Between Reality and the "Showcase": Russian Information Narratives in Occupied Crimea in 2026

The "Showcase of a New Era" for the Global Community

On February 13 of this year, the print publication of the occupation "government" of the temporarily occupied territory of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, "Krymskaya Gazeta" (eng. — Crimean Newspaper) published an interview with the "representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry in Simferopol," Artyom Berezovsky, on the occasion of the Russian Diplomatic Worker's Day. Back in 2004, during the Orange Revolution, this native of Yevpatoria decided he wanted nothing to do with Ukraine and went to study at the "coveted" Institute of International Relations in Moscow. From there, he returned to his homeland a decade later in the occupiers' baggage train. Now, he is the "connecting link" between the central apparatus of the Russian Foreign Ministry and the occupation "authorities" in the temporarily occupied territory of the ARC, responsible, among other things, for the direction of "people's diplomacy" — the creation and support of the activities of various "national-cultural associations," as well as through sports, science, and cultural figures. Mostly through the latter, the occupiers are trying to preserve the threads connecting them with the Europe they so deeply hate.

Echoing statements about "unfriendly states spending billions on anti-Russian propaganda and specifically on discrediting Crimea," Berezovsky claims that he conveys the "truth" about events in the occupied territories of Ukraine to the international community. He alleges that "Western propaganda seeks to blacken everything and turn it upside down, presenting even the infrastructural and social achievements [of Crimea] over the past 12 years in a negative light" — despite the fact that the residents of the occupied peninsula themselves do not particularly see them. In addition, the collaborator recalled how, before the full-scale war, he drove Western "journalists" (he himself used this word in quotes) around Crimea, who supposedly "arrived with an already prepared task — to find arguments, fitting the content to an existing answer." He claimed they were allegedly not interested in looking at the schools, hospitals, and roads that the occupiers were building "en masse" — it was important to "find some flaws."

Therefore, Berezovsky thought of nothing better than to "shock" foreign guests right after the airport... with a supermarket, where foreign goods were on full shelves — which, of course, "were of lower quality than the Russian ones." Notably, these memories of his were made public against the backdrop of news that a number of products in occupied Crimea cost 20–25% more than in neighboring Russian Krasnodar, and the shelves in the supermarkets of one of the region's largest retail chains abruptly emptied — supposedly due to failures related to the lack of internet and logistical problems. However, at the same time, the occupiers promised to open supermarkets of a "federal level" network on the peninsula — so far only in two cities.

Separately, Berezovsky mentioned the informal Arria-formula meetings of the UN Security Council members, held privately for a frank exchange of views. Within the framework of such meetings, the Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN and the UN Security Council, Vasily Nebenzya, organized "speeches by ordinary Crimeans" — students of the "Fevzi Yakubov Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University," representatives of "national-cultural associations" controlled by the occupiers, etc. In response to remarks by European representatives regarding human rights violations in occupied Crimea and doubts about the sincerity of information obtained during street "interviews with ordinary citizens," Nebenzya came up with nothing smarter than flat jokes about "KGB agents with machine guns in the bushes." A worthy "fight against Western fakes," to be sure.

At the same time, Berezovsky noted the presence of "digital diplomacy" — through which information about occupied Crimea is disseminated in English to a Western audience via various platforms. In this context, the Russian Foreign Ministry has created a separate page on its official website for English-language issues of the "Crimean Journal" publication of the "media holding" of the occupation "government" of the temporarily occupied territory of the ARC, which have been published under the auspices of the occupying state's department since 2017: so far there are not many of them — only seven. It is reported that the project aims to "inform the international audience about the socio-economic and cultural development of the Crimean peninsula," and the magazine's materials cover the life of the region, its historical and cultural heritage, as well as "achievements in various fields in recent years." In addition, it is claimed that the English-language version of the "Crimean Journal" aims to convey "objective" information about Crimea to foreign readers — meaning information that is favorable and necessary for the occupiers.

"On some digital platforms they tried to ban us — there was a whole note from the Ambassador of Ukraine to the US to the State Department demanding to ban our channel on one social network. We made a decision: 90% of the content is the popularization of attractions, the remaining 10% is the political agenda for a foreign audience," says Artyom Berezovsky.

The January 2026 issue of the "Crimean Journal" begins with two articles under expressive titles: "Development: The peninsula as a showcase of a new era" and "Crimea in numbers. Eleven years home: from dream to reality".

