Center.

A powerful Crimean media resource, the Center for Investigative Journalism, which was seized in 2014 and is now operating in Kyiv, has been an active source of information on combating corruption in the public authorities.

In contrast to democratic independent and state-owned media, a number of pro-Russian media outlets functioned in Crimea, which actually carried out public attacks on Ukrainian statehood and incited ethnic hatred. In contrast to democratic independent and state-owned media, a number of pro-Russian media outlets functioned in Crimea, which actually carried out public attacks on Ukrainian statehood and incited ethnic hatred. Among them are the following print media: Krymskoe Vremya, Krymskaya Pravda and other marginal Russian-language publications that were printed in large numbers and distributed widely, including in the territories of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate).

Number of Journalists

In the beginning of 2014, there were 1229 journalists working in Crimea, 211 of whom were representatives of the Crimean Tatar people. ATR media holding alone employed 54 journalists. It would also be reasonable to assume that the actual number of journalists or representatives of the media environment in Crimea was much higher, as some journalists worked on an unofficial basis.

2.2. Occupied Territory

Stages of Seizure of the Media Sphere in Crimea

Taking into account the fact that repressions against media representatives in Crimea have a permanent nature, we suggest to distinguish the following stages of forced reformatting in the information sphere of Crimea from February 20, 2014 to the present:

Stage 1. Seizure of the media outlets and violent interference in the activities of media and journalists (February-March 2014)

The period is characterized by the establishment of total control over the Ukrainian media on the peninsula and the organization of propaganda aimed at the local population and the international community. Various methods were used to obstruct the professional activities of journalists during the military operation in February-March 2014: abductions of journalists, beatings, threats, humiliation; destruction, damage and illegal seizure of equipment and media; restrictions on movement, communication, collection and transmission of information, provocations against media representatives, seizure of offices and premises of Crimean media.

Stage 2. Forced transfer of Ukrainian Crimean media to the Russian legal framework (2014-2015)

In order to intimidate and create conditions for the termination of professional activities and forced departure from Crimea of journalists who disagree with the occupation, the illegal authorities initiated criminal and administrative cases, which included searches, arrests, interrogations,

forced interviews, fines, and seizure of property of Crimean media outlets. Most Crimean journalists, who did not agree with the occupation, were subjected to intimidation, blackmail, threats, and so-called preventive conversations. Many Crimean journalists, activists, and bloggers, the number of which, according to various estimates, exceeded 200, were forced to leave the peninsula to save their lives and freedom.

Stage 3. Repressions against civic journalists and the local population of Crimea (2015-2023)

In the conditions of total control and the cessation of activities of Ukrainian media, civic journalism emerged on the peninsula. Active concerned citizens, who created and disseminated content in social media, began to create information about objective developments. The occupation authorities saw the formation of the journalistic civil movement and citizen journalists as a danger, so they are constantly subject to pressure and repression. Since the beginning of the occupation and to this day, measures have been taken to control the activity of ordinary Crimean residents on social media (Facebook, Twitter, Instagram, Odnoklassniki, V Kontakte, etc.), communication channels (Telegram, WhatsApp, Viber, etc.), where comments, likes, posts, reposts, and shares of certain messages become a reason for bringing a person to administrative and even criminal liability. It is important that such cases are opened without regard to the statute of limitations and citizens receive sentences for actions committed before the occupation in 2014, because, according to the occupiers' logic, the availability of information in the media or social networks is considered a "continuous crime".

Stage 4. Media space in Crimea after the start of Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine (February 2022 to the present day)

The measures taken in the context of the war against Ukraine are characterized by the complete establishment of total control over the information space, the conduct of information and hybrid war against Ukraine using a full range of means to manipulate the consciousness of the audience, stimulate denunciation, snitching, create an atmosphere of fear, repression, pressure among the citizens, and prohibit any positive mentions of Ukraine and Ukrainian matters by ordinary citizens.

2.2.1. Organizational Consequences of the Occupation

Reduction in the Number of Media Outlets in Crimea after the Occupation

The occupation of 2014 resulted in a general reduction of the number of media outlets in Crimea as compared to the number of media outlets before the occupation. The implementation of total control over the sphere of information and communications (including social media) by the occupation authorities and the use of the operating permit as a tool of pressure and control over the media laid the foundation for narrowing of the media environment. Recall that in 2012, according to the Republican Committee on Information of the Council of Ministers of the ARC, the total number of media outlets was about 1,325, including the press, radio, TV, and news agencies. After the occupation, in the first quarter of 2016, according to the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Communications of the Republic of Crimea,

626 media outlets were registered on the peninsula, and in the first quarter of 2018 their number was 361. So, the total number of regional media outlets on the peninsula has decreased by almost 60% since 2014.

By 2022, the following resources were operating in the Crimean television space: all-Crimean: Pershyi Krymskyi, ITV, Krym 24, Millet, TV FM; city: NTS (Sevastopol), Narodnyi Kanal (Sevastopol), Pershyi Sevastopolskyi (Sevastopol RDTRK), TRK Kerch, Morion (Yevpatoria); cable and satellite: Krym 24, Devkom, TRK Yalta (Velyka Yalta), small towns' TV channels: Ekran (Dzhankoy, Krasnoperekopsk), KTV+ (Krasnoperekopsk), Pivnichnyi Krym (Armiansk), etc.

In 2017, according to the Public Register of Communications and Broadcasting Infrastructure of the Russian Federation, 9 central television companies, 22 radio companies and 35 cable television channels operated in the so-called Republic of Crimea; 17 central television companies, 23 radio companies and 57 cable television channels operated in Sevastopol.

Misappropriation of Property of Ukrainian Editorial Offices

In 2014, the occupying state illegally appropriated Ukrainian state property and private property of independent Ukrainian media outlets of various forms of ownership. According to preliminary data from the state-owned telecommunications operator Kontsern RRT, after the seizure of the infrastructure and equipment of its subsidiary RTPC Krym, the total amount of losses incurred by Ukraine as a result of the occupation of Crimea is over UAH 161.9 million in prices of 2014. The losses of Crimean radio stations amounted to UAH 52.4 million, television – UAH 6.4 million in prices of 2014. The losses of the National

Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting due to the seizure of property of the regulator's representatives amounted to UAH 75.7 thousand in the AR of Crimea and UAH 8.5 thousand in Sevastopol.

As a result of Russia's occupation of the peninsula, 31 Ukrainian broadcasting companies were deprived of the right to broadcast analog television in Crimea and another 28 lost the right to broadcast digitally. Representatives of the "self-defense of Crimea" and Russian-controlled local authorities were seizing transmitters and editorial offices of Crimean broadcasting companies. Under the post-occupation media outlets with a long history and established audiences were destroyed and, in an instant, they were put in front of a difficult choice: either leave the peninsula or cease to exist. Most of the media that disagreed with the occupation suffered the destruction of their material and technical base, and journalists were subjected to pressure and repression.

Ban on Broadcasting of Ukrainian media

Restrictions on broadcasting of Ukrainian information resources have not been lifted to date. As of the beginning of 2023, the websites of 30 Ukrainian and Crimean media outlets, including those that had to move to mainland Ukraine, remain blocked in Crimea in full or in part. Obstacles are being created for the transmission of the signal of Ukrainian national TV channels and radio stations.

Achieving the ultimate goal of de-occupying Crimea is closely linked not only to activities in the international arena, but also in the domestic direction, which, before February 24, 2022, was based on establishing close ties with Ukrainian citizens living in the occupied territory and protecting their rights.

It is impossible not to take into account the objective difficulties of conducting and implementing measures to counteract the hybrid information war on part of the aggressor state and its impact on the residents of the temporarily occupied territory of Crimea. They include the lack of access to the peninsula's territory and absence of the de facto control of the Ukrainian state over the territory of Crimea. In addition, such activities as informational outreach to the de facto uncontrolled territory have continuous and systematic nature and require daily persistent efforts.

Despite the large amount of work being done in the territory of Ukraine by the state and civil society, due to the lack of direct access to the occupied territory, it is very difficult to determine the criteria for assessing the effectiveness of ideological work with Crimean residents and countering Russian information propaganda.

Measuring the effectiveness of the work on collecting, processing and disseminating information for the residents of the peninsula has an indirect nature. Some human rights organizations and media outlets rely on audience feedback (letters, phone calls, reactions on websites, social media, etc.), some measure the length of sound signal spread across the territory of Crimea (especially radio stations operating on FM or AM waves), conduct ratings and check the availability of media or their satellite resources in social media, but such traditional methods of assessing the effectiveness of a media outlet or a media resource as opinion polls, rating of an information product, audience reaction and feedback are not used. When studying the situation on the occupied peninsula, a certain array of factors and details remains out of sight, which can only be revealed with the direct presence on the ground, full-fledged fieldwork, and detailed analysis of an

event. It is also important to keep in mind that Crimean residents will not be able to openly, objectively, without endangering their own safety and even lives, express their opinions and demonstrate their attitude to the situation in Ukraine.

However, with all the understanding of the existence of objective difficulties and threats, the problem with the dissemination of Ukrainian information products in the TOT of Crimea cannot be an obstacle or a reason to refuse to conduct full-fledged objective communication work with its residents aimed primarily at providing verified information about Ukraine and countering information propaganda, strengthening and protecting Ukrainian civic identity, preserving and developing national consciousness. The most appropriate thing to do in the current conditions is to conduct multifaceted, multiaspect work on the "Crimean theme" and establish communication links with the residents of Crimea, with the subsequent provision of certain opportunities for them on the Ukrainian mainland and protection of their interests.

Total Violation of Journalists' Rights

The issue of violations of journalists' rights remains relevant to this day and is also one of the components of Ukraine's claims to international courts regarding the violation of territorial integrity. From February 2014 to August 2019, human rights defenders recorded almost 300 cases of violations of journalists' rights in Crimea, including 11 criminal cases, 13 administrative cases, 8 cases of torture, 23 physical attacks, 47 arbitrary detentions, 20 searches, 18 interrogations, 48 cases of seizure of and damage to equipment, 4 bans on entry to Crimea, 3 cases of threats, 9 DDos attacks and more than 100 obstacles to filming.

But even such a painstaking, large-scale and important work of human rights defenders does not reflect the full picture of repressions in Crimea, as many facts for objective reasons remained outside the research vision of human rights defenders. First, in different conditions, not all Crimean media and journalists, activists, bloggers, citizen journalists and ordinary citizens informed the media and society of or made public the facts of pressure. Certain cases of intimidation, entry bans and bans on access to information are not reflected, and some forms of pressure are not described, such as provocations against journalists and activists, threats and humiliation of dignity of journalists on the mainland of Ukraine after they left; information on the situation in the area of civic journalism is incomplete. The absence of individual facts in the report only shows the variety of forms and methods of pressure on Crimean residents, the uniqueness of each case or situation, and the scale of human rights violations and obstruction of freedom of speech on the peninsula.

Forced Migration of Journalists

When investigating the problem of forced transformation of the Crimean information space since 2014, we can identify such socio-political phenomenon in the sphere of professional journalism as the forced departure or migration of dozens of journalists from the peninsula. It is necessary to point out numerous violations of rights, examples of pressure on journalists by the so-called Crimean authorities and law enforcement agencies of Crimea, which took into account not only the professional position and public activity, credibility, popularity, influence, experience of a journalist, but also their marital status, the situation with relatives and friends, the circumstances

of their personal life and even everyday life. Every journalist forced to leave Crimea after 2014 faced a threat to their life and health as a result of repression by law enforcement agencies and the so-called authorities.

After 2014, until 2022, three journalistic groups were formed in the professional environment that resisted information and covered the seizure of the peninsula. Their representatives:

- were forced to leave the peninsula and now continue their activities on the mainland of Ukraine or outside the Ukrainian state, do so either openly or conduct their professional activities semi-clandestinely, completely conceal their names and surnames or use pseudonyms for the sake of safety and preservation of their freedom;
- remained in Crimea and have fully ceased their activities;
- chose activities unrelated to socio-political issues, including blogging, social work, media projects, producing.

Massacre of the Media of the Indigenous People of Ukraine – the Crimean Tatars

During the occupation of Crimea, the Russian Crimean authorities brutally took out the representative body and the active part of the indigenous people of Crimea. Almost immediately after the beginning of the occupation, persecution and repression of representatives of the Kurultai-Mejlis system began, and in each case a wide range of forms and methods of pressure was used. Repressions continue throughout the period of the de facto presence of the Russian Federation on the territory of the peninsula, and active members of the Kurultai-Mejlis system at all levels, namely more than 2,000 representatives of the indigenous people, are being subjected to pressure.

ATR TV channel, Meydan Radio, Krymski Novyny Agency (QHA), 15 Minut website, and Liale TV channel were forced to leave Crimea

Publishing

Regarding the state's priority steps in the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol after the de-occupation, the Ukrainian Association of Publishers and Book Distributors informed the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine that, according to the Ivan Fedorov Book Chamber of Ukraine, in the end of 2013 there were 36 publishing houses in Crimea that together published 730 titles with a total circulation of 437 thousand copies during that year. The lion's share of publications was formed by literature on local topics and by Crimean authors, as well as guidebooks. There is no information about the bookstores that existed at that time.

Since the occupation of Crimea, Russia has been actively using the book as part of a propaganda campaign to implant Russian narratives in the minds of the peninsula's citizens for the past nine years, destroying any literature that would remind people that Crimea is Ukraine. For this purpose, libraries were actively used, in particular those, which were filled with relevant literature produced by the Russian Federation at the expense of the budget, as well as systematic propaganda campaigns that both libraries and all cultural organizations and institutions were obliged to carry out.

In addition, the occupiers launched a series of systematic book and exhibition events to bring Russian printed and electronic publications to potential consumers. Bookstores also play an active role in the process of stupefying the population, and, according to Russian sources, there

are about a hundred of them in Crimea today. Overcoming this propaganda influence of Russian books on the minds of residents, returning them to the Ukrainian mental, social, and political space is impossible without a state program to return Ukrainian books to the de-occupied territory of Crimea.

2.2.2. Ideological Consequences of the Occupation

Militarization of Consciousness of Crimea's Population Using Media Propaganda Means

Since the beginning of 2014, after gaining control of the peninsula's territory, the Russian Federation has been conducting a systematic expansion in all spheres of humanitarian space (science and education, culture and art, media and social communications) aimed at destroying Ukrainian civic, Crimean Tatar and Ukrainian ethnic identity and formation of the pro-Russian, anti-Western and anti-democratic worldview of Crimean residents. In the temporarily occupied territory of Crimea, Ukrainian civic and ethno-national identity is being replaced, the development of Crimean Tatar identity is being restricted, and the consciousness of the population, especially children and youth, is being militarized through the imposition of the Russian system of values and views. A special place in this process is given to the formal and non-formal education sector.

Throughout the occupation, the illegal authorities conducted propaganda activities, the basis of which was manipulating the facts of Crimea's historical past, creating a negative, hostile image of Ukraine, shaping public opinion about the validity and legality of the Russian Federation's forcible seizure of Crimea in 2014. The goal was

achieved by creating and spreading myths that Crimea belonged exclusively in the "Russian world" using false information about the present and past of Ukraine and conducting educational work to militarize the consciousness of the peninsula's population.

History Mythologization

The consequences of the occupation were not only the militarization of the peninsula, changing the demographic composition of its population, violation of human and civil rights and freedoms, destruction of the environmental landscape of the region, but also interference in the spiritual sphere of Crimea. The impression that an exclusively militarized base is being built in the territory of Crimea and that no opportunities for the development of the intellectual sphere have been created in the region is not true. During the occupation in 2014–2022, The Russian Federation carried out a large-scale intellectual intervention in the humanitarian environment: science and education, culture and art, and the information space. The result of this work was the creation of an intellectual product in the scientific, educational and information spheres, which not only cultivated the myth of "purely Russian Crimea", but also fully justified the occupation of the peninsula in 2014 as an act of "establishment of historical justice".

Representatives of the spiritual and intellectual sphere, scientific researchers in Crimea received orders in the form of government programs, grants, and projects to create works, the content of which changed history and demonstrated only a positive impact on the development of historical events in Crimea, first of the Russian Empire, then of the Soviet Union, and now of the Russian Federation. Historians began work on the

fundamental history of Crimea with a description of past and present events.

Mandatory elements in scientific, popular science, and educational publications on the latest processes in Crimea are a characteristic comparison of the so-called "Ukrainian" and "Russian" periods, emphasizing only positive trends after 2014, defining the stay of Crimea as part of Ukraine as a "historic mistake", reporting on the completion of the process of Crimea's integration into the political, economic, social and information space of the Russian Federation. A radical view in such propaganda work is the opinion expressed by individual Crimean deputies in 2020 that the 23 years of being under the de facto control of Ukraine (1991–2014) should be considered "Ukrainian occupation."

The occupation authorities are actively engaged in rewriting and falsifying the historiography of the Ukrainian Crimea and the history of the Crimean Tatar people. Thus, the 10th grade history textbook printed in Crimea in 2019, which was supposed to be used in the schools of the peninsula, contained statements that incited hatred towards the Crimean Tatar people. The publication contained false and biased facts from the history of the Crimean Tatar people, which contained signs of xenophobia.

Destruction of Ukrainian Identity in Crimea

During the occupation, the so-called authorities of Crimea carried out systematic work to destroy the Ukrainian identity of the residents of the peninsula, which is most clearly observed in the humanitarian sphere, in particular in the system of education, culture, science, and information policy. In fact, the anti-Ukrainian bacchanalia has its origins in the activities of pro-Russian

chauvinist forces long before the Maydan and the occupation of Crimea. Numerous pro-Russian political forces and public associations felt free and carried out their activities in the territory of the peninsula without any obstacles, and their activity, which was definitely financially and organizationally supported by the Russian Federation, was reflected in the mass media of the region.

3. DESCRIPTION OF THE VISION OF THE FUTURE MODEL FOR REINTEGRATION

As a result of the violent transformation of the information sphere of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the occupation authorities of Crimea banned the activities of Ukrainian mass media and journalists; there are no free media or journalists, bloggers, authors left in the region; over time, not only professional media persons, but also civic journalists and ordinary residents, who were not afraid to express their opinions about the situation in the temporarily occupied Crimea, became the target of repression, pressure and control. The results of the occupation policy were complete control over the information sphere of Crimea, change in the information landscape, reduction in the number of the media, impossibility of full-fledged work of Ukrainian and international monitoring missions in the region, pressure and repression of the so-called authorities on citizens, whose positions and opinions were different from the “pro-government” position.

