Russia is attempting to frame Ukraine as a terrorist state by accusing it of attacks on Russian energy facilities

One of the elements of the Russian-Ukrainian war is hybrid warfare, in which informational narratives carry no less weight than combat operations. Around key events — the 14th St. Petersburg International Gas Forum (SPIGF, October 7–10, 2025) and the All-Russian Forum on the Protection of Civilian Facilities from Unmanned System Attacks (October 7–9, 2025, St. Petersburg) — Russian propaganda campaigns have intensified. Public discussions are attempting to shape the image of Ukraine as an aggressor and even a “terrorist state.” Particularly harsh accusations concern strikes by the Armed Forces of Ukraine against Russian energy facilities (especially gas transportation infrastructure) and the alleged “provocation of an energy crisis in the EU.” At the same time, messages are being spread about the “cruelty of the Kyiv regime,” drone attacks on civilian facilities, and acts of sabotage — a typical set of “hybrid” accusations.

An analysis of official statements and unofficial Telegram channels indicates a coordinated information campaign. Official sources (the Russian Foreign Ministry, Ministry of Defense, State Duma) and Kremlin media outlets (TASS, RIA Novosti, Lenta.ru, Tsargrad, etc.) systematically disseminate claims that the “criminal Kyiv regime” has resumed strikes on Russian gas and energy facilities. Emphasis is placed on the importance of these facilities for Europe’s energy supply, while anxiety and concern about the EU’s energy security are deliberately intensified. At the same time, within Russia’s domestic information space, the image of Ukraine as a “terrorist state” is being promoted, allegedly using mysterious “call centers” to spread terror abroad. Propaganda Telegram channels and regional media outlets (for example, the occupation-run publication “Donetsk Media”) actively circulate sensational “news” about “Ukrainian intelligence services recruiting terrorists for attacks in Russia.” In parallel, narratives about “Ukrainian drone terrorist attacks” harming the Russian population are being amplified (for example, statements by the governor of Russia’s Kursk region about the killing of a woman in a Russian village by a Ukrainian FPV drone), allegedly “accompanied by cooperation with global terrorism.”

The campaign also retrospectively links new events to older narratives. For example, references are made to the Trump–Putin agreement of March 18, 2025, after which there was officially supposed to be a “moratorium” on strikes against energy infrastructure. Russian sources claim that Ukraine “buried the hatchet of energy peace” immediately after this agreement by attacking the Sudzha gas metering station (GIS “Sudzha”).

Example of the “Sudzha scenario”. In February–March 2025, Russia lost its gas transit agreement through Gazprom, after which the “Sudzha” pipeline (from Russia’s Kursk region) remained the main supply corridor to the EU. On March 19–21, U.S. President Donald Trump reportedly secured an agreement from Putin on a 30-day “ceasefire regarding energy facilities,” but already on March 21 Ukrainian forces allegedly attacked the Sudzha gas metering station (GIS “Sudzha”). At that time, the Russian Ministry of Defense claimed that the “Kyiv regime” had blown up the station before the withdrawal of “Nazis” from the Kursk region. Russian media emphasized that these attacks threatened not only Russia, but also the EU’s energy sector. Lenta.ru called Sudzha “the largest corridor for Russian gas supplies to Europe.” Russian officials claimed that “Kyiv deceived and sabotaged the agreement to halt strikes on energy infrastructure.” Against the backdrop of the St. Petersburg forum, these reports were aimed at portraying Ukraine as allegedly ready to “sink” the European energy system.

In July 2025, the Kremlin newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta and the state agency RIA Novosti concluded that the “first defeat” over Sudzha should be attributed specifically to Ukraine: “no contract with Gazprom, no Sudzha — everything was destroyed by retreating militants of the Armed Forces of Ukraine.” This corresponded to the broader anti-Ukrainian rhetoric suggesting that “elements of energy infrastructure” could be considered legitimate targets, while the Ukrainian Armed Forces were allegedly waging a “terrorist war” against the civilian population of Europe. Statements by Maria Zakharova (head of the Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson’s office — ed.) on March 22, 2025 directly linked the “strikes on energy facilities” with Kyiv’s “unreliability” and described them as “provocations” against the peace process. TASS quoted her as saying: “the Russian side reserves the right to a symmetrical response if the Kyiv regime continues strikes against energy facilities.” All of these messages were reinforced by alleged “data from the Ministry of Defense” supposedly confirming sabotage — although there is no independent confirmation of these claims.