● The construction of the Simferopol-Yevpatoria-Mirny highway, which was called "one of the largest transport projects of recent years" and connects Simferopol with Yevpatoria and the village of Mirny. The occupiers did not miss the opportunity to remind that the new road, over 80 kilometers long, cost them more than 48 billion rubles (almost 27 billion hryvnias), and also stated that it "gave a powerful economic boost to western Crimea, providing it with faster transportation of goods and food, as well as easier access to popular resorts";

● The "reconstruction" of the historical center of Alupka and the "construction of new parks." Surprisingly, the "Crimean Journal" forgot to mention that these events took place with the assistance of one of the largest Russian financial institutions, "Sberbank," which entered occupied Crimea three years ago and no longer has any reason to fear Western sanctions. Moreover, the head of "Sberbank," Herman Gref, whom Crimean collaborators declared an "honorary citizen of the Republic of Crimea" at the end of 2025, has his own benefit from the "renovations" in the resort southern zone of the occupied peninsula, where he is actively taking over lands;

● The "Great Crimean Trail" — a tourist route launched in 2023 from the Karalar Nature Park to the Quiet Bay and from the "Voloshin Trail" to the cave cities. At the same time, the occupiers claim that the trail, which "unites over 3,000 natural, cultural, and culinary attractions," has a length of 1,000 kilometers (!) — whereas the length of the entire coastline of occupied Crimea is 2.5 thousand kilometers;

● The construction of the "Yalta Hydrotunnel," to which the occupiers were prompted by the blocking of the Dnipro water supply to Crimea after the establishment of Russian control over it in 2014. The invaders boasted of the illegal construction of a new hydrotunnel under Mount Ai-Petri, parallel to the old one laid in the 1960s: the waterworks, which provides occupied Yalta from the Schastlivoye-2 reservoir with almost 100 thousand cubic meters of water per day, cost the Russian budget almost 9 billion rubles (over 5 billion hryvnias). Another "achievement" of the occupiers is that today completely worn-out water supply networks are being replaced across the peninsula, where losses were "up to 70%" and even more—for which Ukraine is "traditionally" blamed;

● The illegal "restoration" of historical and architectural monuments—the buildings of the Aivazovsky Art Gallery and the Stamboli dacha in Feodosia, as well as the Karaite Kenesa in Simferopol. The first long-term construction project, started in 2021, was completed in 2024. The deadlines for the second, which has dragged on for almost a decade and which the occupiers promised to complete by the end of 2025, have been postponed again — to the beginning of the summer of 2026. As for the long-suffering Karaite prayer house in Simferopol — its "restoration," which had been ongoing since 2017, was completed in 2023, and in less than a year and a half, the "restored" facade of the historical building began to collapse.

The second article, like a number of subsequent ones, was also dedicated to the numerical expressions of Crimea's "achievements" in various fields over more than a decade of occupation. Perhaps the foreign audience can be convinced of the "grandiosity" of their implemented projects on the peninsula — it only remains to explain to the local residents what a wonderful reality they live in... The same applies to the tourist attractions advertised in the issue, including the "museum of Soviet childhood."

Unlike the "internal" propaganda publications, the "external" "Crimean Journal" does not mention Ukraine. Not a word.

"Happy Ukrainians in Russian Crimea"

However, it is still unclear who the occupiers are trying to convince that Ukrainians are currently living well in Crimea. In that Crimea where virtually everything Ukrainian has been systematically cleansed starting from 2014, and where today, not just for performing, but for listening to Ukrainian songs, one can be sent behind bars under a relatively new article of the Russian criminal code on "discrediting the Russian army." There would seem to be no logic in this — yet it is present. It is a crooked and perverted logic, like Russian propaganda in general and through and through. The actions of the Russian authorities and army are aimed at ensuring that there is no Ukraine and no Ukrainians in the space accessible to them. If you are a bearer of Ukrainian identity, that is, you practice and profess anything Ukrainian, you are declared a "Nazi," "fascist," "extremist," or some other "-ist," and you will certainly be punished for it. Because by your actions, you "discredit" the Russian army, which throws all its efforts into making this identity disappear along with all its bearers.