Due to the global social changes that took place in Ukraine after the occupation of Crimea in 2014, in the context of protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty of Ukraine, the safe reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories,

the information vector, which is an important component in the process of protecting the interests of Ukraine, was recognized as one of the priority areas of development of the country.

In the Report the term “information sphere of Crimea” is considered as a set of the following components:

- social institutions: state and administrative institutions in the field of mass information and social communications, professional journalists’ unions and associations, mass media system, social communications (social media, communication channels, blogosphere, forums, wiki sites, etc.);
- publishing area: institutes, organizations, establishments, the professional duty of which is aimed at creating and distributing printed products in paper and electronic form (printing houses, editorial offices, etc.);
- the field of citizen journalism and human rights activities related to the communication environment: human rights organizations, movements, associations, the functioning of which is based on the protection of human rights and freedoms and informational resistance to repression and pressure.

Principles of the State Policy:

1. Information independence and objectivity: Ukrainian information policy should be based on objectivity, accuracy and independence from internal and external influences. It is important to ensure that information disseminated through governmental and independent media is based on verified facts.
2. Transparency and accessibility of information: The government should actively share information with the citizens about the steps taken to restore and develop Crimea. This will help

maintain citizens’ trust in the state and reduce the possibility of spreading misinformation.

3. Dialog and communication: It is important to maintain a dialog with the local communities of Crimea and ensure their involvement in decision-making processes. This will help take into account the needs and opinions of the region’s residents, ensure their active participation in shaping the future of Crimea and promote social stability.

4. International cooperation: Ukraine should support international efforts to prevent recognition of the occupation of Crimea, appeal to international organizations and partners with a request to support the recovery of the region and provide humanitarian aid.

5. Cultural and language diversity: Ensuring the support and development of media in the state language, the languages of indigenous peoples, and the languages of the region’s residents, which will contribute to the creation of a harmonious society.

6. Counteracting misinformation: Develop means for detecting and revealing misinformation, especially when it is spread by the occupant state with the aim of discrediting Ukraine, the governmental institutions of Ukraine, undermining the trust of citizens and causing chaos.

7. Development of media literacy: Implement programs to increase media literacy among citizens so that they can critically evaluate information, distinguish between sources and understand manipulation in the information space.

8. Informational support for economic and social development: Highlight reforms, investment projects and other measures aimed at the development of the media of Crimea in order to stimulate the interest of investors and ensure the growth of the region’s economy.

4. ASSESSMENT OF RISKS AND THREATS, MULTIVARIATE SCENARIOS

Of the possible scenarios of de-occupation of Crimea two are considered at the time: short-term and long-term.

Based on the position of the Ukrainian state and civil society after the full-scale invasion, we can talk about the most probable scenario, which at this point is the scenario of liberation by military means.

Threats after de-occupation (the first stage):

- disrupted (or destroyed) information infrastructure in Crimea as a result of military operations or its destruction by the occupiers after the liberation of the territory;
- lack of communication management, cooperation with the media regarding the implementation of the state policy and integration;
- lack of professional personnel in the field of the state information policy on reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine;
- complete or partial absence of the material and technical base at the first stage after de-occupation for the work of the media and the media environment;

General Issues and Challenges:

- outdated and unregulated legal framework of Ukraine in the information sphere (Strategy of Informational Reintegration of the TOT of the AR of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the Law of Ukraine “On Media”);
- the need to adopt new regulations corresponding to the conditions of the current situation

(the Law “On Collaboration”, the Law “On the Activities of the Military Civil Administrations, etc.);

– the need to form a new professional journalistic environment after the de-occupation of Crimea;

– criminal proceedings, lustration, etc.

After the long stay of Ukrainian citizens under the influence of the propaganda of the aggressor state, the following challenges are the key ones in the information sphere after the occupation of Crimea:

1) non-recognition by the Russian Federation of the occupation of Crimea as an international crime;

2) the Russian Federation’s disregard for the validity of the norms of international humanitarian law in Crimea, the main provisions of the UN Convention, the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, the Declaration on the Rights of the Child and other documents on international law;

3) the formation and implementation of the state policy of the Russian Federation aimed at replacing the population of the peninsula, in particular at displacement of Crimeans loyal to Ukraine, and the colonization of Crimea by citizens from various regions of the Russian Federation;

4) implementation of the Russian state policy aimed at the destruction of the Ukrainian national identity in all humanitarian spheres;

5) the introduction of the Russian state policy aimed at destruction of the identity of the indigenous peoples of Ukraine and, first of all, the indigenous Crimean Tatar people, which is especially dangerous given the lack of other places of historical formation of the cultural mentality of the people related to their spiritual and material culture outside Crimea;

6) establishment by Russia of full governmental control over the humanitarian space of Crimea, depriving Crimeans of the opportunity to receive objective information for a long time;

7) aggressive propagandistic information policy using the tools of state power and media aimed at forming the image of the “enemy” and demonizing it (the collective West, Ukraine, the Armed Forces of Ukraine, Ukrainian nationalists, Euromaidan, the Crimean Tatar people/national movement, etc.);

8) militarization of informational and educational space, especially regarding children and youth;

9) distortion of history through the creation of false narratives about the purely “Russian land of Crimea”.

RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATE AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE ON OVERCOMING THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE OCCUPATION AND CHALLENGES IN REINTEGRATING THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL AFTER THEIR LIBERATION IN INFORMATION POLICY

It is necessary to recognize the obvious fact that Ukraine as a state has not been implementing any state policy towards the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol for almost 10 years of occupation of Crimea.

The prepared experts' recommendations are primarily intended for the central government authorities of Ukraine, which formulate and implement state policy in the information sphere, in particular:

- the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine;
- the Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine;
- the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine;
- the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting.

Accordingly, these recommendations are also provided to the Committees of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine: on humanitarian and information policy; on human rights, de-occupation and reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, national minorities and interethnic relations, – to summarize and understand the situation in the information sphere, to improve the effective legislation of Ukraine, to prepare conclusions and exercise control functions within the framework of the committees' activities in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "On Committees of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine".

The provided expert opinions on the formation of information policy are recommended to the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine and the President of Ukraine for analyzing the situation in the information sphere in the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

I. SUGGESTIONS FOR MINIMIZING RISKS AND THREATS

For the first time since its independence, the Ukrainian state has faced the problems of occupation, war and aggression and is now trying to find ways to solve them. The main theoretical problem in the study of information wars is that the process of conducting hybrid information wars is constantly evolving and, accordingly, is updated with the latest materials.

Turning to the analysis of information wars and the search for countermeasures, an attempt to project the accumulated experience to the present, is complicated also by the fact that the application of information wars is multidimensional. Actions are carried out not only in the information environment and mass media, but also in various spheres of life, including the information environment and mass media, as well as in the political, diplomatic, military, economic, social, humanitarian and other spheres. The developments and studies that have been carried out in relation to the events of, for example, not only the end of the twentieth century, but also the first years of the twenty-first century, are already quite different from the tools used and implemented at the present stage. The work in the Crimean direction is further complicated by the fact that Crimea is a territory that de facto is temporarily not controlled by the Ukrainian state.

After the de-occupation, countering the information hybrid challenges posed by the aggressor state against the Ukrainian state requires a whole range of measures and forms of work on the part of the Ukrainian state and society.

Summarizing the areas of activity, it is necessary to highlight the main vectors of the state's work in the information dimension to counter hybrid threats:

1) pursuing a clear and understandable policy on the TOT with the demonstration of this policy in the information space;

2) protection of Ukrainian citizens in the TOT in the legal and social dimension with the appropriate information support;

3) meeting the needs of Ukrainian citizens in the provision of public services;

4) creating conditions for the full functioning of mass media and communication channels;

5) creating a high-quality information product by applying high standards of the profession and complying with the requirements for providing truthful, objective information about the events in Ukraine;

6) creating conditions for various events to increase the level of media literacy and media competence of Ukrainian citizens.

II. PROPOSALS FOR SOLUTIONS AND FORMATION OF THE POLICY OF INFORMATIONAL REINTEGRATION OF THE TOT OF THE AR OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL

The information policy of Ukraine after the de-occupation of Crimea should take into account several important aspects to ensure effective recovery and development of the country, as well as the support of the international community:

a) Post-occupation measures of the authorities in the field of information policy

After the de-occupation of Crimea, in order to protect Ukrainian civic identity and counteract discrimination against indigenous peoples and other ethnic groups, strengthen the country's information security, counteract and overcome the consequences of information expansion by the aggressor state, Ukrainian authorities (executive,

legislative, judicial) and society should organize joint coordination work.

Such work has already been partially laid down in the adopted Strategy for the De-occupation and Reintegration of the TOT of the AR of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (2021), which was essentially a road map for de-occupation to unite the efforts of the authorities in the Crimean direction, and after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia in 2022 – in the document "De-occupied Crimea: Priority Steps of the Government. The Report on the Implementation of the Order of the President of Ukraine to Develop the State's Priority Steps after De-occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol (2023) developed by the Permanent Mission of the President of Ukraine in the AR of Crimea and sent by the Office of the President of Ukraine to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

After the de-occupation of Crimea, the measures developed before as part of the humanitarian and information policy on the temporarily occupied Crimea aimed at preserving and strengthening the civic and national consciousness of Ukrainian citizens should be implemented: primarily and for a long-term perspective.

Primary measures include a set of measures aimed at organizing and establishing information communication between the authorities and the population through the mass communication media in the first period after de-occupation (if necessary, martial law and curfew).

The following is important **at the first stage after de-occupation**:

- a complex of measures for ensuring communication and communication opportunities in the territory of the liberated Crimea;
- in the event of destruction, theft or damage of communication and information property by

the occupying state in the process of the military liberation of Crimea, implementing state policy measures to restore and develop information infrastructure in the regions (in particular, restoring the operation of Internet providers, satellite and cable TV, building television and radio transmission towers, creating conditions for radio digitalization, etc.);

- implementation of regulatory documents on cooperation between the media sector and military civil administrations;

- creation of a single official center (at the first stage) to provide and disseminate official, verified information from the authorities;

- establishing a system of notification of the Crimean population by state authorities through media resources and social communication channels;

- identifying (if necessary) official speakers to provide priority information;

- in order to prevent the dissemination of unverified information and counteract information threats, identify and implement a number of measures to ensure media safety and media hygiene (fact checking, verification of information, access to reliable sources) at the first stage;

- to prevent the spread of false information and disinformation, temporary censorship and imposition of restrictions on the activities of resources that sided with the occupier in 2014 and violated the Ukrainian law;

- a complete ban on the activities of media resources (respectively, the termination of the activities of organizations of all forms of ownership) of the aggressor country that were established in Crimea after February 2014;

- improving the Glossary of Names, Terms and Phrases Recommended for Use by the Government Authorities and Local Government

Bodies, Diplomatic Missions of Ukraine, Mass Media, and Public Sector Organizations in Connection with the Temporary Occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the City of Sevastopol and Certain Districts of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions by the Russian Federation and suggesting that journalists use terminology that is consistent with the position of the Ukrainian state.

In the long term, the return of society to the usual way of life is expected and the following should be appropriate:

- for establishing ties between the state (in the first years – the military civil administrations) and the society: organizing and conducting public, educational and awareness campaigns, creating and publishing arrays of information, disseminating useful information through social media and official media pages of the Ukrainian government;

- improving the legal framework for the functioning of the media in Crimea (the Law “On Media”, the Strategy for Information Reintegration of the TOT of the AR of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, etc.), improvement of existing decisions and adoption of new necessary decisions by the state authorities;

- introduction of Ukrainian regulatory and legal norms on the functioning of the media and media environment, as well as the publishing sector;

- support and stimulate the opening of Crimean editorial offices and offices of the national media of Ukraine in the territory of Crimea;

- creating a diverse journalistic product of various forms and genres (programs, broadcasts, talk shows, etc.) to dismantle the narratives of the occupying state’s propaganda;

- state support for the creation of various media in the state language and language of the indigenous peoples;

- formation and perception of the development of the media and media resources to meet the needs of different categories of society with the formation of a high-quality information, educational and cultural product for Crimean residents through innovative projects;

- developing a policy of cultural and informational reintegration of the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine, including Crimea, in cooperation with civil society through various forms and methods of outreach to the public (campaigns, events, celebrations);

- initiating and conducting activities to reintegrate the temporarily occupied Crimea into the unified information, educational and cultural space of Ukraine (conferences, forums, round tables, discussions, etc.);

- involvement of prominent political and humanitarian figures, opinion leaders and goodwill ambassadors from both Crimea and other regions in covering the situation in Crimea;

- use of soft power tools to form an objective, positive attitude to Crimea among domestic and foreign audiences (national culture, public diplomacy);

- introducing quotas and standards for broadcasting in the state language and indigenous languages in the Crimean media in order to remedy the situation that was observed before the occupation, when the vast majority of media outlets published their materials in the language of the occupier state;

- creation of a state broadcaster for the indigenous peoples of Ukraine based on the standards and templates of the Public Broadcaster of Ukraine;

- returning to Crimea and supporting all Crimean media that were forced to leave Crimea after the occupation and continued their work in

mainland Ukraine after 2014. For instance, such Crimean media outlets as: News agency Tsentralistykykh Rozsliduvan, project Krym. Realii (the project of Ukrainian editorial office of Radio Svoboda), news agency QHA (Krymski Novyny), TV and radio company Chornomorska, TV channel ATR, website 15 Khvylyn, children’s TV channel Lale, Meydan Radio, newspaper Krymska Svitlytsia, website Black Sea News, website Holos Krymu. Forcible displace editorial offices Chornomorska Bezpeka, Ukrayinske Zhyttia v Sevastopoli, TV and radio company Bryz, and newspaper of the Navy of Ukraine Flot Ukrayiny;

- holding the Journalist’s Day, Radio and Television Day at the regional level to attract the attention of Crimean residents.

b) De-occupied Crimea as an informational component of Ukraine’s international policy and coverage of de-occupation in the international media

- organization of systematic consultations and sharing of experience with international partners to disseminate objective information about the de-occupied Crimea;

- continuing cooperation with international non-governmental organizations dealing with “Crimean matters”;

- engagement of international partners and international organizations in actively building and supporting the restoration of the Ukrainian Crimean media system;

- cooperation with experts and journalists of the world’s leading media to familiarize the international audience with the real situation in the de-occupied Crimea;

- ensuring effective cooperation and systematic consultations of international media organizations with the Crimean media;

– initiating visits to the peninsula by special international missions and institutions, facilitating the work and arrival of monitoring missions of various international organizations, whose activities are aimed at covering the situation in the de-occupied Crimea;

– organizing and conducting an annual international conference of journalists in Crimea for the purpose of covering the situation and attracting the attention of the international community and the media;

– introduction of a quota for Crimean topics in the Ukrainian system of broadcasting in foreign languages.

c) Implementation of measures to overcome the consequences of hybrid information challenges

The occupation of Crimea was accompanied by significant work of the occupying state towards Ukraine, which had a hybrid nature due to the fact that it was conducted and implemented not only in the information sphere, but also in other humanitarian spheres of social life. A set of measures to counteract and overcome the consequences should be used at all levels of work (at the regional level, namely the de-occupied territory, as well as at the national and international levels) and should be carried out using news media to counteract information threats:

– organizing various types and forms of cooperation with representatives of state authorities and the expert community (scientific and practical conferences, symposiums, debates, round tables, etc.) to convey the position of Ukrainian society both in Crimea, in Ukraine and abroad;

– encouraging the efforts of all international and national professional institutions and communities to refute hostile propaganda after de-occupation;

– restoration of the Ukrainian national political identity of Ukrainian citizens in the TOT through profound scientific and popular science research;

– creation of comprehensive research works that study the events in the region, in-depth studies on the history of Crimea, the history of Russia's encroachment on Crimea with exposure of its expansionist policy, research of the position of the international community on the Crimean issue in order to establish historical truth, an objective view, and an assessment of the current situation after de-occupation of Crimea;

– creation of a modern intellectual information product aimed at popularizing Ukrainian history, culture, language, including the Day (Festival) of Ukrainian Cinema, Theater Day, cultural festivals, etc.;

– organizing and holding national Ukrainian public and religious holidays;

– involvement of famous people, opinion leaders, and national heroes in the state information policy.

d) In the publishing area:

The document called "De-occupied Crimea. State's Priority Steps" contains no vision of the implementation of the priority steps in the publishing area.

As part of the state policy on de-occupation and reintegration of the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, first of all, changes must be made in the Information Policy section of the Strategy for De-occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine dated March 24, 2021, No. 117/2021. Draft text:

"Ukraine will ensure overcoming the propaganda influence of Russian books on the minds

of the residents, returning them to the mental cultural and social space through Ukrainian books in the de-occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol."

The way of returning Ukrainian books to the de-occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol should be based on the dedicated comprehensive state program "Ukrainian Book – the Future of Crimea" (the name of the program is a working title), which should be developed and adopted by a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "On Publishing". The Constitution of Ukraine also defines the legislative aspects of publishing. Article 34 guarantees the right to freedom of thought and speech, to the free expression of one's views and beliefs. Thus, every citizen can engage in publishing activities within the law. Article 54 of the Constitution of Ukraine guarantees citizens the freedom of literary, artistic, scientific, and technical creativity, as well as protection of intellectual property rights and copyrights. This makes it possible to have a basis for the development of a dedicated comprehensive state program "Ukrainian Book – the Future of Crimea", which should be implemented by the Ukrainian Book Institute in accordance with the Law of Ukraine "On State Support of Book Publishing in Ukraine".

The Ukrainian Book Institute is a state institution at the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine designed to formulate state policy in the book industry, promote book reading in Ukraine, support book publishing, stimulate translation activities, and popularize Ukrainian book publishing.