Forum on protection against drones. At the All-Russian Forum “Protection of Public Facilities from UAV Attacks” (St. Petersburg, October 7–9), the main topic was threats to civilian infrastructure security and methods of countering hostile drones. At the same time, Russian media and speeches by government representatives used this technical event to strengthen the narrative of “Ukrainian terrorism.” For example, propaganda publications quoted calls from State Duma deputies to “declare Ukraine a terrorist state” and to “recognize the Kyiv regime as a terrorist organization.” Analysts in these materials described Ukrainian drone attacks as “terrorist acts” against Russia’s civilian population: “They are striking the civilian population. They are not waging a military conflict, but organizing terrorist acts.” In this way, the anti-UAV forum was portrayed in Russian media as a platform for constructing the image of Ukraine as a “terrorist state,” thereby justifying harsh security measures and military “symmetrical intervention.”

SPIGF Forum (October 7–10). During the 14th St. Petersburg International Gas Forum (SPIGF), Russian propaganda rhetoric focused on alleged Ukrainian strikes against Russia’s energy infrastructure. Official Kremlin representatives actively promoted the narrative of a “gas war.” In particular, Russian Foreign Ministry spokesperson Maria Zakharova accused Western media at the forum of conducting a “coordinated fake-news campaign” about Russia’s alleged use of “gas as a weapon.” At the same time, Putin publicly claimed that the “Kyiv regime, seeking to demonstrate at least some successes, is striking peaceful facilities in the Russian Federation” (referring to the energy sector — ed.). These statements overlapped with the Kremlin’s announced moratorium on strikes against energy infrastructure, as well as official Russian Ministry of Defense reports about attacks on Ukraine’s “gas transportation infrastructure.” During the forum, propaganda narratives were also revived calling for the “recognition of Ukraine as a terrorist state” due to its alleged series of attacks on Russian energy facilities.

Mechanisms for spreading “energy” narratives

Kremlin media constantly refer to promises and agreements that Ukraine allegedly violates in order to amplify the sensationalism of these claims. For example, after Putin’s phone conversation with Trump (March 18, 2025), Zakharova declared that Ukraine had “already violated the U.S.-proposed ceasefire” through “strikes on oil depots and the Sudzha gas metering station.” Seizing upon this story, propagandists retrospectively linked it to the forum, claiming that “Ukraine undermined Europe’s gas security precisely on the eve of an important energy meeting.”

For several consecutive days after each reported episode involving “drone attacks on energy infrastructure,” numerous pro-Kremlin channels disseminated fake news stories. Major state media outlets and Telegram channels promoted nearly identical talking points simultaneously. For example, one day before the “Gas Security Forum,” interviews with Dmitry Medvedev and analytical commentary from the Russian Ministry of Energy were released at the same time, emphasizing the “treacherous strikes by Kyiv” against Russia’s “gas infrastructure.” Similarly, statements by Zakharova, various ministers, and regional governors were circulated in a synchronized manner. These coordinated waves artificially create the impression of “mass support” for Kremlin narratives on the international stage.

The image of Ukraine as a “terrorist state”

Alongside the energy narrative, Moscow has intensified the message that “Ukraine is a sponsor of terror.” Throughout 2025, Russian officials and media repeatedly claimed that attacks on civilian facilities constituted “state terrorism” by Kyiv. On November 18, 2025, Yuliya Zhdanova, acting head of the Russian delegation in Vienna, directly described the “Kyiv regime” as an initiator of “terrorist methods of warfare,” alleging the use of UAVs against civilians, among other accusations.

Even Putin’s foreign allies echoed this rhetoric. On April 3, 2025, following a meeting with Sergey Lavrov, Mali’s Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diop told TASS: “For us, Ukraine is a terrorist state,” additionally alleging that Ukraine supports Islamist groups in the Sahel region.

In practice, this narrative was voiced during public discussions at the forum “Protection of Civilian Facilities from UAV Attacks.” For example, Russian media reported on “roundtable sessions” where Russian military experts emphasized that “the targets of Ukrainian drones are innocent civilians,” and that the actions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine should be classified as “terrorist attacks.” Numerous publications and social media posts stressed that individuals detained in Russia for acts of sabotage had “immediately understood that the orders came from Kyiv’s special services,” and that “through Telegram call centers Kyiv would recruit new ‘apostles of terror’” (fake narratives developed by the occupation-controlled outlet “Donetsk Media” — ed.).

Such statements are made regularly. For example, on October 14, 2025, regional media outlets, including RIA “Novy Den,” reported an alleged airstrike by “Ukrainian FPV drones” against residents of Russia’s Kursk region, in which a woman was killed and a man wounded. This was presented as evidence of the “criminal actions of Kyiv against Russia’s civilian population.” All these reports are intended to create within Russian society the perception of a large-scale Ukrainian “terrorist war.”