Another cynical statement by collaborators about the "well-being of Ukrainians in Russian Crimea" was heard in the second half of February, during a "working" meeting of the "head of the state committee for interethnic relations of the Republic of Crimea," Ruslan Yakubov, with the head of the "center for supporting Ukrainians of the international public movement 'Other Ukraine'" (rus. "Drugaya Ukraina"), Oleg Bondarenko, who has been particularly actively "highlighted" in the media field of occupied Crimea lately. Incidentally, Yakubov noted the "active" work of the collaborationist "regional national-cultural autonomy of Ukrainians of the Republic of Crimea" with the illegally appropriated name "Ukrainian Community of Crimea": it supposedly "promotes the preservation and development of Ukrainian culture and language" in the temporarily occupied territory of the ARC. Additionally, the occupation "official" issued a statement that today, Ukrainians living in Russia and the territories of Ukraine occupied by it (in his version - "throughout the territory of Russia, including in Crimea") allegedly "can freely speak their native language, develop their culture, traditions, and customs," because "all conditions have been created for this."

It is at least strange to hear such statements in conditions where Ukrainians under occupation are deprived not only of any linguistic, educational, cultural, spiritual, and any other rights, but even of the right to call themselves Ukrainians. However, they can do this under certain conditions — if they renounce Ukrainianness in any manifestations, and wish Ukraine the fate of a "Little Russian federal district."

In this context, the remarks of the aforementioned Permanent Representative of the Russian Federation to the UN and the UN Security Council, Vasily Nebenzya, who during the UN Security Council meeting on February 25, turning to the representatives of Ukraine, stated, do not look strange:

"If formally — I am a Ukrainian, (...) from the Zaporizhzhian Cossacks. My father is a true Ukrainian, and my mother is also from the Cossacks, more genuine than you. But for us there is no difference, we are all one. Millions of Ukrainians are in Russia, millions of Russians are in Ukraine and Belarus. You yourselves know this very well. That's not the point. Our nationality is shared, but our faiths are different. From Kievan Rus, which you sold for 30 pieces of silver. Back then we had a common fatherland — and what have you turned your current one into? Almost no one understands this and cannot understand it. Back then we fought together against the Nazis, and now we are fighting alone — without you, without those who were turned into Nazis, for the people of Ukraine, so they wouldn't become the same. I am not happy that people are dying, but if necessary — this will last as long as it takes so that you no longer zombify these people."

Nebenzya's latest passages strangely echo the recent public statements of the Crimean "political scientist" Andrey Nikiforov that Ukrainians "have to be killed to be preserved," as well as the dreams of the "head of the Ukrainian community of Crimea" and "chairwoman of the committee of the state council of the republic of Crimea on people's diplomacy and interregional relations" Anastasiya Gridchina to "arrive in Kyiv on a tank together with the victorious Russian army." Overall, in the statements of the Kremlin "diplomat," who was the fifth child in the family of the Soviet party functionary from the Volgograd region of the Russian Federation, Alexey Nebenzya, what is surprising is not even his "Ukrainian coming out," but the fact that in his speech he did not disdain the phrase "Kievan Rus," which modern Russian propaganda rejects, speaking instead of an "ancient Russian state," of which the current Putin's Russia is supposedly the successor.

It is exactly such "true Ukrainians," in the mold of Vasily Nebenzya and his ilk, that the occupation regime would like to see in the subjugated territories of Ukraine, including in Crimea, where propagandists are trying to create a blasphemous picture of the "happy life of Ukrainians." Last autumn in Yalta, the fifth "international round table" titled "Development of ties of the Ukrainians of Crimea with compatriots abroad" was held, during which cynical statements were made that the Ukrainian culture, language, and customs in the region "are preserved as part of the shared historical and spiritual heritage of the multinational people of Russia," and local Ukrainians "can freely speak their native language, develop their culture, traditions, and customs," since "all conditions have been created for this" (almost a carbon copy of collaborator Ruslan Yakubov's "working template").