The dedicated comprehensive state program "Ukrainian Book – the Future of Crimea" should be developed for at least 10 years of the period

of reintegration of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

The main objectives of the program must be:

– development of a separate program of competitive procurement of books in the state language and languages of indigenous peoples of Ukraine at the expense of the state budget of multi-genre Ukrainian and translated literature for different age groups and filling public libraries, as well as preschool, school and higher educational institutions' libraries of de-occupied Crimea with them;

– creating favorable conditions through a system of lease, tax and credit preferences for establishment of Ukrainian publishing houses, bookstores, bookstore chains, and book printing houses;

– improving state policy and implementing measures to develop and support book publishing and distribution in the languages of indigenous peoples of Ukraine;

– full-scale implementation of the Law of Ukraine No. 1213-IX "On Amendments to Certain Laws of Ukraine regarding Stimulating the Development of Ukrainian Book Publishing and Book Distribution";

– communication with the governments of the Crimean Platform member countries to provide the necessary financial grant support to restore publishing in de-occupied Crimea and to purchase Ukrainian books for Crimean libraries;

– organizing regular quarterly all-Ukrainian book fairs in different cities of Crimea;

– introducing the practice of systematic meetings of the Crimean readership with Ukrainian and foreign writers;

— introducing lessons in Ukrainian language, literature and reading of both Ukrainian and foreign authors in Ukrainian translation in preschools, schools, and higher educational institutions;

— establishing a grant support program for authors/writers, who write in Ukrainian and indigenous languages of Ukraine, as well as translations into these languages;

— organizing free Ukrainian and European languages courses at libraries with gift sets of dictionaries and necessary books, audio and video products;

— providing educators, teachers and lecturers with the necessary visual, methodological, and educational literature;

— organizing a state order for the media and a series of TV and radio programs about Ukrainian books and authors on a competitive basis;

— establishment of all-Ukrainian and international annual library and book forums in Crimea;

— establishing literary writers' residencies in Crimea;

— holding various literary and artistic contests, educational clubs for children and youth after school hours.

In addition to the implementation of the dedicated comprehensive state program "Ukrainian Book – the Future of Crimea", the state should take the following priority steps:

1. Re-staffing of local authorities regulating cultural sphere, cultural institutions and organizations, as well as libraries, dismissal of collaborators and their lustration.

2. Seizure of Russian propaganda books, audio and video products from libraries, educational institutions, cultural centers, bookstores, online shops and media resources.

3. Organizing systematic work to return Ukrainian books and literature to the information

and social space of de-occupied Crimea by restoring state institutions, including the Republican Committee on Information of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (during the military administration – the Department of Information Policy of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the Department of Information Policy of the City of Sevastopol).

4. Restoration of strategic state institutions/organizations and enterprises for the period of 10 years of reintegration of the liberated Crimea from occupation, in particular:

— resumption of activities of the State Organization "All-Ukrainian Information and Cultural Center" in Simferopol, founded by the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine;

— resumption of the activities of the State Institution "Ukrainian Cultural and Information Center" in Sevastopol, founded by the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine

— restoration of the State Enterprise "Tavria Publishing House"

— restoration of the State Enterprise "Tavryda Publishing and Printing House".

5. Resumption of financial support for the editorial office of the newspaper Krymska Svitlytsia and the Crimean children's magazine Dzherelce, restoration of children's and literary-artistic publications of the indigenous peoples of Crimea

6. Establishment of the Publishing Department at Volodymyr Vernadsky Taurida National University.

7. Development and adoption of a governmental program for training/education of personnel/students from among Crimean applicants/youth, who lived in the occupied territory, to ensure HR policy in the field of publishing in the de-occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of

Crimea and the city of Sevastopol with a branch of the Ukrainian Academy of Printing in Simferopol, which functioned before the occupation of Crimea, and other Ukrainian universities.

8. Designation of the Volodymyr Vernadsky National Library of Ukraine as an entity responsible for organizing the acquisition/replenishment of library collections for the de-occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

9. Announcement of a nationwide collection of books from the people of Ukraine for residents of the de-occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. Hold permanent all-Ukrainian campaigns to collect books for Crimeans.

10. Printing of the gift book "Kobzar" and a number of thematic and patriotic postcards in Ukrainian with the state symbols of Ukraine and the Crimean Tatar people on the topic "With Ukraine in the Heart" in the amount of 1 million copies for a mass volunteer campaign to distribute the books to Crimeans in the first months of the liberation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

e) Prosecution for collaboration and anti-state activities in the information sphere during the occupation

— monitoring the situation, collecting information on violations of human rights, journalists' rights, and crimes in the media sphere of Crimea;

— analysis and classification of the information received on violations of the law and human rights, building response mechanisms, modeling situations and developing strategic policy vectors for civil society, Ukraine and its partners on this basis;

— forming an evidence base for bringing the Russian Federation to international legal

responsibility for crimes in the information sphere;

— disseminating objective and verified information about the processes on the peninsula that took place during the occupation in the information spheres of life, and especially about the illegal actions of the occupation authorities of the Russian Federation in violating human rights and freedoms, international humanitarian law and freedom of speech;

— initiating consideration in Ukrainian and international courts of cases of human rights violations, violations of the rights of journalists and civic journalists, as well as claims for compensation for the property of Ukrainian media in Crimea that was illegally appropriated during the occupation;

— conducting lustration in the temporarily occupied Crimea to identify collaborator journalists who cooperated with the occupying state and pursued an anti-Ukrainian broadcasting policy;

— conducting a lustration process and resuming the work of journalists' unions in Crimea, including the National Union of Journalists of Ukraine;

— initiating proceedings in the International Courts for crimes committed in the information sphere of Crimea.

III. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE INFORMATION POLICY ON REINTEGRATION OF THE TOT OF THE AR OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL

Paragraph 73 of Section "Information Policy" of the Strategy for the De-occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City

of Sevastopol” (approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine dated 3/24/2021 No. 117/2021) reads: “Ukraine provides systematic support to the media, which were forced to move to the territory controlled by Ukraine due to the temporary occupation and continue to operate, as well as to the media, organizations and other subjects of information activity, including social media, which cover Crimean issues objectively and accurately on a regular basis.”

According to Article 3 of the Law of Ukraine “On State Support of the Media, Guarantees of Professional Activity and Social Protection of Journalists” (the “Law on Media Support”), the targeted support of the government is provided exclusively to media outlets that distribute media for children and youth, for persons with disabilities, specialized scientific print media published by scientific institutions and higher educational institutions, media that purposefully promote the development of languages and cultures of national minorities and indigenous peoples of Ukraine, as well as print media of literary and artistic content.

According to Article 4 of the Law on Media Support, state support for media entities is provided through a protectionist policy of reducing the consumer value of information products, including tax, tariff, customs, currency and economic regulation, compensation for losses, and financial assistance.

The funds required for financial assistance are indicated in the State Budget of Ukraine as a separate line item and are serviced by the central executive body that implements the state policy in the field of treasury services for budget funds.

The funds determined for the financial support are used for provision of:

the financial assistance to media entities specified in Article 3 of this Law;

the economic support to television and radio centers and printing and communication enterprises in accordance with the requirements of Article 2 of this Law.

Distribution of funds indicated in Part Two of this Article is carried out by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

The norms of the state support defined by this Law shall apply to all media entities operating in accordance with the Constitution of Ukraine, regardless of their form of ownership, except for the media referred to in Part Three of this Article.

The norms of the state support for media entities are not applied to the media, which:

distribute media of an advertising nature;

distribute media of an erotic nature;

established in Ukraine by international organizations or with the participation of legal entities or individuals of other states, stateless persons;

distribute media, in which more than 50 percent of the total publications are foreign media materials.

The norms of social protection in accordance with this Law apply to journalists and, within the limits defined by its individual articles, to other creative workers of the abovementioned media entities equated to them.

The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine is responsible for ensuring the implementation of the provisions of this Law, including determining the procedure for regulating and providing the state support to media entities, introducing appropriate tariffs for the above purposes, creating favorable conditions for development, introducing a methodology and procedure for regulating wages, labor protection and social protection of journalists, and taking other measures.

Article 5 of this Law sets forth that in accordance with the Tax Code of Ukraine, transactions of sale (subscription) and delivery (at all stages – from the editorial office to the subscriber) of domestically produced print media are exempt from value added tax.

Preferential taxation of media entities is applied in accordance with the Tax Code of Ukraine.

Article 6 of the Law sets forth that state and municipal entities in the area of audiovisual media, entities in the area of print media established by associations of citizens, public research institutions, educational institutions, labor and journalistic groups, communications enterprises that distribute them, use the lease and services of postal, telegraphic and telephone communication in accordance with the procedure and at the rates established for budget organizations.

Article 9 of the Law sets forth that the tariff for subscription and delivery of print media to subscribers must not exceed 40 percent of the cost of production of one copy of the subscription print media.

In the territory of Donetsk and Luhansk Regions, where the governmental authorities of Ukraine exercise their powers, separate tariffs are set for the acceptance and delivery of domestic subscription print media delivered in the territory of these regions.

Thus, the Law of Ukraine “On State Support of the Media, Guarantees of Professional Activity and Social Protection of Journalists” provides state support only for the media of certain directions, not for all the media, which were forced to move to the territory controlled by Ukraine due to the temporary occupation, or those media, which cover Crimean topics objectively and accurately on a regular basis.

In this case, the provisions of the Strategy for the De-occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol regarding the provision of systemic support to the media that were forced to move to the territory controlled by Ukraine due to the temporary occupation or to those media that cover Crimean topics on a regular basis objectively and accurately require amendments to the effective legislation of Ukraine, starting with the basic Law of Ukraine “On State Support of the Media, Guarantees of Professional Activity and Social Protection of Journalists”.

IV. EFFECTIVENESS OF IMPLEMENTATION OF THE STATE POLICY ON INFORMATION REINTEGRATION OF THE TOT OF THE AR OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL

To carry out systematic monitoring and analysis of the adopted legislation of Ukraine concerning the state policy of Ukraine on information reintegration of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, in particular:

- Resolution of Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine “On Recommendations of the Parliamentary Hearings on the topic: “Strategy of reintegration of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol into Ukraine: issues, ways, methods and means” dated September 22, 2016;

- Decree of the President of Ukraine “On the Decision of the National Security and Defense Council of Ukraine dated March 11, 2021 “On the Strategy for the De-occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the

Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol”.

Hold public officials accountable for a failure to comply with: the Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “On Approval of the Strategy of Information Reintegration of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol” dated December 27, 2028.

The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine should develop, approve and implement a new Order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine “On Approval of the Strategy of Information Reintegration of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol”, which will practically ensure the implementation of the state policy in the information sphere.

The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine should provide an expert assessment of a failure to comply with the articles/sections of the abovementioned effective legislation of Ukraine and exercise government control over compliance with and implementation of the same in the state information policy of Ukraine.

To assign the function of monitoring, analysis and expert assessment of the implementation/non-implementation of the abovementioned effective legislation of Ukraine to the President of Ukraine and to authorize the Representative Office of the President in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea to be responsible for control over the performance with the obligatory involvement of the public, media representatives and experts by raising the status of the Expert Council with the Mission of the President of Ukraine in the AR of Crimea. Implementation of the state information policy on the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol requires responsible control and monitoring. Introduce mechanisms to prevent risks and eliminate

threats of failure to implement the state information policy on reintegration of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, together with the Mission of the President in the AR of Crimea and the Expert Council of the Mission of the President in the AR of Crimea, should conduct an expert assessment, prepare professional opinions and suggest revision of their provisions specifying the powers of the central authorities that formulate and implement the state policy on information reintegration of the temporarily occupied AR of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, namely:

- the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine;
- the Ministry of Reintegration of Temporarily Occupied Territories of Ukraine;
- the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting of Ukraine;
- the National Council of Ukraine on Television and Radio Broadcasting.

Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine should provide targeted funding to ensure the formation and implementation of the state policy on information reintegration of the temporarily occupied Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. The financial support is provided at the expense and within the limits of the state and local budgets, information entities, international technical assistance, contributions from the international stakeholders and other sources not prohibited by law.

The Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine should instruct the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine to develop a state program to support independent media outlets displaced

from the temporarily occupied Crimea and creating information content aimed at the information reintegration of the TOT of the AR of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, ensure publicity and transparency of the state support programs. The basis and foundation is formed by Articles 73, 74 of Section “Information Policy” of the Strategy for the De-occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol” approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine dated March 24, 2021 No. 117/2021.

The central executive bodies that formulate and implement the state information policy of Ukraine should begin to create content on the information reintegration of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol in accordance with the Law of Ukraine “On the Basic Principles of the State Policy in the Area of Strengthening Ukrainian National and Civil Identity.”

During the Russian-Ukrainian war, there is an urgent need to improve the state information policy in the military sphere and train military journalists.

The Committee of Verkhovna Rada on Humanitarian and Information Policy should consider the recommendations of the Humanitarian Policy Expert Group of the Crimean Platform Expert Network by holding committee hearings on the topic: “Implementation of the State Policy of Ukraine on Information Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol”. To draw conclusions and approve expert recommendations to be followed by the central authorities implementing the state policy on information reintegration of the temporarily occupied territory

of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

The President of Ukraine, in accordance with the Regulation on the Advisory Council on De-occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territories of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine dated August 15, 2023, should convene an advisory council, which should:

- develop Ukraine’s position on the key areas of the Crimean Platform’s activities regarding the international information policy of cooperation in countering Russian propaganda;
- prepare proposals for improving Ukrainian legislation on matters related to the de-occupation and reintegration of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol in the information policy of the state of Ukraine;
- taking into account the provisions of the Strategy for the De-occupation and Reintegration of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol, approved by the Decree of the President of Ukraine dated March 24, 2021, No. 117/2021, prepare and to submit proposals in accordance with the established procedure on the priorities of activities, including within the framework of the Crimean Platform, on information reintegration, protection of the rights and interests of Ukrainian citizens, overcoming the consequences and compensation for damage to the Crimean media that have been subjected to aggression; journalists and editorial staff who have been subjected to political repression in connection with the armed aggression and temporary occupation of a part of the territory of Ukraine by the Russian Federation.

**FORMATION OF A COMPREHENSIVE
VISION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
TO THE STATE AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE
ON OVERCOMING THE CONSEQUENCES
OF THE OCCUPATION AND CHALLENGES
IN THE REINTEGRATING THE AUTONOMOUS
REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY
OF SEVASTOPOL IN THE CULTURAL POLICY**

*Evelina Kravchenko, Andrii Lutsyk,
Serhii Mokrenyuk, Daryna Pidgorna*

*invited experts:
Tetiana Vodotyka, Volodymyr Gurich*

CULTURAL POLICY

The formed concept of cultural policy implementation is a critical component of the de-occupation of the territory of Crimea and the reintegration processes going forward on the Peninsula. The concept should not only be developed according to the norms and principles of international and national law, but also consider the following points:

Differences between the legislative and practical levels of the cultural management system and strategic planning of cultural development and support and information policy between 2013 (2014) and the time of the de-occupation of the Crimean Peninsula.

The historical background of the Crimean Peninsula, the ethnic groups that once were and still are living in Crimea, their cultural, religious, and linguistic features to effectively implement the policy of memory and diversity, and the processes of reintegration of the region and its population.

The peculiarities of the demographic composition of the peninsula's population at the time of de-occupation, as well as its cultural and

information needs. Prioritization of needs according to capacities, resources, and the actual state of affairs.

Involvement of representatives of the civil society, scientific and cultural sectors, and international partners to find compromises and the most flexible models for building a cultural and information management system on the territory of the de-occupied Peninsula.

The Report summarizes the preliminary analysis of the situation in Crimea's cultural, social, and information fields, identifying challenges and potential needs.

The current situation in Crimea was analyzed in the following thematic cultural policy contexts: cultural heritage, national memory, and national identity.

The Report also provides a list of recommendations for the Ukrainian government, international organizations, and national and international institutions.

The Report has two parts:

Culture as an integral humanitarian component in the de-occupation and reintegration of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of

Sevastopol, demographic composition of the Crimean Peninsula, and recommendations for the elaboration of cultural policy in the region (*Evelina Kravchenko, Tetiana Vodotyka*).

Appendix: Cultural policy implementation through social work (*Volodymyr Gurich*).

The cultural property protection in the context of mitigating the consequences of the occupation and challenges in the reintegration of the TOT, in particular the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol (*Daryna Pidhorna, Andriy Lutsyk, Serhiy Mokreniuk*).

List of Abbreviations

ARC and Sevastopol	Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol
ATC	Amalgamated territorial communities
CSO	Civil society organization
IA NASU	Institute of Archaeology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
IDP	Internally Displaced Persons
MA	Military administration
MCA	Military-Civil administration
MCIP	Ministry of Culture and Informational Policy of Ukraine
NASU	National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine
NGO	Non-governmental organization
RAS	Russian Academy of Sciences
RS	Russian Federation
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic
SMB	Small and Medium-sized Businesses
TOT	Temporarily occupied territory
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Culture as an integral humanitarian component in the de-occupation and reintegration of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, demographic composition of Crimea, and recommendations for cultural policy in the region

Cultural heritage is the foundation of human civilization, which allows us to understand and verify how our experience has been shaped over hundreds and thousands of generations. The attitude to and respect for our past makes us civilized people. After all, in human history, civilization is a state of systematization and generalization of acquired knowledge and skills, as well as material objects of antiquity, i.e., cultural heritage. This is how European civilization, of which we are a part, was formed. Cultural heritage is the basis of culture; it shapes the features of national identity, preserves ethnic diversity, and, together with historical memory, is the basis for the history and experience of both individual nations and all of humanity. Therefore, the shaping of the cultural policy of a civilized society should be based on preserving and using cultural heritage or cultural values.

I. The cultural heritage of Crimea is an integral part of the cultural heritage of Ukraine

It is impossible to separate the culture of Crimea and Ukraine: it is a single historical region, a historical province called the Northern Black Sea region in scientific texts, the territory from the northern Black Sea coast to Polissya. The Greeks, who inhabited this territory at one time, began to

record geographical information in their texts alongside legendary names and plots, to give names to local tribes, and to track the history of those ethnic groups and tribes that lived to the north of the Black Sea. The same processes took place in other parts of Europe on the shores of the Black and Mediterranean Seas. This is how European history and civilization began on the shores of Italy, France, Spain, and so on, and how Greek and Roman influence penetrated central and northern Europe, just as it did in Ukraine.