Mechanisms for constructing the “terrorist” image

Russian propagandists, attempting to portray Ukraine as a “terrorist country,” often refer to historical events or unrelated foreign conflicts. For example, during one forum, speakers compared “AFU drones” to terrorist attacks carried out by ISIS or even the September 11 attacks, claiming that “the methods of warfare have already become similar to terrorism.” References to alleged Ukrainian support for “terrorism” in Mali (which is fighting jihadist groups) are designed to suggest a broader international threat.

Immediately after incidents such as drone strikes, social media is flooded with dozens of reposts using identical phrases: “drones of the Ukrainian Armed Forces are instruments of terror.” Telegram channels such as “Tsargrad,” “Russkaya Vesna,” “Novorossiya,” and “Officers of Russia” published reports about “large-scale terrorist attacks” in Russia, all based on the same article and repeating the same keywords (“terrorist war,” “a million new fighters,” etc.). This creates the illusion of “at least 20 sources” discussing the same “threat.”

Another example occurred several months earlier, when a proposal was voiced in the Russian State Duma to officially recognize Ukraine as a “terrorist state.” In 2025, several media outlets amplified this idea: during a discussion on Russia’s Channel One, Volodymyr Zelenskyy was referred to as a “leader of terrorists.” Throughout October 2025, this rhetoric was echoed by Kremlin-aligned “allies”: the narrative “Ukraine is a terrorist country” was even promoted by the Turkish publication Aydinlik and African media outlets supportive of Russia. Irish journalist Chay Bowes commented on one of the nighttime Ukrainian drone attacks targeting the Kursk and Moscow regions as well as Moscow itself, stating: “This made no sense from a military point of view, since the victims were intended to be (and unfortunately in some cases were) civilians.” Such a mechanism — where daily informational rumors are reinforced by the “official” voice of a Moscow ally — strengthens the perception of the narrative as “objective truth.”

Risks for Ukraine

Russian narratives are aimed at damaging Ukraine’s relations with its Western partners. Accusations of hostile provocations may be used to justify reducing political support for Ukraine within the EU, based on the argument that “we are assisting a terrorist state.”

These accusations also influence global perceptions of Ukraine — especially in countries that have hesitated to support Ukraine in the war. The label of a “terrorist state” creates the image of a deceitful or criminal regime allegedly willing to commit crimes against civilians. This complicates the work of Ukrainian diplomacy: partners may demand more guarantees and proof of innocence, while opposition politicians in other countries may use such narratives in their own rhetoric. At the same time, the media storm directed against Ukraine diverts international attention away from Russia’s own alleged crimes (violations of WTO norms, chemical attacks, shelling of civilian areas) and may contribute to the emergence or strengthening of critics of Ukraine.

The spread of false claims about “terrorist attacks by Ukrainian saboteurs” also creates operational risks, including additional counterterrorism measures inside Russia and in occupied territories (mass searches, arrests of alleged Ukrainian agents, and the introduction of states of emergency in border regions).

How Ukraine Can Counter These Narratives

Ukrainian authorities, media outlets, and the Center for Strategic Communications and Information Security (CSCIS) must urgently counter the main disinformation narratives. It is necessary to present the real picture — for example, by giving interviews to Ukrainian or Western journalists about the actual condition of Russia’s energy sector (fact-checking by The Insider has already exposed Zakharova’s claims as false). Ukraine should also launch a fact-checking campaign on social media (with the participation of independent experts) aimed at Russian-speaking audiences, reinforcing the narrative that “Russian media are spreading falsehoods about AFU strikes,” supported by concrete examples of debunked fake stories.

It is also necessary to expose the mechanisms used to spread disinformation — for example, demonstrating how fake “call centers” attempt to recruit people, as the Kremlin has done in previous campaigns. Cooperation with cybersecurity specialists and the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) would help identify Telegram bots and networks of fake accounts spreading these narratives.

Domestic Ukrainian media should adhere to strict standards of information verification and avoid unintentionally amplifying propaganda by repeating Kremlin statements without context. Analytical centers and media hubs can prepare professional fact-checking analyses for journalists and bloggers. Informational materials should also be distributed to the public explaining why accusations of “terrorism” are dangerous and how to distinguish fake news from verified information in order to avoid panic.

Through diplomatic channels, Ukraine should communicate to neighboring countries and allies that Russia’s accusations are part of an artificial propaganda campaign. Public reporting on Russian strikes against Ukraine should also be promoted as a counter-response. Ukraine should initiate discussions of these narratives on platforms such as the OSCE and PACE in order to obtain public refutations.

Overall, only systematic coordination between government institutions, civil society, and media organizations will minimize the damage caused by fake narratives. In addition to carefully verifying its own communications, Ukraine must actively inform the world about who is truly the aggressor and who is acting in self-defense. This will reduce the risks of diplomatic isolation and public disorientation that Kremlin propaganda seeks to create.

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