In the context of "conditions for Ukrainians," recently, media outlets in Crimea controlled by the occupiers suddenly decided to remember the Ukrainian poetess Lesya Ukrainka — on February 25, for her birthday. Articles from a few years ago were circulated (apparently, they were too lazy not only to create something new but even to change the old) — stating that although the Ukrainian language in occupied Crimea "is practically not used in official communication, but is one of the state languages of the republic," and overall in the region "after the long-awaited reunification with Russia, much remains from the Ukraine of a 'healthy person'." It turned out that in resort Yalta, streets and schools are named after Ukrainian writers (from Soviet or pre-occupation times; after the occupation, the only Ukrainian school in the city was stripped of the name of the classic of Ukrainian literature Stepan Rudansky, who is buried in Yalta), and memorial museums function at the expense of the occupying state — and no one is going to close these museums or demolish Ukrainian monuments, unlike in Ukraine, where a "genocide of the Russian-speaking population" has been taking place for over a decade.

And in general, it turns out, on the occupied peninsula both the Ukrainian language and the memory of prominent Ukrainians are treated "with respect uncharacteristic of modern Western civilization." They say, even the museum of that Lesya Ukrainka of theirs is in "Russian" Crimea (created in Soviet times, through the incredible efforts of local Ukrainian activists), which modern Ukraine "did not finish off," and Russia "saved." It was saved by the fact that when the ceiling collapsed on the second floor of the historical building in 2016, the permanent exhibition was closed "to ensure the safety of visitors," and the exhibits were handed over to the funds, from where they are "regularly" taken for periodic exhibitions on the first floor.

However, this same information was circulating in the Crimean segment of the internet back in 2023. By the end of summer 2024, it became known that the Lesya Ukrainka Museum in occupied Yalta had effectively ceased to exist.

Yet, as practice shows, the occupiers cease the activities of even those "Ukrainian" projects that they themselves launched. News appears less and less frequently on the website "Pereyaslavska Rada 2.0," affiliated with the collaborationist "Ukrainian community of Crimea," and the last issue of the Ukrainian-language propaganda magazine "Krym Syohodni" (Crimea Today), which never even became a full-fledged quarterly, is dated autumn 2024; since 2020, a total of 12 issues were published. The decrease in the activity of these publications is associated with the "promotion" of their "editor" Anastasiya Gridchina to "deputy of the state council of the republic of Crimea."

If not replacing the "Ukrainian community of Crimea" created by the occupiers, then at least operating parallel to it, is the aforementioned "center for supporting Ukrainians of the international public movement 'Other Ukraine'." This organization allegedly provides comprehensive support to internally displaced persons moving to Crimea from the mainland occupied territories of Ukraine, and also "makes a significant contribution to countering provocative plants and fakes, informing the world community about the real events taking place in Ukraine, and about persecutions on the territory of Ukraine based on national and religious grounds."

Exactly what the activities of this center consist of is difficult to evaluate, as is the number of the aforementioned "refugees from the Kyiv regime," who every day allegedly do nothing but "honor the memory of the heroes" of Putin's war against Ukraine and "integrate into Russian society" by the thousands.

However, the nominal head of the "center," Oleg Bondarenko, has recently been frequently introduced into the media field of occupied Crimea with various absurd statements. Thus, for example, he recently publicly "made a discovery" that "the Zelensky regime, which seized power in Kyiv, is afraid to give the 23rd of February," because this day, which in Russia is celebrated as the Defender of the Fatherland Day, "symbolizes the unity and invincibility of the Russian army and people," and is also "especially relevant for the people who went through the great patriotic war."

In occupied Crimea, according to Bondarenko, February 23 is a "double holiday," because on this day in 2014 began the formation of the paramilitary separatist "people's militia," which "ensured order and security during the referendum that culminated in the reunification of the peninsula with Russia." In addition, this character broadcasts statements that residents of Crimea and local IDPs from the mainland territories of Ukraine "only with the reunification of Crimea with Russia gained human living conditions, unlike the citizens of Ukraine, who are exposed to the crimes of the Kyiv regime."

"Return of Russian Lands": Waiting for a New Khmelnytsky

"True Ukrainians" like Anastasiya Gridchina, Oleg Bondarenko, and their ilk, who only dream of the destruction and absorption of Ukraine by Russia, and for whom national heroes must be figures like Bohdan Khmelnytsky — whose main merit lies in "uniting Little Russia with Great Russia." This is how the ideological-selection product of the occupying state in the territories it has seized is envisioned.