Today, the Russian Federation cleverly manipulates facts from history and archeology to demonstrate that Crimea belongs to its territory. In scientific and educational texts, the peninsula is referred to as either the Northern Black Sea region or the south of the Russian state. This region has always had a historical path in line with the pan-European development patterns of tribes and states of the historical era. Modern Ukraine was formed on the lands where various tribes co-existed, appeared, disappeared, emerged, and transformed, eventually starting an ethnic unity that, throughout social development, created a state. And despite the fierce debate among historians about the beginning of this unity, the fact itself is definite, and there are no reasonable objections.

Such a theoretical model in studying and interpreting Ukraine's ancient history and culture is not an isolated intention to revise the historical constructions of Soviet or Russian historiography. The last decade in European and primarily English-language humanities has been characterized by the substantial prevalence of postcolonial theory, which is actively applied to archaeological and historical research¹.

¹ <https://oxfordre.com/literature/view/10.1093/acrefore/9780190201098.001.0001/acrefore-9780190201098-e-1001>, <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00438243.2011.544883>

Therefore, the concept of the “Russkiy Mir,” which is the basis of the foreign and national policy of the Russian Federation and is actively implemented in Crimea, is an archaism in terms of scientific progress, particularly in archaeology and its closely related cultural legacy. Leading scientific centers have not recognized concepts like the ISIS militant ideology or the communist idea of exporting the proletarian revolution. The Russian Federation’s activities aimed at fueling this concept, for example, the article by the President of the Russian Federation on interethnic relations published on the Kremlin’s website in 2020, is a tool to create the illusion of the existence of this concept and its integrity, and a modernized version of Joseph Stalin’s article “Marxism and the Question of Linguistics.” Both examples result from the use of a very outdated ideology created by imperial powers to rule and control conquered peoples. In this way, the imperial narrative was formed, which the civilized world now recognizes as part of the history of the past. The primary mechanism for creating such a narrative is destroying the link between cultural heritage, national memory, and national identity by changing the meanings and essence of events and destroying and rebuilding monuments and memorial sites.

To our minds, the concept of postcolonialism is an adequate counterweight to the idea of the “Russkiy Mir”; such an approach will best promote ethnic diversity in the region.

1. The state of the cultural heritage of Crimea under Russian occupation, lessons learned from response after the end or freezing of similar conflicts

As of 2023, according to the state lists of immovable monuments of Ukraine, 37 monuments of national significance are registered in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea (hereinafter – ARC), 19 monuments of national importance, and 32 monuments of local significance are listed in the Sevastopol City. However, on June 25, 2020, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine adopted two resolutions at its meeting: “On the Inclusion of Cultural Heritage Sites of National Significance in the State Register of Immovable Monuments of Ukraine (ARC)” and “On the Inclusion of Cultural Heritage Sites of National Significance in the State Register of Immovable Monuments of Ukraine (Sevastopol).” Following these Resolutions, the Government of Ukraine listed 175 cultural heritage sites of national importance located on the temporarily occupied territory of the Crimean Peninsula – 164 in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and 11 in the city of Sevastopol. These objects were also excluded from the List of registration and protection of architectural monuments on the territory of the Ukrainian SSR. It was facilitated by the public, actively putting pressure on the central executive body that develops and implements state policy to preserve Ukraine’s cultural heritage since 2014.

In October 2021, the relevant recommendations were also adopted by the Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine but have yet to be implemented².

² <https://www.voicecrimea.com.ua/main/mainnews/komitet-uxvaliv-rishennya-pro-zaxist-kulturno%D1%97-spadshini-v-krimu.html>

However, the number of Ukrainian cultural objects in Crimea is much more. The registers do not reflect the actual situation for several reasons:

The monument must meet certain conditions and criteria defined by the law.

The monument can be nominated only through state bodies and their local offices.

Including a monument is complicated, burdened by bureaucratic procedures, and lengthy.

Most monuments are either unknown or mentioned only in scientific or historical works. From this perspective, archaeological objects are most endangered, as their number far exceeds the number of sites listed in the registers. Still, they are mainly invisible to the eye because they remain unexcavated and underground. Their discovery is solely the responsibility of archaeologists.

Scientific output and human resources are the combination of knowledge and skills accumulated around Crimean archaeology and cultural heritage in general. They can be defined as something of an intangible heritage. It contains information about the ancient human groups that lived on the Crimean Peninsula. Also, these are the results of studies of Ukrainian science, educational, and cultural institutions carried out in Crimea. Some of these works have been published and introduced into the scientific and informational fields. Still, others have been left in Crimean archives or presented in small local exhibitions, museum displays, or during short-term cultural events that received media coverage only at the local [Crimean] level. Such information includes data on those cultural, primarily archaeological, heritage objects not listed in the official registers of the cultural heritage protection bodies and the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy. Therefore, archives, libraries, and small

museums of Crimea are no less important for cultural heritage than other cultural heritage objects of Ukraine.

The exact number of archaeological sites on the territory of Crimea is also significantly higher due to the complicated procedure for state registration of archaeological objects identified during research or rescue or other archeological excavations. The initial information about the discovery and study of archaeological objects is available in scientific records on archaeological research, which are the basis for registering an archaeological object. While ideally, all archaeological objects should be state-registered, there is no data on how many are registered or known only from scientific publications. Also, no generalized registers or catalogs of movable cultural heritage objects were created.

The only source of information on archaeological objects deposited for permanent or temporary storage in the funds of Crimean museums is transfer certificates and exhibition descriptions attached to scientific reports on archaeological research sent to the Field Committee of the Institute of Archaeology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, or transferred to the Ministry of Culture and Informational Policy of Ukraine together with brief information on excavations or explorations. General information about the finds made during archaeological excavations is submitted to the central authority only from national preserves directly subordinated to the MCIP. However, museums subordinated to local cultural departments do not submit information to the central authority.

After the Russian Federation occupied the Crimean Peninsula, it started irreversible processes in the occupying power’s cultural heritage management, which became the pillar of Russian

imperial propaganda. The Russian Federation has consistently modernized its propaganda machine over the past few decades. The main tools of influence on foreign audiences have been the manipulation of cultural matters, humanitarian knowledge, and internal Russian audiences – the religious factor in the context of the so-called new concept of the history of Crimea. Cultural heritage became the material basis of this concept.

The non-recognition of the annexation, the recognition of the occupation as an act of aggression against Ukraine, and pressure from the international community accelerated the process of the RS's creation of a new military and strategic infrastructure on the Peninsula. The development of the military bridgehead has caused damage and destruction of hundreds of archaeological objects, which the RF is trying to hide behind the veil of so-called archaeological excavations. Instead, another area of activity of the occupation authorities receives stable state support and unprecedented funding – the creation of a new ideology of the “Russian myth” of “primordially Russian Crimea.” This has led to landscape transformations at the world-famous archaeological monument the Ancient City of Tauric Chersonese and its Chora, a series of so-called restorations of palaces and fortresses, such as the Baghsaray Palace of the Crimean Khans, Genoese fortresses, the historic center of Sevastopol, and so on. These “landscape transformations” and “restorations” created a new, powerful, and dangerous bridgehead for the new Russian ideology.

The same applies to the memory and identity policy of people in Crimea. It is essential to

convey to the Crimean population, on the one hand, and to the international professional community, on the other, that the real, non-distorted historical experience of societies living on a specific territory and having national or ethnic unity is a particular type of social experience that creates a set of ethnic or national characteristics of the people. Ideally, the historical background should protect the people from mistakes made in the past and form taboos at the level of living mythology in the cultural environment of the people based on collective trauma or historical experience. Similarly, historical memory shapes people's dignity and consciousness, creating signs of national identity.

The current RF occupation policy in Crimea is a continuation of the policy of the Soviet ideology of erasing national identity and creating not the “Soviet myth of a bright future” but the “Russian one” this time.

The monitoring of such situations of violations in the field of protection and use of cultural heritage by the Occupying Power is generally based on the practice of post-Soviet countries with the participation of the Russian Federation as a party or as an ally of one of the parties to the conflict. The very first results of such monitoring are now visible in the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh, where, after the de-occupation of part of the Nagorno-Karabakh province, Azerbaijan raised the issue of the activities of archaeologists from other countries in this territory³. Other countries of the post-Soviet camp still need to develop an effective strategy for monitoring their occupied territories. Still, such work is being done in Georgia, primarily within the framework of the National

³ <https://youtu.be/uiFANQEYgEU>, <https://www.facebook.com/ramazashvili.georgiy/posts/3258470277611925>

Committee of the Blue Shield activities⁴. The trial in Amsterdam regarding the collection of museum objects from the exhibition “Crimea – a golden island in the Black Sea” with a final decision in favor of Ukraine as the owner of cultural property can also be considered a precedent⁵. Our group collects the facts of violations and qualifies them in international law and national legislation with further submission to Ukrainian and international bodies⁶.

2. The influence of the Occupying Power on the Ukrainian culture in Crimea

Given the general concept of humanitarian knowledge and its historical, cultural, and philosophical content, the new ideological foundations introduced by the Occupying Power in Crimea, no matter how much the Russian Federation wants to whitewash and cultivate it, are a comprehensive and consolidated policy that extends the approach of the ideology of the USSR and the Russian Empire. The Russian Federation is effectively implementing this centuries-old scheme of influencing the mentality and erasing national identity to the detriment of Ukraine and its people. The Russian Federation

is not only seizing the tangible cultural heritage, but by rewriting history in their way, they are trying to change the paradigm of cultural development in the occupied territory⁷.

The influence of the Occupying Power on the culture of Crimea is manifested in two ways.

First and foremost, these are ideological projects aimed at connecting Crimea with the history of the Russian Empire since the time of Empress Ekaterina II. It is Russian scientists who are credited with the glory of the discoverers of Crimean antiquities (in fact, they were French and German scholars, English travelers, Polish and Turkish négociants such as Frédéric Dubois de Montpère, Peter Simon Pallas, Marie Holderness, Edmund Chojecki, Guillaume Le Vasseur do Beauplan, Eviya Çelebi, and others).

The activities of the Occupying Power in the National Reserve “Tauric Chersonese” tend to level the significance of this ancient and Byzantine archaeological site for the UNESCO World Heritage Site. At the same time, the concept of the “cradle of Russian Orthodoxy” is being developed there, for the implementation of which the “My History” Foundation, accountable to the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church, is involved. The so-called “New Chersonese”

⁴ <http://www.gch-centre.ge/en/2020/01/29/internationalconference1-2/>

⁵ <https://youtu.be/XFUos-LYINI?si=zWEh8W20xFl5rUq2>, https://youtu.be/jVBoS86u0Ug?si=Np0x32_7BY3yzdPe, <https://www.stopfake.org/ru/fejk-ukraina-vyigrala-sud-po-skifskomuzolotu-iz-za-natsizma-i-okkultizma-v-evrope/>

⁶ <https://krymbezpravil.org.ua/wp-content/plugins/pdfjs-viewer-shortcode/pdfjs/web/viewer.php?file=https%3A%2F%2Fkrymbezpravil.org.ua%2Fwp-content%2Fuploads%2F2021%2F06%2FBuklet-PRESS-anhl.-sotssety.pdf&download=true&print=true&openfile=false&fbclid=IwAR1yumpSwxzHxuOPm0Qt7QcvFj1U3E2ANSmFVdbuu-yKk-RY29i8QFi4HTQ>, https://arcrimea.org/en/analytics/2023/01/04/criminal-system-of-russias-looting-cultural-heritage-of-ukraine-in-occupied-territories/?fbclid=IwAR3TUj3Znu5H5LUSknxaGMviR6CJH85PXBNS5H5JCQik0_ewMYjkfxN7zs

⁷ <http://www.nrcu.gov.ua/schedule/play-archive.html?periodItemID=3546229&fbclid=IwAR3g1FTpMTolL3oIAV5d0RMRNti0gCmIEDpEcWVCUSgkFaEdq5E11wvlGeo>, <https://www.youtube.com/live/5lYwODXCDYc?si=Cc5KXq-SncF2lJvs>

archaeological park is being built⁸. The construction of this complex will completely change the ancient landscape around and on the site of the world-famous monument "The Ancient City of Tauric Chersonese and its Chora." Currently, preparatory work has already destroyed one of the necropolises and part of the suburbs of Chersonese. Near the reserve's fence in the protected zone of the archaeological site near the only preserved and museumified remains of the Roman citadel in the Northern Black Sea region, cultural layers have been destroyed and a military facility is being built⁹.

In general, the ideological activity of the Occupying Power in Crimea, disguised as scientific, is carried out through several societies:

- The "Russian Geographical Society" (headed by Russian President V. Putin, Russian Defense Minister S. Shoigu, Russian Presidential Press Secretary D. Peskov; funded by Rosneft and Gazprom). The organizations provide grants for research and expeditions in Crimea, historical projects to study "Novorossiya," Genoese fortresses and their connection with Italy, Turkey, and Bulgaria,

- The "Russian Historical Society" (headed by the Director of the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service S. Naryshkin, scientific director, and co-chairman – Academician of the Russian Academy of Sciences A. Derevyanko). The organizations provide grants for research, with a priority on events in Ukraine,

- The "Russian Military Historical Society" (headed by the Assistant to the President of the

Russian Federation V. Medinsky, Special Representative of the President of the Russian Federation for Environmental Protection, Ecology and Transport S. Ivanov). The organizations provide grants for patriotic education and youth policy. Currently, the priority is the occupied territories of Ukraine),

- The "Rossotrudnichestvo" (headed by former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov (during his lifetime), First Deputy Chairman of the Military-Industrial Commission of the Russian Federation Dmitry Medvedev, and founded by the Russian MFA). In Ukraine, they were closely associated with the research structures of the National Academy of Sciences – mechanical engineering, space and aviation, and archeology.

The Russian Academy of Sciences structure has no strict subordination to the Russian presidential vertical; heads of RAS institutes are involved in presidential initiatives through these organizations or foundations. The structure of the foundations is poorly "visible" on official websites, except for the "My History" foundation, through which the Patriarchal Council for Culture of the Russian Orthodox Church and Tikhon Shevkunov (Putin's confessor and the newly appointed bishop of Simferopol and Crimea of the Russian Orthodox Church¹⁰), which is also directly managed by Putin himself.

The most active is the "Russian Historical Society". The "Society" aims to discover new oil and gas reserves, mainly in the Arctic and Pacific Oceans, and research transportation routes,

regardless of the declared research goals (marine biology, climate, etc.). It is known that until 2014, large archaeological expeditions in the areas where Rosneft's oil towers later appeared were led by Academician A.P. Derevyanko, who then headed the Siberian branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences. The headquarters of this society is already in the process of relocating to Sevastopol, where one of the cultural heritage landmarks, the Konstantinovsky Ravelin, has been allocated for its needs.

The second aspect of illegal RS activities in Crimea is the transfer of cultural heritage objects outside the territory of the Crimean Peninsula to the territory of the Russian Federation, in particular to museums and archives, which are a kind of *Kunstkamera* for storing looted cultural property of other nations. The Russian Federation explains this transfer by the lack of experience in exhibition practice in Crimean museums, the low professional level of museum workers, and the inability to properly display or interpret these items at the sites where they were found. This devaluation of the staff of Crimean museums is supported by the massive firing of experienced and qualified staff with extensive experience, primarily in international projects and with academic degrees. Over the past six months, collections from Sevastopol museums have been actively taken out of Crimea and are being prepared for their removal from museums in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea. Under the veil of "exhibitions or restoration work," Russians are successfully disguising the looting of the cultural property of Ukraine¹¹.

The war in Ukraine has activated criminals on its territory, which has led to the formation of large black markets for the sale of stolen and otherwise seized cultural heritage objects.

The first illegal market to become active immediately after the occupation of Crimea and Donbas was online auctions, where archaeological objects typical for the sites of Crimea and the Ukrainian East began to appear. Their condition indicated they had been excavated much earlier, as the items had already been restored. Given the massive amount of "goods for sale" and the systematic nature of this process, it is currently impossible to establish whether they were stolen from museum collections or came from illegal collections acquired due to the looting of archaeological sites.

Several criminal cases evidenced its further functioning after the large-scale invasion in 2022, which revealed illegal collections of archaeological objects and antiques moved from Crimea to Ukraine. Their owners had fled the country at the time of the invasion, leaving most of their collections behind. The market continues to function, as can be seen from the criminal cases on antiques and archaeology collections confiscated at the border and archaeological objects seized by US customs from Ukraine.

The second market is directly related to the large-scale invasion. This illegal market was filled in the first half of 2022 with items taken from museums in the border regions, probably by people involved in their operation. Such items still "pop up" in European antique shops, where they can

⁸ https://zaxid.net/yak_rosiyani_znishhuyut_hersones_tavriyskiy_n1568258?fbclid=IwAR16Xj3rFbuMuo6Zg0lyKwwuX8Kf0_4WUbm66EE5KEEo-SIOxni36Vbnnik, https://culture.voicecrimea.com.ua/uk/arkheolohiia-nauka-pozapolitykoiu-i-voienni-zlochyny/?fbclid=IwAR16DzyCKcbYgLN04Rqo_dRD914IFA76Et7zRqHkuOWyYRbQT05i-janYRw

⁹ https://zaxid.net/statti_tag50974/

¹⁰ *Note.* Formerly the eparchy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate)

¹¹ <https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-ukraine-cultural-appropriation-artifacts-looted-war/32657653.html?fbclid=IwAR2HlopLGscFGDUyyLcubhmXf5m3vyUzqSKfo605yvLkUlalwRqm4CMfIyA>, <https://iananu.org.ua/novini/news2/1288-peremishchennya-kulturnikh-tsinnostej-pid-chas-vijni-i-faktor-okupovanogo-krimu?fbclid=IwAR1UsaHuY8NxMo2tVo1GERcvFG7mkuXv6diX-pOEZHbB6fU4df2FF4QDeYg>

be purchased for a small amount as a nice souvenir.