On January 16, a "traditional" propaganda show dedicated to the anniversary of the Pereyaslav Council was held in occupied Simferopol near the monument to Khmelnytsky, with the participation of regional "political and public figures." During the event, many statements were made about the occupation of Ukrainian territory as the "reunification of Russian lands and their return to the fatherland" within the framework of building an "Orthodox great Russian empire," "restoring historical justice," and the "victory of the 'Russian world' over Russia's enemies." Recently, on February 26, one of the participants of this event, Vladimir Rezanov, who participated in the events of the Russian occupation of Crimea in 2014 and currently positions himself as a member of the public chamber of the Russian Federation and deputy head of the "public chamber of the republic of Crimea" and the "Russian community of Crimea," made public statements identical to those at the celebrations. He called occupied Crimea the "spiritual and moral primary foundation for the return of Russian lands," and expressed conviction that Ukraine "has always been and will be an alien body" to him.

Crimean propaganda also seeks its target audience among the "gatherers of Russian land" — military personnel of the occupation army involved in combat operations against Ukraine. Every week, the print publication of the occupation "government" of the temporarily occupied territory of the ARC, "Krymskaya Gazeta," puts out a special thematic issue — which is a mix of Soviet-era agitation publications, tabloid press, and provincial magazines. The "colossal" losses of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, the innumerable "successes" of Russia at the front and in various sectors of rear-echelon life, the "victorious" reports of various politicians and court experts, blasphemous cartoons, greasy jokes (sometimes blatantly racist and sexist) — all this is presented on the pages of the "special issue for the heroes of the special operation." Ukraine is the "Pig-Reich," its government is the "Kyiv regime of empty-headed farmstead figures," the president is a "petty narco-fuhrer," the military are "Ukro-Nazis," and the population are simply "Banderite degenerates." And Russian officials and soldiers, of course, are chivalry on white horses, all as one, genuinely striving to liberate the "Little Russians and Novorossians" from this outrage. And at the same time — the "shrine of the Russian people," the Kyiv-Pechersk Lavra, which "neo-Nazis mocked with signs in the Ukrainian language."

"Russian Jews of Crimea": Playing the Ethnic Card

It would seem everything is clear with the Ukrainians in Crimea: either they should not exist, or they will be allowed to call themselves Ukrainians only if they are Russians who desire the destruction of Ukraine and support the Russian war against it. However, the occupiers have recently actively begun to play the "Jewish card" in the temporarily occupied region — for reasons understood only by them.

For example, it recently became known that the historical building of the Talmud Torah school, built in 1913–1915, which later housed the rectorate of the Taurida University, was transferred into the ownership of the Jewish community of Simferopol.

The building also has a tragic history: during the occupation of Crimea by Nazi German troops, it was an assembly point for Jews, Krymchaks, and Roma, who were subsequently executed by the Hitlerites. During the years of Ukraine's independence, the building housed the Faculty of Physical Education of the V.I. Vernadsky Taurida National University. After the Russian occupation of Crimea, the local Jewish community repeatedly raised the issue of its restitution, which has finally been satisfied. It did not go without the "chief of interethnic relations" Ruslan Yakubov, with his "traditional" remark that such steps are possible only in "Russian" Crimea.

The transfer of the historical building of the Jewish school to the Jewish community of Simferopol coincided with the latest statements by the "chief rabbi of Sevastopol," Binyamin Wolff, who in August 2018 publicly thanked Russian dictator Putin for the citizenship of the occupying state. Israeli-born Rabbi Wolff has been taking care of Sevastopol's followers of Chabad Hasidism since 2004; after the Russian occupation in 2014, he not only stayed in place but also called on Jews of the world to move to the occupied peninsula because "together with Russia, security for Jews came to Crimea." He repeated these calls in 2025, persuading that it would be even better for Jews on the occupied peninsula than in the EU countries. Notably, shortly after these statements, Rabbi Wolff celebrated the wedding of his son to the daughter of the rabbi of the Austrian capital in Vienna.

On February 24, the propaganda media outlet "RIA Novosti Krym" published a lengthy interview with Binyamin Wolff. Noting that 3,600 families of Orthodox Jews currently live in occupied Sevastopol, he stated that before the Russian occupation, the city "had persecutions, there were many anti-Jewish sentiments; there were constant pickets at the site of the synagogue's construction — they brought pig heads and tried to burn it." Wolff recounted all this in March 2019 in occupied Simferopol to Russian dictator Putin during his meeting with "representatives of the public." However, both then and now, he "forgot" to specify that some of the main drivers of anti-Semitic processes in Sevastopol were local pro-Russian communities, about whom Wolff himself stated in 2013, shortly before the occupation, that "these are exactly the same fascists who used to slaughter Jews; Sevastopol, which fought against the fascists, does not need them."

Mentioning his brother Avraham Wolff, who is the Chief Rabbi of Odesa and southern Ukraine, Binyamin Wolff noted that "they love each other very much and try not to talk about politics."

"It is very difficult for people there, anti-Semitism remains: even if they write something positive about Jews in the media, the comments are terrible, and this has been going on for a long time," said the Sevastopol rabbi.

Of course, it would be pointless to deny the presence of people with anti-Semitic views in Ukraine (as in many countries of the world). However, the Rabbi of Odesa, Avraham Wolff himself, in an interview with a Voice of America correspondent at the end of May 2024, called any accusations against Ukraine of Nazism, fascism, and anti-Semitism "absolutely senseless."

"In reality, Ukraine is the best place for Jews, where they can live freely and do whatever they want: open schools, synagogues, community centers, etc. As absurd as Putin's propaganda is, it's not funny, because we all suffer equally from Russia's attacks," said Wolff, who incidentally noted that he has no problems because he has not yet learned the Ukrainian language.

The Sevastopol Rabbi Binyamin Wolff, meanwhile, is now boasting that his personal driver has been to the war against Ukraine twice, as part of artillery units. He himself, in 2022, took 200 members of the local Jewish community out of besieged Mariupol to the occupied Crimea.

"Everything happened by accident. We were looking for insulin for the residents of Kherson then, the community asked. It was nowhere to be found. The 'governor of Sevastopol' helped us; they brought three whole boxes from him, which went to Kherson that same night. When I was looking for insulin, I asked for help from the community of Syrian Jews who are in Israel. They told me that there is one family near Mariupol, and if I evacuate them — there will be funds for any insulin. They are a very rich community, but nothing worked for them — neither through Ukraine, nor through the UN, no way. I hired a car, and in five hours the family was taken out. And I learned about the dire situation of the Mariupol community. There are children, old people, wounded, but people don't know how to leave — there's no gas, the cars are smashed. We found people ready to help us, bought high-clearance vehicles, rented a base in the village of Yalta near Mariupol. We transported people in batches from Mariupol to the base, from there to Berdyansk, from Berdyansk to Crimea. We didn't keep them here. Some went to Moscow, some stayed, some went to relatives in Russia, we sent two planes to Israel," Wolff recounted about those events.

Among other things, the Sevastopol rabbi said that among the population of the occupied city there are those who turn to him for help with converting to Judaism:

"I know that many of them think that if they approach from this angle, they will be able to easily leave for Israel."

"The Illegal Transfer of Crimea," or "We Can Cancel It"

In addition to media personnel controlled by the occupiers, some of the main producers of trash content in occupied Crimea are also representatives of the local "authorities," in particular in the temporarily occupied territory of the ARC. First and foremost, this concerns the most prominent collaborators — the "head of the republic of Crimea" Sergey Aksyonov and the "chairman of the state council of the republic of Crimea" Vladimir Konstantinov. Their regular statements regarding Ukraine, its people, language, history, culture, and identity in general, in most cases, deserve not only separate study but also a legal assessment — in addition to the rest of their crimes against the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and security of Ukraine.

One of the most notable current examples of the "oral creativity" of the mentioned individuals was a recent interview given by Konstantinov to the Crimean collaborator-media person Alexander Mashchenko, who is a correspondent for the publication of the Russian Federal Assembly "Parlamentskaya Gazeta" (eng. — Parliamentary Newspaper). The main topic of the conversation was the transfer in 1954 of the Crimean peninsula, which at that time had the status of an oblast, from the Russian SFSR to the Ukrainian SSR within the territory controlled by the Soviet regime at the time. Notably, the Crimean "speaker," who undertook to comment on these events, was born almost three years after they occurred.

As for Alexander Mashchenko, who held an openly anti-Ukrainian position before the Russian occupation of Crimea, after 2014 he willingly became a mouthpiece for Russian propaganda in the region. For this, among other things, in November 2025, he was awarded the title of laureate of the VI All-Russian Public Award "Pride of the Nation" as the "director of the institute of media communications, media technologies, and design of the Crimean Federal University." A few months prior to this, at the beginning of summer, Mashchenko publicly stated that the Ukrainian language in Crimea after the Russian occupation "disappeared somewhere," because it is supposedly "inorganic" to the peninsula. At the same time, he complained about how he was "forced" to maintain documentation and format scientific papers in the state language.