The third market is the most significant and dangerous due to the lack of direct access to the Russian-occupied territories, in particular, Crimea. Millions of movable cultural heritage objects exist in museums, research institutions, universities, archives, and libraries. Some of the objects came to the territory of Crimea after the occupation – these are collections stolen from museums in southern Ukraine and objects obtained as a result of archaeological excavations during the occupation. The Russian Federation has introduced a federal law allowing the registration of all cultural heritage objects related to Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions in a simplified mode without state expertise. These items can also be deregistered. Thus, there is now a complete lack of public control over cultural heritage collections not only from Ukraine or the world but also in Russia. This event coincided with a surge in the black market for archaeological, antique, and artistic items on online auctions.

The export of works of art from Crimean art galleries to allegedly temporary exhibitions in Russian cities is worth noting. This applies to Aivazovsky's works from his museum in Feodosia and paintings from the Kroshytsky Art Museum in Sevastopol. So far, none of the paintings illegally transferred to the territory of the Russian Federation have been returned to Crimea.

Under the guise of exhibitions and restorations, exposition objects and objects of special preservation are being removed from the National Reserve "Tauric Chersonese." Currently, exhibits from the times of antiquity and the Middle Ages have been taken to the Museum of the Novgorod Kremlin, and objects from the main fund of the Reserve are being prepared for transfer for so-called restoration¹².

In addition to its use in the creation of a new Russian ideology, the archaeological heritage in Crimea is being systematically destroyed by illegal excavations that are taking place in connection with the frantic pace of creating new military infrastructure, including defense structures and the construction of new strategic facilities¹³. The remaining archaeological projects result from the Russian corruption system, where those closer to the government trough can promote their project in the state program.

The Tavrida highway. Most of the violations occurred during the construction of the Tavrida highway of military-strategic significance, where most of the archaeological sites along its route were bulldozed without archaeological research. Only a small part was excavated by archaeologists. At the same time, these excavations cannot be called consistent with the methodology of scientific research; scientists barely had time to se-

¹² <http://vgosau.kiev.ua/novyny/arkheolohichna-spadshyna-na-okupovanykh-terytotiyakh/1351-vyvezennia-arkh-tsinnostei-khersones?fbclid=IwAR3WiiTLQ7VDEkknQ6bzt7jUt5XF6wIw92CSM59GI9JrYVS-LzaFeAMwJHvA>

<https://hromadske.radio/podcasts/my-ie-buly-y-budem-informatsiynny-maraton/rosiiany-vyvezut-vse-shcho-vstyhnut-arkheolohynia-pro-arkheolohichnyy-zapovidnyk-khersones-tavriyskyy>

¹³ <https://armyinform.com.ua/2023/08/15/fermery-na-tymchasovo-okupovanyh-terytoriyah-masovo-znosyat-kurgany-korystuyuchys-bezkarnisty-z-boku-rf/?fbclid=IwAR3BONbnwM4QI0hkOI5BJPc3MHvY54omZkMCGJpyevKcQOIVzvpkSQL0Lvq>

lect artifacts before the equipment arrived, and often, the leaders of expeditions and their parts were low-skilled workers from museums or even public organizations who had no experience in Crimea. The level of publication of research results in RAS publications is also low.

It is well known that archaeological excavations are a destructive method of researching a site. The practice of archaeological excavations in the civilized world is to keep archaeological sites out of construction zones as much as possible and to develop projects to avoid the possibility of archaeological sites getting into the areas of earthworks. An archaeological site, in the sense of world culture, is a kind of archive where information about the past is stored in its entirety, which is why it is protected in its entirety, including the things that fill it, without the possibility of extracting or moving them, including with the use of search equipment. By sticking a shovel into the ground, an archaeologist begins to destroy a monument. Therefore, the requirements for scientific archaeological research are incredibly high and include the maximum methods available during excavation for analyzing, recording, and describing the site, the excavation process, and the material. If the circumstances do not allow for a high-quality record of everything excavated, the site should not be excavated. The best way to preserve an archaeological site is to leave it in its natural state under the ground. That is why international law regulates the possibility of excavations in the context of armed conflict only if the site is inevitably being destroyed – it is threatened by processes that cannot be stopped. Construction is not such a process, so the entire length of the Tavrida highway is a chain of crimes committed by the Occupying Power against all the monuments that came across the

highway, regardless of whether they were excavated or not.

In the current situation, Russian museums and scientific institutions are seizing the moment to obtain new items for their collections and exhibitions and scientific evidence for research. This is a kind of scientific or museum looting.

In general, Russian scholars view excavations in Crimea as a source of income, and many do not disdain to plagiarize the work of other scholars without appropriate references to the source.

3. Creating a new Russian ideology based on the cultural heritage of Ukraine in Crimea

The situation with landscape transformations in Tauric Chersonese, where economic activity is incompatible with the status of the Reserve, is of the most significant concern. The monument is being used for mass events by placing a large, bulky stage with modern equipment for theatrical performances and rows of seats for spectators on the site of the Roman citadel; the building remains of which are associated with the presence of the military authorities of the Roman Empire in Taurica. The ancient landscape near the Zenon Tower was ruined for the same purpose, with the entrance group for the open-air theater being built. It is worth noting that this part of the Chersonese contains the oldest above-ground building remains of pre-Christian times, so covering them with temporary building structures looks like a deliberate act aimed at changing the historical and ideological significance of the Reserve. The unique ancient monument and its components are being gradually and indirectly replaced by a medieval one, which is likely to become the

basis for the idea of the “cradle of Russian Orthodoxy” in the future¹⁴.

Monument protection disaster is the activity of “clearing” from archaeological sites the area under the military units and the diving school located under the ancient defensive walls of Chersonese. Excavations there revealed a new suburban neighborhood in the protection and buffer zone of Tauric Chersonese. After the research, the area was required to be museumized and included in the protected area of the Chersonese settlement. Instead, the entire military base territory was allocated for constructing the so-called “New Chersonese” archaeological park. Currently, the unique remains of the Chersonese necropolis and the part of the suburbs are under construction.

The so-called restoration of the Bagzesaray Palace of the Crimean Khans belongs to the same violation category. Thus, Russians are trying to replace the real Crimean Tatar identity with a new concept, which at this stage looks like an idea loyal to the Russian authorities. The result is the unprofessional restoration of the Khan’s Palace, which led to its destruction and caused irreversible damage, likely due to specific corruption schemes in the use of funds allocated for the work by the occupation authorities.

Many sites are not being restored at all despite their critical condition. In particular, the southern bank’s isars (*note*. fortresses/fortifications), Genoese monuments, the Ozbek Han Mosque in the first capital of the khanate, Solkhat, and so on.

II. Demographic issues in Crimea and the problem of identifying target audiences¹⁵

The demographic situation in Crimea has been poorly studied, except for the demographic losses caused by deportations in the late 1940s and occasional publications. This is due to the peculiarities of working with sources (demographic statistics, particularly population censuses), the absence of a school of historical and demographic research, and the politicization of the problem. Over time, of course, attention shifted to issues related to the deportation and losses of Crimean Tatars.

Changes in the composition of the Crimean population after 1944 were studied by individual researchers, such as Petro Volvach and Elvira Seitova. Some documentary collections were published, but the focus remained on the deportations, return, and resettlement of Crimean Tatars. This is not a bad thing, but it only indicates the scale of work to be done by the Ukrainian and international academic societies in studying the Peninsula, its history, and cultural anthropology. We can only outline the ethnic composition of the Crimean population (see the data in the tables). Since both the memory and cultural policy towards Crimea depend on this, we will not specify ethnic issues in our recommendations regarding their priority, as this will become apparent only after de-occupation. However, general trends and tendencies can already be identified.

The general trends in the number and ethnic composition of the Crimean population are as follows:

¹⁴ <https://culture.voicecrimea.com.ua/uk/kam-iana-khersones-i-tavrijskyj-mohyla-rosijske-pole-chudes-naspadshchyni-iunesko/?fbclid=IwAR172ej0WWbZpYozOIBHYW5-KvX5uPv4BiauVNqcjAkD4H3gtNxWyv59RE>

¹⁵ The analytical report is based on all available open information sources on Crimea’s demography. Russian resources were used only as they contain official scientific data on demography, which still need to be challenged and are therefore also subject to analysis.

Table 1: Population and ethnic composition of Crimea (late 18th century - 2014)

Year	Population, <i>thsd. people</i>	Percentage, %			
		Crimean Tatars	Russians	Ukrainians	Other nationalities
60s-70s of the 18 th century	454.7	90.5	0.0	0.0	9.5
1793	127.8	87.8	5.0	0.7	6.5
1859	331.3	73.0	12.6	4.0	10.4
1897	546.7	35.6	33.1	11.8	19.5
1914	749.8	28.7	41.2	8.6	21.4
1926	713.8	25.1	42.2	10.8	21.8
1939	1126.4	19.4	49.6	13.7	17.3
1959	1201.5	0.0	71.4	22.3	6.3
1970	1813.5	0.1	67.3	13.7	6.1
1979	2135.9	0.5	68.4	26.6	5.5
1989	2430.5	1.6	67.0	25.8	5.6
2001	2401.2	10.2	60.4	24.0	5.4
2014	2284.8	10.2	65.3	15.1	9.4

Source: 60s-70s of the XVIII century and 1793 - Vodarsky Y.E., Eliseeva O.I., Kabuzan V.M. The Population of Crimea in the late 18th - late 20th centuries: Numerosity, Distribution, Ethnic Composition / Russian Academy of Sciences; Institute of Russian History. - Moscow, 2003; for the rest of the years - data from censuses and registers of the Russian Empire, the USSR, Ukraine, Russia, author's calculations.

(doi: <https://doi.org/10.15407/dse2017.02.011>)

Population of Crimea by years, *thsd. people*

1939	1126.4
1944, summer	379
1945, summer	633
1959	1 201.5
1989	2 430.5
2001	2401.2
2014, January 01	1967.2 (2.35 million in total with Sevastopol)
2014, October 01	1889.4
2016, January 01	1907.6
2020, January 01	1912.6 (3.11 million in total with Sevastopol)

1. Simplification of the ethnic spectrum through (a) expulsions and deportations of Italians, Germans, and Crimean Tatars; (b) the Holocaust and the Romani genocide; and (c) “acceptance” of the ethnicity of the titular nation (Russian) for benefits of everyday life.

2. The increase in the number of migrants due to resettlement after World War II, after the independence and return of the Crimean Tatars, after the occupation of the Peninsula, and thus the partial erosion of traditional culture, destruction, and destruction of historical heritage, while simultaneously imposing narratives and practices that are not typical of the Peninsula

3. Increasing dominance of the Russian ethnic group as a result of the policy of resettlement, deportation, and imposition of Russian identity

4. The process of increasing the proportion of Ukrainians, which took place during the last quarter of the 20th century and the first years of the 21st century, stopped in 2014 with the occupation of Crimea

Demographic data by period

1930s – 1944. During the 1930s, Ukrainians and, to a lesser extent, Russians fled to the territory of Crimea. People were fleeing collectivization, the Holodomor, and repression, recruited to work on Five-Year Plans. But the Great Terror also led to significant losses among certain ethnic groups in Crimea itself, such as Germans (about a tenth)¹⁶. A significant change occurred in the

late 1930s. In the 1939 All-Union census of Crimea, for the first time, Ukrainians were identified as a separate group – 154.1 thousand people (13.7% of the population) and became the third largest ethnic group (after Russians and Crimean Tatars)¹⁷.

The Second World War brought dramatic changes.

1941. Deportation of Germans by the Soviet authorities, the Holocaust

1942. Deportation of Italians

1944. Deportation of Crimean Tatars (194 thousand), Bulgarians, Armenians, Greeks, and Germans

1944–1946. Deportation of demobilized Tatars, Ostarbeiters repatriated from Germany and Austria in 1945, deportation of representatives of this nationality who served in the armed forces of Germany from Western Europe in 1945¹⁸.

So far, there is only one scientific study of the documents of the Holodomor period concerning Crimea, which only confirms the urgent need to study this period¹⁹.

1945–1954. The critical challenge of rebuilding Crimea, especially in the context of deportations, was the number of working-age people (2/5 of the pre-war level). Human resources became the “bottleneck” of Soviet reconstruction projects. The answer was found relatively quickly and entirely within the administrative tradition of the Soviet government – the resettlement of

citizens to Crimea, with varying, and often zero, degrees of voluntariness. On August 12, 1944, the State Defense Committee adopted a resolution (“On the Resettlement of Collective Farmers to the Regions of Crimea”), and the resettlement began.

In 1944, 62 000 peasants arrived from five Russian (Voronezh, Kursk, Orel, Tambov, and Rostov) and four Ukrainian (Kyiv, Vinnytsia, Zhytomyr, and Podillia) regions. The most significant number of farms were to be relocated from the Krasnodar Territory to the Alushta and Sudak districts and from the Stavropol Territory. 3 000 farms relocated from the Ukrainian SSR to the Kuibyshev district of Crimea. Along with collective farmers, the State Committee demanded that heads of collective farms and village councils, teachers, doctors, agronomists, zootechnicians, combine operators, and tractor drivers be relocated. The categories of people offered a change of residence were peasants and demobilized soldiers. Families were relocated, and the essential requirement was to have several working-age people in the family. The process was managed by the Resettlement Department under the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR and the Main Department for Organized Recruitment of Workers and Resettlement of Families under the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR in close cooperation with the Resettlement Department under the Council of People’s Commissars of the Crimean Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (from 1945). The most significant flow of IDPs was to Alushta, Belogorsk, Bakhchisaray, Balaklava,

Kuibyshev, Staro-Krym, Sudak, and Yalta districts. No relocation occurred in 6 districts (Krasnoperekopsk, Lenin, Pervomaisk, Razdolnensky, Saki, and Chornomorsky). Over time, the list of Russian regions from which resettlement was carried out expanded. In 1952, the list of Russian “donors” was supplemented, and along with the Voronezh and Ryazan regions, Kursk, Moscow, and Rostov regions were added. In total, 7 586 collective farms were relocated from Ukraine to Crimea between 1944 and 1953, while 21 294 farms were relocated from the Russian areas and 10 635 from the Chuvash Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic²⁰.

But it was a two-way traffic. The outflow of IDPs was also strong – due to difficult conditions, difficulties in adaptation, lack of housing, drinking water, etc. The aid promised during the resettlement was not allocated or was allocated with delay, and it was not enough. This is why the phenomenon of “turnover” (“obratnychstvo”) appeared. By the beginning of 1950, more than half (56.6%) of the migrants had left the inhospitable Crimea. Between 1950 and 1953, the situation improved slightly: 11 974 families moved to Crimea, while 3 071 families (26%) left²¹. (for additional information see the tables below)²².

The resettlement process continued in the following decades, but with less intensity and stress. However, with increasing effectiveness, living conditions on the Peninsula improved. Researchers estimate that there were over 100 000 working-age IDPs between 1944 and 1960. The actual number of IDPs was higher as families

¹⁶ <https://evnuir.vnu.edu.ua/bitstream/123456789/8942/1/omel.pdf>

¹⁷ Prior to that, Ukrainians were not identified as a separate ethnic group in Crimea. This does not mean that there were no Ukrainians in Crimea, but they were called Little Russians and were not distinguished as a separate ethnic group (*comment added at the personal request of the project manager – E.K.*)

¹⁸ <https://doi.org/10.15407/dse2017.02.011>

¹⁹ https://www.historians.in.ua/index.php/en/istoriya-i-pamyat-vazhki-pitannya/2559-martin-oleksandr-kislj-narativi-velikogo-golodu-poglyad-z-obokh-bokiv-perekopu?fbclid=iwar0qmw-dcw24ihoyjvalpflprjuu3dg0hokngzugowmc5xq-1liweq5p_y0

²⁰ DOI: 10.18500/1819-4907-2017-17-1-59-63

²¹ Seitova E. I. Post-war resettlement in Crimea: starting steps and first structural problems // <https://elibrary.ru/item.asp?id=36399563>

²² Дані станом на 1 серпня 1959

Years of settlement	Families (people) received	Families left
1944-1950	20956 (70955)	10900
1951-1955	13777 (50550)	2408
1956-1960	28853 (108112)	5528
In total from 1944 to 1960	63586 (229617)	18833

Name of regions	Families (people) received	People
Vinnitsia	540	2000
Volyn	195	724
Drohobych ²³	158	607
Zhytomyr	567	2160
Transcarpathian	136	498
Kyiv	272	984
Lviv	114	408
Poltava	525	1811
Rivne	221	862
Sumy	377	1371
Stanislaviv ²⁴	15	58
Ternopil	206	741
Khmelnitsky	563	2046
Chernihiv	199	700
Cherkasy	329	1186
Chernivtsi	126	440
Total	4543	16596
By internal regional resettlement	81	288
Total in the region	4624	16884

moved in groups²⁵. Estimates suggest that 468 000 arrived on the Peninsula between 1944 and 1967²⁶.

1954-1991. At that time, the Peninsula was being resettled. A significant change is that the government realized the need for systematic steps that would keep the IDPs in place. Measures are being taken to create the region's infrastructure – including housing, social, and industrial. Thus, IDPs would have more opportunities in

Crimea. For example, new housing was built (3-6 thousand houses per year in 1956-1959). The leading trend after the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine was the growth of the number of Ukrainians on the Peninsula. But we are talking only about absolute numbers. Compared to other ethnic groups, the situation was not so positive. The number of Russians on the Peninsula continues to grow. Thus, according to the 1970 census, Crimea has already become Ukraine's most

²³ Note. the former district of Ukraine in the southwestern Lviv region.

²⁴ Note. the old name for Ivano-Frankivsk region (till 1963)

²⁵ <https://evnuir.vnu.edu.ua/bitstream/123456789/8942/1/omel.pdf>

²⁶ http://history.org.ua/JournALL/kraj/kraj_2012_2/11.pdf

“Russian” region (67.2% of the total population). Ukrainians, by comparison, accounted for 26.5% of the population²⁷.

During this period, Crimean Tatar families gradually began to return from Central Asia. Of course, these were isolated cases and rather an exception to the rule, but they did happen²⁸. In the late 1980s, this process naturally intensified. In the last years of the USSR, attempts were made to implement programs to support them.