Soon after, the collaborator published a report in the Russian "Parlamentskaya Gazeta" about the 28th holding of the chauvinistic festival "Great Russian Word" (rus. Velikoye Russkoye Slovo) in occupied Crimea. Among other things, he stated that the festival, which was held on the peninsula even before its Russian occupation, "became an act of spiritual resistance to the policy of forced Ukrainization of the peninsula and other regions," and that supposedly the "language" policy of official Kyiv "became one of the catalysts for the collapse of Ukraine due to the persistent refusal to take into account the linguistic and cultural diversity of the regions." Quite expectedly, he called the occupation of Crimea "reunification with Russia" and "the result of the struggle of Crimeans for the right to speak and think in their native language and the strongest socio-political charge of resistance to Ukrainization."

This time, Konstantinov and Mashchenko decided to discuss the decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR issued on February 19, 1954, "On the transfer of the Crimean region from the RSFSR to the Ukrainian SSR." If from the perspective of that time, this decision did not seem special to the collaborators given the "conditional nature of the borders between Soviet republics," today they see it as having "had, without exaggeration, grandiose historical consequences." In addition, Mashchenko, repeating the myths of Russian propaganda, lamented that the decision to transfer Crimea to Ukraine was allegedly made "in commemoration of the 300th anniversary of the reunification of Ukraine with Russia" and was supposed to be "evidence of the unbreakable fraternal friendship between two close peoples," but ultimately "led to the exact opposite results."

In the mentioned interview, the Crimean "speaker" Konstantinov — a builder by profession, whose competence in jurisprudence is quite dubious — tries to convince the target audience that all the theories attempting to "justify" the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine "are not confirmed by historical facts." In his opinion, the procedure for transferring the region was "simplified" by the then First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, making it "improvisational and absolutely illegal." Despite the fact that Khrushchev's signature is absent from any of the main documents on the transfer of Crimea, Konstantinov, echoing Russian propaganda, accuses him of a "completely chaotic and illegal act," stating that both Khrushchev himself and his behavior "were often very chaotic," and there was "often no logic whatsoever" in his actions.

In addition, Konstantinov asserts: the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine in one fell swoop violated both the general constitution of the Soviet Union and the puppet "constitutions" of the Russian Soviet Republic and subjugated Ukraine, which also had the status of a "Soviet Socialist Republic." Moreover, the "speaker" of the occupation Crimean "government" referred to the fact that Ukraine, colonized by the Soviet regime, was part of the UN and thus supposedly had "international legitimization within certain borders" (!), and therefore supposedly had no right to absorb the Crimean peninsula, which "de jure never left Russia." Even more so, he said, no referendum was even held on this matter — just as they were not held regarding the changes of borders of other republics of the Soviet Union, of which there were over 200 in total. However, the Moldova-born Konstantinov insists: everyone who lived in Crimea since 1954, young and old, and especially the participants of World War II, were "offended" by the decision to transfer it to Ukraine, and this "offense" was "passed from generation to generation and only intensified with Ukraine gaining independence." In addition, according to the collaborator, Crimea "never grew attached to Ukraine, did not become native," because "they in Kyiv always considered it alien and did not understand Crimeans, and Crimeans did not understand them." Therefore, Konstantinov, based on his own subjectivism, considers Crimea's presence as part of Ukraine "unnatural."

Furthermore, the "speaker" of the Crimean "parliament" stated that he once had the opportunity to talk with the first president of independent Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk. He claims Kravchuk told him that during the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent declaration of Ukraine's independence, the then Ukrainian leadership "was ready to give up Crimea, and not only to build its movement into Europe." Of course, Kravchuk, who died shortly after the start of Russia's full-scale war against Ukraine, will no longer be able to either confirm or deny these words — nor respond to the fact that Konstantinov called him, a native of the Rivne region which at the time of his birth was controlled by Poland, a "Western Ukrainian nationalist-Banderite." Moreover, in his time, Kravchuk, who was a party functionary, had to his credit measures to "combat manifestations of Ukrainian nationalism."