1991-2014. The demographic situation on the Peninsula during this period was similar to that of the rest of Ukraine. On March 07, 1991, the Verkhovna Rada of the USSR adopted a resolution to repeal the legislative acts of 1941-1968 but emphasized that their repeal should not lead to the infringement of the rights and legitimate interests of citizens living in the respective territories. The burden of restoring historical justice to the Crimean Tatar people was shifted to independent Ukraine.

The return of the Crimean Tatars to the Peninsula could not compensate for the losses caused by emigration, high mortality, and falling birth rates. In 2003-2013, the population of the ARC decreased by 20.6%. The population decline was remarkably rapid in the steppe region due to difficulties in re-profiling and adapting the region's economy to the conditions of a market economy. Thus, there was a decline in the number of rural residents in such districts as Pervomaisky, Nizhnohirsky, Leninsky, and Dzhankoysky²⁹. At the

same time, the population of Sevastopol and Simferopol, as well as resort regions, grew.

The critical process of this period was a decrease in the proportion of Ukrainians and an increase in the proportion of Russians and Crimean Tatars. It was a natural consequence of the de facto absence of a state demographic policy on the Peninsula.

2014-2022. After the annexation of the Peninsula, the occupation authorities pursued a policy of forcibly changing the population's demographic composition. These are measures aimed at encouraging the resettlement of Russian nationals to the Peninsula and the displacement of the existing loyal or neutral population (Ukrainians and Crimean Tatars) by Russian nationals. According to official Russian statistics, in 2020, migration growth in Sevastopol alone amounted to a record 184.7 people per 10 thousand population (in general, in Crimea as a whole, this figure is 21.2 people per 10 thousand population. For comparison, it amounted to 19.4 people per 10 thousand people in the Moscow region.

Data from the Ministry of Social Policy show that as of August 2021, 50 449 people received the status of internally displaced from the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol. However, the number of Ukrainian citizens who have left the Peninsula may reach 60 to 100 thousand people. At the same time, the number of

²⁷ <http://web.znu.edu.ua/pu/articles/79.pdf>

²⁸ 1972, November 3 - Information of the State Committee of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine on the arrival of Crimean Tatar families from the Uzbek SSR to the Crimean region as part of the planned resettlement Crimean Tatars, 1944-1994: Articles. Documents. Testimonies of eyewitnesses. - K.: Ridnyi Krai, 1995. - P. 180-181; Crimean Tatars, 1944-1994: Articles. Documents. Testimonies of eyewitnesses. - Kyiv: Native Land, 1995. - P. 202-203.

²⁹ https://ukrgeojournal.org.ua/sites/default/files/UGJ_2016_3_49-55.pdf

those who entered the Peninsula from the territory of the Russian Federation may reach 500 to 800 thousand people³⁰. Other estimates put the number at 800 thousand to 1 million³¹. However, official statistics may not show such rapid growth due to data concealment, visitors' reluctance to register, etc.

Preliminary conclusions on ethnic policy and reintegration challenges:

Violent and deliberate interference in demographic processes on the Peninsula and artificial changes in the ethnic, age, and gender composition of the population create severe problems for the future reintegration of Crimea into Ukraine. These are legal problems (issues of property, citizenship, tax residency, etc.), ideological and political problems (it was evident that the population loyal to the idea of Russian imperialism would not leave with the return of the Ukrainian state to the Peninsula, remaining a factor of military danger and political tension), social problems (issues of pension, medical and other support for the population that arrived during the occupation of the Peninsula). This will also create a precedent for manipulating sentiment and, accordingly, pose a threat to territorial integrity in the future (separatism will become a widespread phenomenon).

At the same time, given the lack of interest in relocating to Crimea among Ukrainians during the years of independence, it is likely that Ukrainians will choose European countries over Crimea. Most likely, the same problem will arise after de-occupation with Russian citizens who will remain

in Crimea, which could lead to a migration crisis in the European Union.

Section III: Countering the New Russian Ideology in Crimea and de-occupation Measures.

Future scientific research in the context of national memory, decolonization policy:

- History and culture of the indigenous peoples of Crimea
- History and culture of Ukrainians of Crimea
- Liquidation of the institutions of the Hetmanate, Zaporozhian Sich, and the Crimean Khanate, the colonization of Crimea, and the creation of the Russian colony "Novorossiia" at the end of the 18th and the first half of the 19th century.
- Mass resettlement of people in the USSR after liberation from Nazi occupation.
- Resettlement of peasants to Crimea after 1954.
- Crimea in World War II, national politics in Ukrainian Crimea from 1917 to the present.

These studies, together with public events and special cultural policy programs (exhibitions, memorials, museums, memorial sites) that will be developed based on the findings of scholars, should reach a target audience – all Crimeans and, more broadly, all citizens of Ukraine. It is crucial to create a high-quality public discourse that should form a public demand for a policy of decolonization using the developments of post-colonial theory. We propose this approach for

³⁰ <https://krymbezpravil.org.ua/ru/tematycheskye-obzor/zvit-za-rezultatamy-doslidzhennia-polityky-rosiyskoi-federatsii-shchodo-nasylnytskoi-zminy-demohrafichnoho-skladu-naselennia-okupovanoi-terytorii-krymskoho-pivostrova-rezume/>

³¹ https://www.blackseanews.net/files/crimean_library/UKR_Socio-Economic_Occupied_Crimea_2020_November_3th%20edition.pdf

historically multi-ethnic regions. It is softer than the decolonization course currently chosen in Ukraine. This, in turn, will cause less resistance from ethnic Russians, who will theoretically act as the conductors of the imperial idea in the de-occupied Crimea. It is essential not to alienate the part of ethnic Russians permanently residing in Crimea who oppose the imperial idea, to make their voice the leading voice of the Russian ethnic minority in the decolonization policy.

Democratization through culture. One of our goals is to explain to Crimeans what democracy is, to show the difference between what they hear now and what democracy is. Learn to take responsibility for your decisions, actions, and choices. One of the ways of presenting this information is the history of ancient democracy, the emergence of land ownership, private and public property, institutions of power, etc. It is crucial that in this way, the ancient Crimean history will be illustrated, the archeological and architectural sights will be involved, and the tourist and educational component will be involved.

History of religion. A case study on the history of religion, particularly early Christianity, is critical. This should refute the myth about Crimea – the cradle of Russian Orthodoxy and actualize the study of early Christian antiquities of Crimea, arouse interest in the study of written sources for the medieval history of Crimea and Christianity in Crimea, the study of ancient languages.

Policy of national memory. The tragedy of World War II. According to the history of the IISV, the project on the museumization of the Inkerman tunnels is already ready for implementation. It must provide complete information on the

tragedy of the defense of Sevastopol and show the actions of the Kremlin in 1942 as a war crime. There is very little research on the events of the Second World War in the east of Crimea, particularly on the Aji-Mushkai catacombs in Kerch.

Deportation of Crimean Tatars. The creation of a memorial to the deportation of Tatars from Crimea is a priority task after the de-occupation of Crimea. In addition to the central museum, there is a need to develop a map of destroyed Crimean settlements and places where their buildings are still preserved, with the creation of interactive tablets, which should contain all topographical and onomastic information. Such memorial sites should be linked into a single whole in the future memorial.

Policy of decommunization. Crimea is one of the regions where communist ideology is still prevalent. It is perceived as an alternative to both Russian nationalism and "ruscism" (*note*. Russian fascism) in its current version and also defines an alternative path for Russia, different from the imperial past. Crimean adherents of communism have a conglomerate of goals and moral principles in their heads. Still, the internal conflict between various left-wing currents of the Crimean public provides space for activity. It shifts the attention of Crimeans from quasi-utopian goals to the natural and urgent needs and tasks of communities.

Demography. Currently, there are practically no scientific studies on the demography of Crimea in the 20th century. Primarily the period from 1944 to 2014 (by district). The first thing necessary for further de-occupation plans is an analysis of the demographic composition of the

Crimea region and, later, the ARC in the second half of the 20th century. Such studies should provide information about potential target audiences in Crimea when we move away from the thesis about the leveling of ethnic identity among Crimeans during the last three generations. It is also essential to have a so-called public portrait of Crimeans to further determine their cultural needs through the prism of a leveled ethnic identity. This is also important for the development of nationality policy in Crimea and the prevention of inter-ethnic conflicts, which Russia will try to stir up.

Monuments. After the de-occupation, there is an urgent need to register, inspect, and restore monumental cultural heritage monuments that suffered from both unprofessional restoration or lack thereof during the occupation and damage during the military de-occupation. To fulfill this need, it is necessary to develop a training program for specialists in monitoring the condition of monuments during and after the de-occupation and training restorers for rescue work on such monuments. To monitor and conduct rescue research at archaeological sites, it is necessary to create a particular unit within the Armed Forces of Ukraine involving military personnel – archaeologists with a civilian specialty and civilian archaeological specialists with experience in the combat zone. Similar units are also needed to carry out security, monitoring, and evacuation measures in the combat zone for museums, reserves, archives, libraries, memorial sites, and other cultural heritage sites within the scope of both protocols of the Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in Time of Armed Conflict.

Organizations. To implement the de-occupation policy in the field of culture, it is necessary to create Crimean branches of the Institute of National Memory, NASU institutes of history of Ukraine, archaeology, ethnography, linguistics, oriental studies, and the National Agency for the Protection of Cultural Heritage. At the preparation stage, they can function as units within existing institutions.

Ways of implementation. Implementation of the proposed measures in preparation for de-occupation is planned through the mechanisms of the Mission of the President of Ukraine in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, the Ministry of Temporarily Occupied Territories, the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine, the Ministry of Social Policy, and the Ministry for Communities, Territories and Infrastructure Development of Ukraine (Ministry of Infrastructure). In the process and after de-occupation, the measures will be implemented through the military and military-civilian administrations, later through the territorial communities and local and central authorities.

Communication before, during, and after de-occupation. Before the de-occupation, it was planned to communicate with the Crimeans through the Internet and radio broadcasts for them to receive information about culture. Information will be disseminated via the Internet, radio and television broadcasts, and paper media during de-occupation. After de-occupation, communication will be carried out by all possible means of communication and telecommunications, as well as through social teachers, psychologists, other social workers, volunteers, civic activists, etc.

Section IV. Expected short-term results:
Cultural heritage:

1. To create a narrative of cultural policy in Crimea (e.g., Crimea is the gateway to European history, Crimea: the heritage of the Gerai, Trident unites, Crimea is the key to the Black Sea, Crimea is a territory of reserves, Crimea and the atavisms of empires, Crimea: in search of sources, Crimea: in the arms of the gentle sea, Crimea is the land of legends and heroes, etc.). To obtain demographic research results and divide the implementation of narratives and their sequence for different territorial units according to their national composition.

2. To start the process of restitution of cultural heritage objects, buildings, and property illegally expropriated by the Russian Federation on the territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

3. To conduct a state audit of all immovable and movable cultural heritage objects (museums, reserves, archives, libraries, archaeological and architectural monuments, landmarks, monumental art, collections of cultural heritage objects, single cultural heritage objects deposited [on the balance sheet] of local state organizations and authorities, etc.) regardless of ownership (state, municipal, private) after the de-occupation of the ARC and Sevastopol.

4. To create registers of all categories of cultural heritage objects based on the audit findings.

5. To create new plans for the management of cultural heritage sites (following the European understanding of cultural heritage, the norms of protection and use of cultural heritage sites adopted in the EU), and on their basis – staffing tables of institutions involved in the management

and preservation of cultural heritage, estimates, plans for the arrangement of museum, reserve, library and archive spaces, etc.

6. To create programs for digitalizing cultural heritage, a digital product must be made on the websites of institutions that preserve and use cultural heritage. The final product should not be just a digitized document but a database, digital catalog, 3D, Internet portal, and website creation. In other words, it is about creating a digital product ready for consumption, not just a digital copy of cultural property. The Ukrainian Cultural Foundation has implemented such projects for several years³².

7. To create a research component in the staffing of institutions that manage, preserve, and use cultural heritage, to return scientists to work in these institutions, to promote research by Ukrainian scientists on the cultural heritage of Crimea as a priority, provided that such research is carried out at the world scientific level.

8. To monitor the ties with Russian cultural institutions of organizations and institutions at the level of management and employees, regardless of their registration (in Russia and other countries), institutions founded by current or former citizens of the Russian Federation or their partners, sanctioned persons, etc.

9. To develop methodological materials and lists of cultural heritage monuments of the most significant value and at risk of destruction in de-occupation for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

National identity:

1. To develop special programs (live and virtual, including social networks) to preserve and support the national identity of all people

³² https://ucf.in.ua/m_lots/63c3e2b43bde1f6e4647eda6

historically living in Crimea. The notion of national identity includes language identity, genealogical research of their own families, creation of historical and local history societies under the auspices of the UINP at museums, libraries, and archives, religious confessions, arrangement of burial sites, installation of information plates about events and figures of national history, etc.

2. To develop a strategy for language policy in the de-occupied territories using Russian during the transition period and a gradual transition to Ukrainian by reducing the percentage of Russians in public space based on the experience of de-Russification in mainland Ukraine.

3. To forecast the effectiveness of transferring the population of Crimea from Russian as a language of interethnic communication to Ukrainian or English.

4. To identify the risks in case Russian remains the language of communication in Crimean communities. Develop a system of checks and balances and incorporate the Russian-speaking region into the cultural space of Ukraine through public and cultural space (the language of cultural products, scientific developments, the speech of advertising, the language of street signs, slang, etc.)

5. To develop a system of learning English and other EU languages for Crimeans based on Ukrainian philology through Ukrainian cultural and educational societies.

National memory:

1. To develop unique programs to preserve the national memory of Ukrainians, indigenous peoples of Ukraine, and national minorities of Ukraine historically residing in the AR of Crimea and Sevastopol. These programs should include the study of the deportation of the indigenous

people of Ukraine – the Crimean Tatars, as well as the processes that led to the leveling of the national identity of the indigenous peoples – the Karaites and Krymchaks; national minorities of Ukraine: Armenians, Bulgarians, Greeks, and Germans, as well as adjacent territories, the study of the historical experience of the defense of Sevastopol in all wars waged by the Russian Empire and the USSR, based on the facts of historical sources and relevant conclusions about the activities of the Russian and Soviet leadership of these campaigns. Particular attention should be paid to the study of the period of Crimean history from 1944 to 1953, from 2014 to the end of the occupation of Crimea, compared with the period from 1954 to 2014.

2. To create programs to digitalize sources of national memory.

3. To create a cultural product (films, photographs, exhibitions, festivals, competitions, video games, quests, online excursions, etc.) for the population of the occupied territories of the ARC and Sevastopol, which will provide trustworthy information about the historical events of the modern history of Crimea, as well as the history and culture of the Crimean population in ancient, medieval and contemporary times.

4. To develop a strategy for decolonization and decommunization of the de-occupied territories of Crimea, considering the transition period in conjunction with the stages of language policy.

V. Expected long-term results:

Formation of a multiethnic inclusive national cultural space in Crimea (*the State of Ukraine creates conditions for developing the culture of all peoples of Crimea as an inclusive cultural space*).

The basis for an inclusive national project could be the Peninsula's multiethnic past, which existed before Russian colonization in the 19th century and was destroyed during the first half of the 20th century (here we are talking not only about wartime deportations but also about the effects of the 1920s famine, the repressions of the 1930s, and the long-term consequences of Russian imperial policy in the 19th century).

Crimea's multiethnic past included Italians, Germans, Armenians, Karaites, Jews, Krymchaks, Ukrainians, Russians, and, of course, Crimean Tatars. The stories of coexistence and co-creation of the Crimean unique culture, traditions, and atmosphere can inspire and serve as a model for creating an open and comfortable Crimean space within Ukraine in the future.

All these people have left their cultural heritage in Crimea with tangible and intangible cultural values through a tolerant attitude, effective project management of cultural heritage sites, balanced cultural and memory policies, administrative measures and legislative initiatives, impartial scientific research, and cultural promotion, the goal and expected result can be achieved.

APPENDIX

Implementation of cultural policy through social work

It can be predicted that in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, the military and civil-military administrations of the regional and district levels will be the representatives of the authorities at the first stages of de-occupation and reintegration. It is unlikely that there

will be a sufficient number of local government representatives. Since there are no legal local governments on the territory of the occupied Crimea, the military and civil-military administrations will be established in all villages, towns, and cities, of which there are about a thousand on the Peninsula. It will involve the creation of nearly 1 000 administrations, which will be problematic in the face of a staff shortage.

According to experts³³, Ukraine should already reform local self-government at the community level in Crimea. For this purpose, in particular, it is necessary to amend the procedure for the voluntary unification of territorial communities to create united territorial communities in the ARC and Sevastopol by the relevant order of the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine before regaining complete control over the territory. A similar administrative-territorial reform at the district level was already carried out in 2020, when the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine No. 807-IX of July 17, 2020, which will come into force after de-occupation, established new districts in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

Theoretical and regulatory framework for social work in amalgamated territorial communities

There are two main approaches to social work: client-centered and problem-oriented. The basis of social work with a client (in our case, the community of settlements in the de-occupied territories and Crimea as a whole) is the technology of assessing the client's needs. Subsequently, measures are taken to assist in meeting individual

³³ <https://www.helsinki.org.ua/articles/plan-zakhodiv-z-realizatsii-stratehii-deokupatsii-ta-reintehratsii-krymu-shcho-zminylosia/>

basic needs and learning to self-organize their efforts in using or creating resources to meet the remaining requirements.

Combining the above approaches will produce a specific matrix of the most popular social services. The need for them will depend either on existing client requests or the results of a needs assessment and conviction of the need to use social assistance or services. Accordingly, a community that creates or preserves its socio-economic and socio-cultural potential through access to such services will be more attractive for living.

Areas and tools of social work in the de-occupied territories to overcome the consequences of occupation and challenges in the process of reintegration of TOT of the ARC and Sevastopol

The socio-cultural integration policy will be based on the quantitative and ethno-national composition of the TOT population at the time of de-occupation.

Given the traumatic consequences of the occupation, in addition to basic (crisis) types of social services, one of the leading technologies of social work to achieve the goals of the Project will be social animation as a way to activate the community, increase the level of involvement of its residents in solving critical issues.

According to the experience of social work in Europe and North America, social animation is considered a social and pedagogical activity aimed at implementing specific actions to improve the social climate of a particular environment, creating an atmosphere of creativity, helping people adapt to social change, facilitating their integration into the socio-cultural space,

encouraging interaction and understanding between people in a group. In the structure of social programs for personal development, the professional responsibilities of a social worker include animation (or leisure time organization), among whose functions are, in particular, educational and campaigning activities and involvement of the population in cultural events.

Projected actions of the military administrations and subordinate bodies

To implement the Project's objectives, the following steps can be proposed by the MA and MCA of the de-occupied territories of Crimea region in the social sphere to overcome the consequences of the occupation and challenges in the reintegration process:

1. Accounting and auditing of social and cultural institutions, drawing up acts on their readiness to provide social services.

Forms of activity:

- Order of the head of the MA-CMA or deputy head on humanitarian matters to initiate a working group.
- Development of audit documentation.
- Audit.
- Analysis of readiness to provide social services and issuance of assessment and recommendations for managers of institutions.

2. Certification of personnel of services and institutions and development of professional development plans to synchronize the social policy sphere.

Forms of activity:

- Order of the head of the CMA or deputy head on humanitarian matters on staff certification (methodological support – Ministry of Social

Policy), responsible institutional managers draw up a plan for professional improvement.

- Conduct training seminars and workshops for SMBs and NGOs with relevant experience.

3. Survey communities to draft ATCs' social passports as a basis for short- and medium-term social development programs.

Forms of activity:

- setting up working groups in communities to survey residents on the need for essential social services;
- methodological support to SMBs and NGOs in preparing a social passport for the ATCs,
- Stimulating public discussion of such a passport, including historical information about the local community and ethnic and religious groups.

4. Developing/raising resources for the community population's short- and medium-term social assistance programs; partner search (agreements, cooperation contracts); creating hubs for concentrating humanitarian aid.

Forms of activity:

- Order of the head of the MA-MCA on setting up working groups in ATCs to draft a short-term social development plan.
- Identify priority tasks for providing essential social services.
- Establish an information bank of potential partners.
- Set up communication with volunteer initiatives and NGOs.

5. Promoting the establishment and functioning of civil society organizations and self-organized groups of residents to solve local problems in the community.

Forms of activity:

- Dissemination of information on the initiative of the relevant structures of the MA

- Stimulation to participate in training programs such as the school of NGO leaders, training under the "School of Public Participation" program (Institute of Socio-cultural Management), and social business development program.

6. Dissemination in communities through digital and volunteer resources of advisory assistance and advocacy on ways and forms of organizing the information necessary for self-help/self-sufficiency.

Forms of activity:

- Order of the head of the MA-CMA to create official information channels of public communication with feedback;
- Dissemination of visual and infographic products on ways and means of obtaining social support, employment, and consultations on social issues.
- Promoting the participation of NGOs and CSOs in training community self-organization.
- Searching for and using local resources to create jobs and historical memory.

7. Promote and facilitate the organization of historical, cultural, and ethnographic events in communities on a parity basis to restore and create community traditions and demonstrate economic and socio-cultural potential.

Forms of activity:

- A letter from the head of the MA-CMA or the deputy head for humanitarian matters outlining the benefits and successful examples of organizing events in Ukrainian communities and recommendations for ATCs to participate in competitions for co-financing the organization of historical, cultural, and ethnographic events.

Indicators for measuring social (socio-cultural) services in ATCs:

- the number of socio-cultural institutions in ATCs.
- the number of people who used the services of socio-cultural institutions in ATCs.
- the number of events organized by socio-cultural institutions and public groups in ATCs.
- the number of people who participated in them. Number and quality of publications about
 - the events in the media and social networks.
 - the number of people who positively assessed their participation in such events.

Indicators for measuring the social capital of ATCs:

- the number of people who are members of associations and clubs of interest engaged in charity or volunteering;
- the number and development of CSOs and NGOs.

Cultural property protection in the context of mitigating the consequences of the occupation and challenges in the reintegration of TOT, in particular, the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol

As of 2014, the state registered more than 5 000 monuments of national and local significance on the territory of the Crimean Peninsula. In addition, 26 museums and 5 historical and cultural reserves are registered in the ARC and Sevastopol, which store museum objects and collections that are state property and belong to the state part of the Museum Fund of Ukraine. In addition to these, there were many private museums on the

Peninsula and an unaccounted-for number of private collections. As of January 01, 2014, the number of museum objects of the state part of the Museum Fund that remained in museum institutions located in the ARC and Sevastopol amounted to 1 247 360 objects; however, as of today, Ukraine does not have complete information on the number, location, and condition of both cultural property and immovable objects of cultural heritage located on the Crimean Peninsula.

Creating a showcase for the propaganda of colonial state policy and promoting the thesis of Crimea as an “original” and “integral” part of its territory, the Russian Federation has been conducting a large-scale campaign of illegal and economically unreasonable construction for 9 years, accompanied by an equally large-scale campaign of unlawful excavations of cultural heritage sites, destroying a large number of monuments. Most of the facts of destruction and/or damage to the objects of Ukraine’s tangible cultural heritage in Crimea by the Russian Federation are widely presented in open sources of information – media, official resources, and databases of the Russian government. In particular, there are numerous cases of destruction and damage to cultural and historical monuments under the guise of their “restoration” and “recovery” (the Palace of the Crimean Khans, the Ancient City of Tauric Chersonese and its Chora), illegal archaeological excavations, export of Ukrainian cultural property outside the Peninsula, and appropriation of cultural heritage and history.

By committing yet another crime against the cultural heritage of Ukraine, the Russian Federation openly ignores local opinion, violates international and national law, and, in some cases, its legislation.

Ukraine does not have access to this cultural heritage and scientific data about it, which deprives Ukraine as a state and the people who inhabit it of the right to cultural heritage and historical memory.

It should also be taken into account that the nature of the activities of the Russian occupation authorities in Crimea in the field of construction and illegal archaeological excavations has revealed a set of problems that demonstrate the imperfection of Ukrainian legislation and the structure of regulations, the system of administrative bodies regulating relations in the fields of construction and control in the protection of cultural heritage.

The scale of the destruction of cultural property through industrial activity, illegal exploration,

illegal activities of Russian-controlled institutions in Crimea, and hostilities in other occupied regions, in the context of de-occupation of the territories and post-war reconstruction, puts Ukraine in the position of facing the challenge of immediate reform of these areas.

Challenges identification.

National legislation is not harmonized with international law regarding protecting and preserving cultural property, particularly during armed conflict.

Ukraine is a party to several international treaties that contain provisions on the protection of cultural property, including those ratified by Ukraine:

International treaty	Entry into force for Ukraine
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954	06/02/1957
First Protocol of 1954 to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954	06/02/1957
Second Protocol of 1999 to the Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954	30/06/2020
Council of Europe Convention on Offenses Related to Cultural Property 2017	11/09/2017 (date of signing, no ratification)

The above treaties have yet to be fully ratified and integrated into national legislation. Practically, the situation is as follows:

A. There are no official Ukrainian translations of some of the above conventions (all except the 1999 Second Protocol), making it difficult for government agencies, lawyers, the military, representatives of cultural institutions, and other interested people to work on cultural property protection.

B. The terminology used in international treaties does not correlate with that used in national legislation (most international treaties aimed at protecting and preserving culture as such use the term “cultural property,” but not national legislation, which continues to use the terms “cultural heritage,” “national values,” which do not meet either the ratified international treaties or the challenges, needs, and demands of the national, including law enforcement, system, and create legal dissonance)

C. Some of these treaties contain norms that are mandatory for implementation in national legislation – notably, the 2017 Council of Europe Convention and some provisions of the 1999 Second Protocol – but Ukraine has not yet developed a draft law to harmonize national law with the norms of international treaties.

D. Draft laws to complete the process of Ukraine’s ratification of international treaties are passed from one agency to another without proper study, conclusions, or results, making it virtually impossible to apply them and does not ensure the necessary protection and respect for Ukraine’s culture.

According to the Office of the President of Ukraine, as of the end of 2022, the draft laws of Ukraine “On Ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on Unlawful Acts Related to Cultural Property” and “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine in Connection with the Ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on Unlawful Acts Related to Cultural Property” were processed by the Office of the President of Ukraine and returned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine for revision (letter No. 02-01/136 of 31.01.2022).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine informed the Office of the President of Ukraine that the package of documents necessary for the ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on Offenses Related to Cultural Property had been sent to the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine for finalization (letter No. 017/7128-02 of 02.02.2022).

With the war in Ukraine intensifying criminal activity on its territory, one of the activities of which

is the looting of archaeological sites and the illicit traffic of cultural property, a vast black market for antiquities from Ukraine has been formed. Given the scale of the looting and export of cultural property from Ukraine and the activities of the Russian Federation, which multiply the challenges, Ukraine’s ratification of the UNIDROIT Convention (Rome, June 24, 1995) to join the international legal framework for the restitution and return of cultural property between contracting states.

The UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Property applies to international requests: (a) for the restitution of stolen cultural property; (b) for the return of cultural property exported from the territory of a Contracting State in violation of its legislation governing the export of cultural property to protect its cultural heritage.

In Ukraine, there is a mismatch between the criminal law regulation of illicit trafficking in archaeological objects and the size of the illegal market.

No special criminal law provisions establish liability for the illegal appropriation, storage, and expropriation of archaeological cultural property. The sanctions of Articles 193 and 198 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine cannot become a reliable deterrent to such illegal activities.

It is necessary not only to increase liability for committing these offenses but also to provide qualifying features in these articles where the subject of unlawful encroachments is archaeological objects of historical, scientific, artistic, or cultural value. There is an urgent need to establish by law the signs under which the relevant socially dangerous act that causes significant damage to society and the state will be qualified as a serious crime.

National law enforcement agencies need more capacity and resources, including human resources, to investigate cases of violations against the cultural property of Ukraine: imperfect national legislation, lack of qualified professionals, lack of access to crime scenes, limited open-source materials, etc.

The lack of a register of the cultural heritage of Ukraine damaged and/or destroyed, or against which other violations of international and national law of Ukraine have been committed, as a result of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation since 2014.

There is a nominal list of Ukrainian cultural heritage sites that were destroyed or damaged after February 24, 2022, excluding sites in the occupied territories of the Crimean Peninsula, Donetsk, and Luhansk regions.

The data presented in this form is limited and incomplete for use in human rights activities. Focusing only on the episodes that occurred after the start of the full-scale invasion creates a false image of the nature of the Russian Federation’s activities since the beginning of the war in 2014 and helps the enemy’s attempts to separate the issue of Crimea from its activities in the rest of Ukraine.

In the sphere of economic relations arising in the process of implementing construction and urban planning policy at the state and local governments’ level, the research and protection of archaeological sites are not regulated.

The system of regulations governing construction lacks clear procedures to prevent the destruction of archaeological sites during construction. Property owners, engineers, and local governments responsible for permitting procedures often do not have reliable information relating to the location of archaeological sites during

construction, nor do they have a precise algorithm of how to act if they are found or discovered directly during construction.

The situation is complicated by the lack of a geoinformation component in the registers of cultural heritage sites, their incompleteness, the lack of capable control bodies in the construction field, and the large scale of the black market for cultural property in Ukraine.

In turn, controlling bodies in cultural heritage protection sometimes cannot perform their functions due to territorial remoteness or insufficient support from local authorities, within whose powers they currently perform their functions, or institutionally, when they are not established or exist only formally.

The scale of the destruction of archaeological heritage in Crimea, during construction work and other economic activities of the occupation administration related to land works, and the organization of illegal archaeological expeditions is commensurate with the volume of its destruction as a result of military operations and “black excavations” in Ukraine in general. However, the problems that arise in the context of economic activity and “black excavators” will not disappear after the war and will continue to grow. In the process of de-occupation and post-war reconstruction, due to imperfect legislation, the lack of a transparent vertical of authority and responsibility, and the lack of reliable and qualified human resources in the fields of cultural heritage and urban planning, Ukraine may create the basis for further destruction of the cultural heritage of Ukraine in Crimea on a large scale.

The issue of protection and preservation of the cultural heritage of Ukraine as such is not one of the main issues on the agenda of Ukraine, which is a strategic mistake in the context of how much

this area affects the formation of national identity.

The activities of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy in the field of cultural heritage could be more effective and consistent due to the lack of understanding of the importance of this topic in Ukraine and the combination of policy-making and control functions in the Ministry.

At present, there is no strategy for the development, protection, and support of Ukrainian culture, in particular because of the ongoing armed conflict.

RECOMMENDATIONS ON THE CULTURAL POLICY OF UKRAINE

Recommendations to the State Authorities of Ukraine

The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine, together with the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the Ministry of Community, Territorial and Infrastructure Development of Ukraine, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, should develop and submit to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

To the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

To introduce and approve amendments to the national legislation of Ukraine:

1. Draft law amending the provisions of the Law of Ukraine “On Cultural Heritage,” in particular Article 1, which contains definitions of “cultural heritage,” “cultural heritage site,” “movable cultural heritage objects,” and “immovable cultural heritage objects” under international law, in particular the provisions of the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural

Heritage, the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, and the 2005 Council of Europe Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society,

2. Draft law on the intangible cultural heritage of Ukraine and its protection based on the 2003 UNESCO Convention for the Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage ratified by Ukraine.

3. Draft law on amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Protection of Archaeological Heritage,” in particular:

a/ To supplement Article 1 of the Law with the definition of “archaeological object” as a type of cultural property, following the Law “On the Export, Import, and Return of Cultural Property,”

b/ To supplement the definition of “archaeological heritage” in Article 1 of this Law with the words: “archaeological heritage belongs to the people of Ukraine and cannot be owned by individuals,”

c/ To define in the Law that objects in the possession of private individuals and not submitted for registration within the established period by the Procedure for State Registration of Archaeological Heritage are considered illegally acquired and are subject to seizure and transfer to the state part of the Museum Fund of Ukraine.

4. To establish a ban on the sale of archaeological objects via the Internet and the provision of any other online services related to such sales.

5. To establish criminal liability for selling archaeological objects via the Internet and providing any other online services related to such sales.

6. To make amendments to the Laws of Ukraine “On Protection of Archaeological Heritage,” “On Regulation of Urban Development” (to the “Urban Development Code” if adopted), to

the Land and Water Codes of Ukraine, in particular: to establish the concept of “archaeological expertise” by initiating and developing a relevant draft law on amendments to the above acts.

7. To initiate discussions to create a mechanism for combating the illicit trafficking of archaeological objects in the expert, scientific, and public spheres and to involve the deputy corps in these activities.

Based on the results of this work, formulate a package of amendments to legislation and other regulations and submit these proposals to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

To the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, the President of Ukraine, and the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine.

Introduce and approve the following amendments to the Criminal Code of Ukraine:

1. To supplement the Code with a new section on “Offenses against objects of the cultural heritage of Ukraine,” introducing liability for the destruction, damage, theft of objects of cultural significance, appropriation or seizure of objects, their smuggling, and offenses against intangible objects of the cultural heritage of Ukraine. This section should align with and not contradict international treaties on protecting and preserving cultural property, which Ukraine has agreed to.”

2. To determine in Articles 178b, 193, 201, 298, 298(1) that crimes related to offenses against cultural heritage objects, misappropriation of cultural property that belongs or should belong to the state, have no statute of limitations for bringing to criminal liability.

3. To establish liability for failure to return cultural property transferred outside Ukraine,

including archaeological property, the export of which was authorized under the procedure provided for by the national law of Ukraine by adding a new article to Section VI, “Criminal Offenses Against Property”.

4. To increase criminal liability for conducting illegal search operations at an archaeological heritage site, destruction, destruction or damage to cultural heritage sites, and such actions committed with the use of excavators or other heavy equipment and mechanisms that do not comply with current methods of conducting archaeological research at archaeological heritage sites by amending Article 298.

5. To replace “looting of national property” with “any form of misappropriation of property, including objects of the cultural and archaeological heritage of Ukraine, in the event of armed conflict” by amending Article 438.

To the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine, the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, and the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.

To finalize the ratification process of international treaties and their implementation and harmonization with national legislation.

More specifically:

1. To submit to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, as soon as possible, finalized proposals for the text of the draft laws, explanatory notes to them, other necessary supporting documents under national law, and official translations of the texts of the treaties as part of the development of the draft laws “On Ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on Unlawful Acts Related to Cultural Property” and “On Amendments to

Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine in Connection with the Ratification of the Council of Europe Convention on Unlawful Acts Related to Cultural Property.”

2. To initiate the consultations on ratifying the UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Property (Rome, June 24, 1995).

3. To translate and publish on the official website of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine as soon as possible the official translations of the texts of the following international treaties ratified by Ukraine:

a/ The 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict.

b/ The 1954 First Protocol to the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.

To the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine

To introduce changes to the work of certain executive bodies of state and local authorities, whose competence includes issues related to culture and information policy

1. To create a separate body (agency) to control the implementation of cultural property protection policy.

a/ To remove from the list of competencies of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine and local self-government bodies the sphere of control over activities in the field of cultural property protection by creating a separate controlling body subordinated to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, to make appropriate amendments to the laws of Ukraine in such a way as to separate the powers to formulate cultural property protection policy and control its implementation.

b/ Such a controlling body, subordinate to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine, should have

structural units on a territorial basis, including in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol, which will operate independently of local governments. Thus, local self-government bodies, the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine, the state authority of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, and the city of Sevastopol responsible for forming and implementing cultural policy retain the power to formulate cultural property protection policy. Still, they are exempt from the need to exercise control. The newly formed cultural property control bodies become institutionally stable and are independent of the influence of local policy and its capacity in this area.

c/ Such a body supervises permitting procedures in urban planning and land policy to protect immovable cultural heritage, determines the need for archaeological expertise, controls archaeological and prospecting work, and the procedure for keeping state records of the Museum Fund of Ukraine.

d/ Such a supervisory body should monitor the condition of immovable cultural heritage in coordination with scientific institutions and in the interests of investigating crimes against cultural heritage, in particular those committed by Russian-controlled organizations during the occupation of the Crimean Peninsula.

e/ Such a supervisory body is a member of advisory bodies to the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine and local governments involved in the formation of cultural heritage policy; supervises protected areas, cultural heritage sites, and compliance with their protection zones; conducts scheduled and unscheduled inspections of these sites; coordinates its activities with law enforcement agencies and the construction control service.

f/ The tasks of such a control body include monitoring to investigate crimes against cultural heritage, in particular those committed by administrations/organizations controlled by the Russian Federation during the temporary occupation of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the city of Sevastopol.

g/ The cultural heritage control body shall establish inspection structural units that carry out patrols on a territorial basis to protect immovable cultural heritage monuments located outside settlements. Employees of such structural units should have the right to check documents for the right to conduct archaeological and prospecting works, suspend or terminate issued permits for their conduct, bring persons committing offenses in the field of cultural heritage to the National Police, seize unique means with which such activities are carried out, take photographs, sound recording and video recording as additional measures to prevent and detect violations, draw up protocols on administrative and criminal violations.