Actually, it is precisely in the latter that Konstantinov sees the problem — in the activity and organization of Ukrainian nationalists, whom the "speaker" considers a "small group that does not have the broad support of the entire Ukrainian people, but is very well motivated" and traces its history from the "traitor-Banderites who bloodied their hands during the [Second World] War." In the collaborator's opinion, "it was very difficult" to oppose them in Ukraine, which he views as a "bilingual country, split into two ethnocultural communities." Moreover, Konstantinov is convinced that it is Russia that must "seriously deal" with the Ukrainian nationalists — Russia, which, with the help of its Black Sea Fleet, as well as the "Russian-speaking population," can force them "to return all her gifts, everything that used to be 'Novorossiya,' and let the rest go to Europe." While, according to the Crimean "politician," previously such a result could have been "achieved by simple agreements," now Russia is "fighting its way towards it," waging a full-scale war against Ukraine.

There is nothing surprising in the convictions of a pro-Russian collaborator that Russia supposedly once "gifted" Ukrainians the land on which they had lived since time immemorial. However, his reasoning looks somewhat strange when he says that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia "was building a pro-European position" (!) — the very Russia that consistently engaged in suppressing national liberation movements on the territory it controlled and fanning the flames of separatism beyond its borders. And, supposedly, exactly against the backdrop of such a "pro-European course" of Russia, "nationalist forces strengthened" in Ukraine (which is not surprising), as a result of which the country defined its civilizational choice, and its sharp break with Russia was predetermined — especially when "Putin finally came to power there and started building an independent course." In this regard, the point of no return for Konstantinov is the events of the Orange Revolution: he claims they lived in one country, spoke Russian, recognized the elected president Leonid Kuchma — "a Soviet leader who did not support nationalism, which was always latently present in Ukraine even in Soviet times" — and then "unexpectedly the first Maidan came down and frightened everyone, a well-organized mass protest aimed at seizing power." It would be naive to believe that Konstantinov is deliberately silent about the true reasons for the events of that time and the aspirations of their participants. However, he is consistent in one thing — that he and his associates "do not accept the model of Ukraine that the organizers of the Maidan imposed." And, he says, since then, anxiety never left him — until Putin "returned Crimea" in 2014.

"I understood that Ukraine was heading for a disaster. Crimea could avoid it only by restoring historical justice, trampled by the decision of 1954," said the collaborator, who currently, in unison with Kremlin propaganda, actively promotes the topic of the "illegality of the transfer of Crimea to Ukraine" in the middle of the last century.

Summary. The examined examples of Russian information narratives regarding occupied Crimea at the beginning of 2026 testify to their systemic, multi-level nature, and close connection with the broader strategy of hybrid aggression against Ukraine. Propaganda constructs broadcast through controlled media, collaborationist structures, and official representatives of the occupying state are designed not only to justify the illegal annexation of the peninsula but also to form an ideologically driven picture in which Ukraine is positioned as an "artificial hostile entity," and the occupation of its territories as "historical justice."

The analysis shows that Russian propaganda uses several key narrative lines—revision of the past, "protection from external enemies," as well as the construction of a myth about the "shared civilizational identity" of the residents of the occupied territories with Russia. An important element of this policy is the creation of a parallel information reality, where systemic repressions, the pushing out of Ukrainian identity, and human rights violations are either denied or masked under declarations of "interethnic harmony" and "development."

At the same time, Russian information strategies have a dual nature. For the domestic audience in Russia and the territories of Ukraine it occupies, radicalized rhetoric dominates, featuring elements of dehumanization of bearers of Ukrainian identity and overt justification of violence against them. In contrast, for the international community, an image of a "successful" and "stable" Crimea is created, which allegedly demonstrates socio-economic development and respect for cultural diversity. Such "showcase" communication is intended to weaken international support for Ukraine and gradually normalize the perception of the Russian occupation of its territories.

Thus, the information space of temporarily occupied Crimea continues to remain an important tool of Russian policy, where propaganda serves not only to accompany military aggression against Ukraine but also acts as a long-term tool for transforming the identity of the local population, further swaying them toward political loyalty. Understanding the logic, mechanisms, and key plots of these narratives is a necessary prerequisite for effectively countering Russian disinformation and protecting Ukraine's information sovereignty.

Vitaliy SOLONCHAK

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The publication was prepared with the financial support of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Its content is the sole responsibility of the author and does not necessarily reflect the position of the German Marshall Fund.