2. To reform the entire structure of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine.

To reorganize the structure of the MCIP in such a way as to ensure the effective operation of the apparatus, transparency of subordination, and reporting (both internal and external). The ICIP should formulate and implement state policy in the field of culture, language, religion, and information, as well as ensure the preservation and enhancement of the cultural heritage of Ukraine, promote the development of cultural and creative industries, in particular through education and cultural initiatives, active involvement of society in such activities, establish and strengthen ties in the field of cultural policy between competent

and other interested state and local authorities, promote digital cultural content and services in the territory of Ukraine. The power to control activities related to cultural property protection should be transferred to a separate body accountable to the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine. The MCIP should contribute to the definition and effective implementation of Ukraine’s external cultural and information activities and activities related to Ukrainian institutions abroad.

The Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine.

Amend certain activities and regulations of executive authorities and their structural units:

1. To ensure the openness and transparency of the work of the MCIP, publication of work plans and reports (monthly, quarterly, semi-annual, and annual) on their implementation in the public domain.

2. To ensure that the information posted on the official website of the MCIP concerning its work, its results, and the regulatory framework of its activities is constantly updated.

3. To amend the Regulation on the Museum Fund of Ukraine (the Regulation) and the Instruction on the organization of accounting of museum objects, in particular, by providing detailed procedures for state accounting of archaeological objects, both those transferred to the Museum Fund of Ukraine by private individuals, those found by chance and removed from illegal storage, to determine the time limits within which such objects should be submitted for registration.

4. Following the Regulations of the MCIP, to provide for the functioning of a single general electronic interagency register of cultural property of historical, archaeological, and artistic

value, which the relevant cultural and scientific institutions should fill in. The database of this register should contain categories used in the museum accounting of cultural property and the activities of law enforcement agencies and cultural heritage protection bodies.

5. To introduce a register of immovable cultural heritage of Ukraine similar to the register of cultural property. It should be an open interactive platform created in conjunction with a geographic information system linked to the land cadaster of Ukraine and data from urban planning cadasters of settlements or as part of a national urban planning cadaster. The register should contain categories of data in the records of immovable cultural heritage objects, their significance as cultural or historical value, status (monument of national or local importance, UNESCO monument, memorial site), its condition before the moment of destruction or damage as a result of the armed aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine since 2014, the circumstances of such destruction and damage (date, time, perpetrators, means of committing the offense, etc.), national and international law, including humanitarian law, relating to the obligations of the Occupying Power. The register should be linked to the data of the unified state electronic system in the field of construction, should be easy to use, state and local authorities exercising powers in the field of urban planning, construction control, cultural heritage control bodies, law enforcement agencies, private institutions and individuals engaged in the restoration and research of immovable cultural heritage objects, in the field of urban planning and land use.

6. To create a register of lost cultural property, those owned by other states, property that was lost or disappeared due to various historical

events, and property that was stolen and exported illegally, the location and form of ownership of which can potentially be established, which can be returned to Ukraine through the acquisition or exchange of museum collections with other countries, and as a result of criminal investigation and confiscation within the framework of the work of Ukrainian and international law enforcement agencies. Such a register should be created by analogy with the register of cultural property, with a similar set of data on objects.

7. Provide data from the registers identified in paragraphs 2-3 below to the competent law enforcement agencies, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, and other state authorities of Ukraine to bring to justice, implement the principle of inevitability of punishment, and create a basis for further restoration, compensation and return of stolen property.

8. To introduce a specialized section on the Ministry's official website dedicated to implementing the policy to protect Ukraine's cultural heritage in the ARC and Sevastopol.

9. Together with the Ministry of Justice of Ukraine, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, law enforcement agencies of Ukraine, in particular the Prosecutor's Office of Ukraine, and other state authorities, to carry out constant monitoring, recording, and periodic informing, in particular to the public, of any illegal transfer of Ukrainian cultural property by the authorities of the Russian Federation, the route of such property, those involved in such transfer and their actual location. All identified valuables and information about them should be entered into the relevant electronic interagency register and shared with international partners (until separate control bodies are established in the field of cultural heri-

tage protection, and these functions should be transferred to them).

10. To create, jointly with the law enforcement agencies of Ukraine, a separate register of individuals responsible for committing offenses against Ukraine's cultural property. To submit to the Government of Ukraine a list of such persons for their further inclusion in the sanctions list or imposition of other disciplinary and legal sanctions (until the establishment of separate control bodies in the field of cultural heritage protection, these functions should be transferred to them).

11. To establish sustainable, direct mechanisms for financing archaeological expeditions, including those engaged in rescue archaeological work, the need arises due to criminal acts of persons that have led to damage or destruction of an archaeological site and due to natural processes, that change the landscape.

Institute of Archeology of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, together with the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine and the Ministry of Community, Territorial, and Infrastructure Development of Ukraine.

To implement the relevant measures under the Ukrainian legislation:

1. To draft and publish a "Procedure for conducting an archaeological expertise" based on the proposed amendments to the legislation on "archaeological expertise" and the provisions of the above acts as a mandatory procedure preceding the drafting and approval of urban planning documentation.

2. To update the relevant instructions for responding in the event of an emergency or armed conflict in Ukraine.

Centres permanently containing monuments (museums, galleries, archives, libraries, reserves, research institutes, etc.) under the support of the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine:

1. To establish an institutional capacity to ensure the digitization of collections on an ongoing basis.

2. To create mechanisms for rapid response in an emergency or armed conflict following the First and Second Protocols of the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict.

The Prosecutor General of Ukraine, regional prosecutor's offices, the National Police of Ukraine, the Security Service of Ukraine, the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, and the State Customs Service of Ukraine:

1. To strengthen the institutional capacity of law enforcement agencies, to improve the competency of the State Customs Service and the State Border Guard Service in dealing with cultural property objects to more effectively search for and return stolen property, to counter the looting and destruction of cultural objects in Ukraine, and to prevent smuggling of cultural property.

2. To establish a structural unit within the Prosecutor General of Ukraine specialized in crimes against the cultural heritage of Ukraine.

SUGGESTED PROCEDURE FOR IMPLEMENTING THE ACTIONS ENVISAGED IN THIS SECTION OF THE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall finalize the ratification of international treaties on the

protection and preservation of cultural heritage and initiate consultations on the ratification of the UNIDROIT Convention.

2. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall legislatively introduce terminology in the current Ukrainian legislation to be further defined in national legal acts: bring it into line with and resolve discrepancies with international law, in particular, the Laws of Ukraine “On Protection of Archaeological Heritage,” “On Protection of Cultural Heritage,” “On Export, Import, and Return of Cultural Property.”

3. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall amend the Criminal Code of Ukraine to tighten responsibility for the crimes against cultural heritage and shall clarify the differences in the interpretation of terms in the Criminal Code of Ukraine, legislation on the protection of cultural heritage, and international humanitarian law.

4. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall consider the recommendations and amend the Law of Ukraine “On Museum Affairs” and, according to the above amendments, shall task the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine to update the “Regulations on the Museum Fund of Ukraine” and “Instructions for Organizing the Accounting of Museum Objects” by establishing procedures for digitalizing the accounting of cultural heritage.

5. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall introduce and adopt amendments to the Laws of Ukraine

“On Protection of Archaeological Heritage” and “On Regulation of Urban Development,” defining the concept of “archaeological expertise” as a mandatory stage in the development and approval of draft urban planning documentation.

6. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine shall introduce and adopt amendments to the Law of Ukraine “On Protection of Cultural Heritage,” differentiating the sphere of control and policy implementation; the Cabinet of Ministers shall further establish the necessary supervisory authority and reform the structure of the Ministry of Culture.

7. Verkhovna Rada Committee on Humanitarian and Information Policy and the Ministry of Culture and Information Policy of Ukraine shall develop a mechanism to combat the illicit trafficking of archaeological objects and submit to the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine draft amendments to the current legislation of Ukraine.

POSTFACE

In the context of the cultural heritage in the occupied territories, the actual status of the national memory policy and national consciousness in the occupied Crimea, the ethnic, demographic, and cultural policy in Crimea over the past three generations, i.e., 75 years, and the review of the current Ukrainian legislation on cultural heritage, one

of the key findings of the analysis is that there is a general trend of unchanged state policy of Ukraine in each of these spheres, not only for the occupied Crimea but also for the non-occupied territories of Ukraine. As Ukraine begins negotiations on its accession to the European Union, the urgency of reforms in the cultural property management and protection sphere and the implementation of international law into Ukrainian legislation is even more acute.

Reforming the cultural sphere, developing demographic and migration policies, strengthening the role of civil society, and introducing a system of state support for their functioning are all components of cultural and memory policy and national identity. These transformations are necessary for forming a pro-European space in Ukraine; in another case, the de-occupation of the territories may become a new conflict, which might lead to a new world crisis beyond anything we have ever experienced, threatening the very existence of Ukraine as a state and not only it.

Thus, it is necessary to launch the above reforms as soon as possible.

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RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE STATE AUTHORITIES OF UKRAINE REGARDING OVERCOMING THE CONSEQUENCES OF OCCUPATION AND CHALLENGES IN THE PROCESS OF REINTEGRATION OF THE TOT OF THE AUTONOMOUS REPUBLIC OF CRIMEA AND THE CITY OF SEVASTOPOL ON THE USE OF TERMS RELATED TO COLLABORATIONISM

Andrii Shchekun, Yurii Smelyanski

Without the support of Ukrainian citizens, who at the beginning of the occupation were in one way or another embedded in both state and regional socio-political, economic, informational, educational and other systems, thus, having the means of influencing the public opinion of those living in Crimea or other parts of the now temporarily occupied territories (TOT), the actions of the occupiers would not have succeeded or would at least have been very difficult. The truth is that the establishment, strengthening and functioning of the occupation regime would not have been possible without the help of the locals.

In that respect, the de-occupation of Ukrainian territories, especially those that have been under occupation for a long time, requires the realization of two major tasks:

1. Restoration of justice in a shape or form deemed fair by the public towards those engaged in collaboration during the war and occupation.
2. Ensuring long-term national security in view of the possibility of overt and covert collaborators continuing assisting aggressors throughout Ukraine, in particular, in the de-occupied territories.

To that end, one of the key strategic national security tasks is to minimize the collaborators' capacity to act in favor of the aggressor.

At present, the Criminal Code of Ukraine provides a general definition of collaborationism. However, it's so vague that under it, almost any citizen of Ukraine can be easily accused of collaborationism, not to mention that such approach would exacerbate the already acute problem of staff shortage in the de-occupied territories.

Collaborationism is a multidimensional phenomenon, and without a clear definition of its types and manifestations, restoration of justice and ensuring a successful state reintegration policy in the TOT becomes impossible.

Given the importance and pertinence of the issue, experts recommend implementing the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine (VRU) «On Recommendations of the Parliamentary Hearings on the Subject: «Strategy of Reintegration into Ukraine of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol: Problematic Issues, Ways, Methods and Means,» approved on September 22, 2016, that (item 2, subitem 1) of paragraph 3) says: «to adopt the Law of Ukraine «On Collaborationism and

Authorities Purge (Lustration) in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol.»

The public has repeatedly emphasized the need to implement the aforementioned resolution that is a well-argued necessity and an important fundamental document in the formation and implementation of Ukraine's state policy on the TOT de-occupation and reintegration.

Based on the above, our recommendations are as follows:

I) To the VRU and its committees – to develop and adopt the Law of Ukraine «On Collaborationism and Authorities

II) Purge (Lustration) in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol» pursuant to item 2, subitem 1) of paragraph 3 of the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine «On Recommendations of the Parliamentary Hearings on the Subject: «Strategy of Reintegration into Ukraine of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol: Problematic Issues, Ways, Methods and Means,» adopted on September 22, 2016;

III) To the President of Ukraine and the Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine – to ensure the implementation of item 2, subitem 1) of paragraph 3 of the Resolution of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine «On Recommendations of the Parliamentary Hearings on the Subject: «Strategy of Reintegration into Ukraine of the Temporarily Occupied Territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol: Problematic Issues, Ways, Methods and Means,» adopted on September 22, 2016;

Taking into account the recommendations of the expert community, in accordance with the

already existing Resolution of the VRU, we suggest to consider the issue of new relevant terms and definitions in the future legislation of Ukraine, that we hope will be developed and adopted in the near future.

In relation to the draft Law of Ukraine «On Collaborationism and Authorities Purge (Lustration) in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol» we propose the following terms and definitions in the field of humanitarian policy:

1. Educational collaborationism – voluntary holding of leadership positions in educational institutions in the TOT of Ukraine and areas of the Russian Federation; destruction/participation in the destruction of Ukrainian books, educational materials and visual aids; organization, conduct and participation in educational activities aimed at militarizing and affecting the minds of students, persuading them to support the occupying state of the Russian Federation, approve of the war against Ukraine and be ready to participate in it on the side of the aggressor state of the Russian Federation; public statements in support of the occupation of the territory of Ukraine; propaganda and interpretations in favor of the occupying state, including calls and advocacy for enlistment in the Armed Forces and other units of the aggressor state of the Russian Federation; public approval of the war against Ukraine and calls for the destruction of the state of Ukraine and its citizens.

2. Scientific collaborationism:

• voluntary transfer of the results of scientific research and development to the occupation administration of the Russian Federation; participation in Russian scientific projects and scientific

projects funded or co-funded by the Russian side; participation in scientific and/or scientific-practical conferences, symposia, round tables and other events to discuss or exchange scientific achievements, technological developments, etc. held on the territory of the aggressor state, in the occupied territories of Ukraine, video conferences, etc., including those financed or co-financed by the Russian side, and publication of scientific articles and other materials based on the results of scientific research in Russian publications or those financed in whole or in part by the Russian side

• voluntary holding of leadership positions at scientific institutions in the TOT of Ukraine; public statements supporting the occupation of the territory of Ukraine by the Russian Federation; propaganda and interpretations in favor of the occupying state, including calls and advocacy for enlistment in the Armed Forces and other units of the aggressor state of the Russian Federation; public approval of the war against Ukraine and calls for the destruction of the state of Ukraine and its citizens.

3. Religious collaborationism – voluntary agreement to redirect the activities of a religious community and its leader in favor of the occupation administration of the Russian Federation; actions taken by a religious organization/community and spiritual leaders to facilitate the occupation of the sovereign territory of the state of Ukraine and establishment and operation of the occupation regime of the Russian Federation. Organization of aid collection and calls for aid in religious communities, among believers and other social groups for the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and other socio-political structures of the aggressor state; public approval of the war

against Ukraine; calls for the destruction of Ukraine and its citizens who are waging war against Ukraine and psychological support and ideological encouragement of people to wage war against Ukraine, kill Ukrainian citizens and participate in war crimes on the territory of Ukraine.

4. Information collaborationism – voluntary leadership and starting and ensuring operation of mass media in the TOT of Ukraine that serve as propaganda of the Russian Federation; cooperation with the occupation administration of the Russian Federation in the information field; participation in the formation of anti-state narratives aimed at shaping the perception by citizens living in the TOT and elsewhere of Ukraine and its policies as hostile and inhuman towards the TOT residents; participation in propaganda and promotion of the ideas of the «Russian world» in the media; creation and dissemination of the information propaganda content and advocacy for enlisting in the armed forces of the Russian Federation and other socio-political structures of the aggressor state; public approval of the war against Ukraine; calls for the destruction of the sovereignty, territorial integrity of Ukraine and its citizens; calls for violence and incitement to ethnic hatred.

5. Cultural collaborationism – voluntary consent and cooperation of a citizen of Ukraine and his/her actions aimed at assisting the occupation administration of the Russian Federation in the TOT of Ukraine in the field of culture, that results in the destruction of the tangible and intangible cultural heritage and the system of cultural values of the Ukrainian political nation; voluntary holding of leadership positions at cultural institutions in

the TOT of Ukraine and territories of the Russian Federation; public statements in support of the occupation of Ukraine; propaganda and interpretations in favor of the occupying state, including calls and advocacy for enlistment in the Armed Forces and other units of the aggressor state of the Russian Federation; public approval of the war against Ukraine and calls for the destruction of the state of Ukraine and its citizens.

Actions aimed at assisting the occupation administration of the Russian Federation in the destruction of the culture and value system of the Ukrainian political nation include the expropriation of movable exhibits of cultural heritage from museums and exhibition complexes in the TOT of Ukraine and museums and exhibition complexes in other states where they were displayed, including private collections, and transfer of exhibits of

cultural heritage from the TOT of Ukraine to other territories belonging to or associated with the aggressor state; preparation and conduct of repair and/or restoration works on cultural heritage sites in the TOT of Ukraine that lead to the total or partial destruction of those sites and of their historical value; change of the designated purpose of the areas where cultural heritage sites are located; archaeological digs; actions that restrict the free functioning of the Ukrainian language and indigenous languages in Ukraine; changing the repertoire of theaters in the temporarily occupied territories of Ukraine as a tool for spreading the values of the «Russian world»; prohibition and implementation of bans or voluntary refusal to distribute and/or show Ukrainian-made films in the TOT of Ukraine; illegal export of cultural property outside the TOT of Ukraine and destruction of Ukrainian national identity.